This is my issue with your use of word "cause". To me it insinuated culpability by NATO and the lack of agency from Russia.

So would you agree that the cause of invasion is not necessary Ukraine sought to join NATO, but Russia simply decided to invade, and this could be avoided if they decided to not invade.

I wish to clarify that I am not talking about blame or morality, but simply to address the underlying implication that one that caused it ought to be the one to make concessions to fix it, and by removing agency from Russia and placing cause on NATO, you essentially suggests that NATO ought to be the party that ought to make concessions, and my post should've be abundantly clear that I don't agree with that position.

I think causation is not a binary, and tried to mitigate thinking along those lines by saying "factor in causing to happen" not just "causing", but admittedly I didn't make that aspect fully clear. I meant "influenced a chain of events" not "is the absolute most significant factor in the chain of events". I think NATO's actions were a hugely significant factor though, because it's the factor that we control! As I said, we don't control or have responsibility for the actions of the Russian government, so in our decision-making process, we must take those largely as a given. I support the various stop-the-war movements that were making this all plain -- an invasion would be evil, and it would be evil for us to knowingly fail to take reasonable actions to avoid invasion, and likewise for us to knowingly pour fuel on the kindling of war.

> So would you agree that the cause of invasion is not necessary Ukraine sought to join NATO, but Russia simply decided to invade, and this could be avoided if they decided to not invade.

I'd quibble with the negation of causation for NATO's actions and the use of "simply", but, if I understand the final clause correctly, then yes I ultimately agree, there was absolutely a reasonable chain of events under our control that would have lead to there being no invasion, but also, there absolutely exists a plausible Russian government that would not have invaded. But we don't live in a world with such a government, and we have no control over that fact.

I don't disagree with the premise that "we ought to avoid war if we can", but pacifism and appeasement to an actor not acting rationally or in good faith is not fruitful, historically speaking.

My question to you is, where do you draw the line between "I am willing to make such a concession to avoid a war" and "then let there be war"?

I am clearly more hawkish but I am curious to where you stand.

I don't think there's a need to create much in the way of hypotheticals, because there is nothing in the 13 clauses of Minsk 2, even extrapolating out to the most concessionary outcomes of the clauses that are effectively TODOs, that is a concession "too far" that would justify war -- even IR so-called "realists" don't see the strategic logic. You can find a reasonable summary of the clauses of the Minsk agreements here: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-minsk-agreemen...

The faults for the failure of Minsk 2 lie with both Russia and Ukraine, and NATO for effectively incentivizing the Ukrainian government to fail to implement key clauses, and for publicly signaling and pushing for continued talk of NATO membership, which effectively shuts down meaningful action on clause 13.

And note that I am in no way a pacifist. I have no problem with NATO article 5 (up to a point -- I don't want any conflict to go to nuclear war, of course).

Final note: this type of conversion comes up very frequently when anti-war arguments are made. Someone asks "is there nothing you would go to war to defend?", when, regarding the issue under discussion, there are usually relatively clear and reasonable terms already on the table that are totally absent from the public discussion. It's nobody's fault but that of our politicians and media that the discussion is so hollow and bombastic at the same time, but it is frustrating.

By that point Crimea has already been annexed so I cannot exactly fault Ukraine for trying to join a defensive alliance instead of trying to re-kindle the relationship with the invader.

To me, that ship sailed a while ago.

The chain of causation for Crimea annexation was very similar to the one for the current invasion. Just being practical, doing more of the thing that has led to two invasions is not going to end, shorten, or curtail the current one -- we don't like the logic, but as I said, this has been the official Russian government stance for about 15 years, and the cost of going against that stance has been very high and the cost of accepting it would be very low. And I see no practical way for Crimea to ever return to Ukraine, no matter what. I know territorial integrity is a thing countries hold very dear, for a lot of good reasons, but Crimea is as much an artifact of the breakup of the Soviet Union as anything to do with NATO expansion. That is truly a lost cause at this point.

> The chain of causation for Crimea annexation was very similar to the one for the current invasion.

Yes, Putin’s desire for territorial aggrandizement for both image and resources reasons.

> Just being practical, doing more of the thing that has led to two invasions

Having land that the national mythology Putin appeals to views as Russian and/or has economically and strategically useful resources and features is all anyone else has done which has led to the invasions (and it's more than two; as Georgia bears witness to.)

Can't really insist people stop doing that.

> this has been the official Russian government stance for about 15 years

You are confusing pretext with causation (and also ignoring much of the public pretext, like the claims of WMD programs.)

I am ignoring much of the pretext. Much like the Iraq War, I'm trying to focus on the real ideology and material factors driving the decisions, not the rationalizations designed for the public and the salons. Obviously this is not an exact process and there is no way to verify, so here we are.

Given there's a clear historical parallel (not identical, but appropriate enough) with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Monroe doctrine, I don't think it's rational to ignore the NATO "encirclement" argument as pretext. Look through the Wikileaks cables for all the talk of particular "neuralgia" over Ukraine entering NATO, and even talk of Crimea, all the way back in 2008.

One reason I'm so unconvinced this is pure pretext, is that I think it's highly unlikely that the same few people (Lavrov, Putin, etc.) would be making these specific claims and complaints in advance, just to be used a decade and a half later as pretext.

Another is that there are numerous high ranking people in the US foreign policy establishment, both in actual positions of power and attached to semi-official think-tanks, etc., that have agreed with their argument or at the very least identified it as sincere on the part of the Russian government.

As for me saying two wars, I was speaking about Ukraine only (depends on how you count, but I was counting Crimea, and the current invasion, though you could add another for the "breakaway" regions where Russian forces have been involved for years now). I'm aware of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I think you and I might have already discussed those regions on HN in the past.

> Given there's a clear historical parallel (not identical, but appropriate enough) with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Monroe doctrine, I don't think it's rational to ignore the NATO "encirclement" argument as pretext

Given that there is much more recent precedent (e.g., Iraq 2003, including the preceding advocacy by groups like PNAC from which key Bush policy officials were selected) that actually fits the chain of events much better, I don't think it's rational to ignore “false and exaggerated claims of geopolitical threat, ideological terrorism, and WMD as a pretext for a war for economic gain and imperialism from people who don't even bother to not keep saying the imperialist parts out loud”, either.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you about Iraq 2003, and I'm not saying that claims like that are always true or always false (I think it's obvious that it only makes sense to assess such claims in context). All Putin's talk of "de-nazification" as a war aim, of WMD, and a whole host of other stuff is total pretextual fiction, and absolutely makes it harder to negotiate any kind of end to the war now, because pretext has a zombie-like ability to live on and prevent peace, even if there is agreement to resolve the real causes.

But this war was a serious possibility even without those pretexts. Russia was incredibly weak, militarily and economically (both are closely linked) at the time of previous NATO expansions that mattered to Russia (1999, 2004). It's not strong now. Ukraine may be a worse quagmire than the SU in Afghanistan. But it does now seem to be able to stretch itself and probably win the immediate war against the Ukrainian military proper. They have complained about NATO expansion for 15 years, and finally have the capability to do what all great powers do: force their will through unjust means, and call it just.

The sooner there is some agreement to resolve the real causes, the less impact the pretextual bullshit will have in preventing that peace. And as I said before, if I'm wrong, possibly WW3 will just be delayed slightly, but Russia is still not strong enough to do what everyone is implying with their WW2 references, so I don't see it happening.

I should have said, they have complained about NATO expansion since the fall of the USSR (and obviously before, but that's irrelevant), when NATO gave Gorbachev assurances that NATO would not expand "one inch eastward" after German reunification. They've been very vocally critical of NATO expansion into Ukraine for 15 years (and probably longer), and the West has known that Ukraine was specifically significant for 15 years (and probably longer).

I mean this as a genuine question, but is your comment just to say that I was technically wrong to say I have “exactly zero” influence over Russian government policy, given unlikely butterfly effects exist?

Would you dispute that I have a tiny influence on all government policy, but I have orders of magnitude less over Russia compared to the US where I live? I covered responsibility also: do you agree that I am not responsible for Russian government actions (here I think exactly zero would be correct) but I have some responsibility for NATO actions, which are notionally done for my benefit?

I liked your comment and didn't mean to come across overly critical. But one of the scenarios I hear discussed in the media I consume is for this crisis to be resolved through internal changes in Russia, and that de-escalation through western actions is unlikely. I don't know enough to know how realistic that is. But in that case support for Russians could be more valuable than our voting power toward NATO.

There is a path to a peace agreement. Obviously these wouldn't be unilateral actions, but offerings or part of a final agreement with concessions on all sides:

- no NATO membership for Ukraine (it has already been invaded, there is no loss in taking this position now, and much to gain even if it leads to Russian withdrawal)

- some wider security agreement for the region -- if this means no more events like the NATO bombing of Serbia without UN authorization, that is perfectly acceptable

- repeal of discriminatory language laws, etc., and implement some meaningful degree regional autonomy for eastern parts of Ukraine (and western if they want it), basically Minsk 2 clause 4; or some internationally observed (so not like Crimea) referenda in those regions

- relax and withdraw most/all sanctions, but absolutely those on the central bank and SWIFT (though Russia will obviously and rationally accelerate economic links outside of Western control, as will many other countries)

I think a crucial condition should be no imposed change of government in Ukraine (so like what Russia wants in its military intervention in Syria, and not what the US wanted in military interventions in Libya, Iraq, and wants in Syria, etc.)

As for supporting Russians, I totally agree. One of the problems with the sanctions is that they are going to hurt ordinary Russian people, and are just as likely to strengthen the authorities as much as "encourage" ordinary Russians to change their government ("encourage" through collective punishment). The long legacy of Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, etc., shows that this tactic far more often just hurts and even kills ordinary people rather than anything else.

There are many news pundits and analysts with prominent positions and exposure in print and television news in the US, who say things like, "There are no neutral Russian citizens now, they are all responsible for the invasion now" (this is paraphrasing, but not an exaggeration), at least on their personal twitter feeds. Unfortunately, I think most of the focus on "internal changes" is focused on severe collective punishment of ordinary people, rather than anything else, and so I find most of it counter-productive and cruel.