I don't think there's a need to create much in the way of hypotheticals, because there is nothing in the 13 clauses of Minsk 2, even extrapolating out to the most concessionary outcomes of the clauses that are effectively TODOs, that is a concession "too far" that would justify war -- even IR so-called "realists" don't see the strategic logic. You can find a reasonable summary of the clauses of the Minsk agreements here: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-minsk-agreemen...

The faults for the failure of Minsk 2 lie with both Russia and Ukraine, and NATO for effectively incentivizing the Ukrainian government to fail to implement key clauses, and for publicly signaling and pushing for continued talk of NATO membership, which effectively shuts down meaningful action on clause 13.

And note that I am in no way a pacifist. I have no problem with NATO article 5 (up to a point -- I don't want any conflict to go to nuclear war, of course).

Final note: this type of conversion comes up very frequently when anti-war arguments are made. Someone asks "is there nothing you would go to war to defend?", when, regarding the issue under discussion, there are usually relatively clear and reasonable terms already on the table that are totally absent from the public discussion. It's nobody's fault but that of our politicians and media that the discussion is so hollow and bombastic at the same time, but it is frustrating.

By that point Crimea has already been annexed so I cannot exactly fault Ukraine for trying to join a defensive alliance instead of trying to re-kindle the relationship with the invader.

To me, that ship sailed a while ago.

The chain of causation for Crimea annexation was very similar to the one for the current invasion. Just being practical, doing more of the thing that has led to two invasions is not going to end, shorten, or curtail the current one -- we don't like the logic, but as I said, this has been the official Russian government stance for about 15 years, and the cost of going against that stance has been very high and the cost of accepting it would be very low. And I see no practical way for Crimea to ever return to Ukraine, no matter what. I know territorial integrity is a thing countries hold very dear, for a lot of good reasons, but Crimea is as much an artifact of the breakup of the Soviet Union as anything to do with NATO expansion. That is truly a lost cause at this point.

> The chain of causation for Crimea annexation was very similar to the one for the current invasion.

Yes, Putin’s desire for territorial aggrandizement for both image and resources reasons.

> Just being practical, doing more of the thing that has led to two invasions

Having land that the national mythology Putin appeals to views as Russian and/or has economically and strategically useful resources and features is all anyone else has done which has led to the invasions (and it's more than two; as Georgia bears witness to.)

Can't really insist people stop doing that.

> this has been the official Russian government stance for about 15 years

You are confusing pretext with causation (and also ignoring much of the public pretext, like the claims of WMD programs.)

I am ignoring much of the pretext. Much like the Iraq War, I'm trying to focus on the real ideology and material factors driving the decisions, not the rationalizations designed for the public and the salons. Obviously this is not an exact process and there is no way to verify, so here we are.

Given there's a clear historical parallel (not identical, but appropriate enough) with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Monroe doctrine, I don't think it's rational to ignore the NATO "encirclement" argument as pretext. Look through the Wikileaks cables for all the talk of particular "neuralgia" over Ukraine entering NATO, and even talk of Crimea, all the way back in 2008.

One reason I'm so unconvinced this is pure pretext, is that I think it's highly unlikely that the same few people (Lavrov, Putin, etc.) would be making these specific claims and complaints in advance, just to be used a decade and a half later as pretext.

Another is that there are numerous high ranking people in the US foreign policy establishment, both in actual positions of power and attached to semi-official think-tanks, etc., that have agreed with their argument or at the very least identified it as sincere on the part of the Russian government.

As for me saying two wars, I was speaking about Ukraine only (depends on how you count, but I was counting Crimea, and the current invasion, though you could add another for the "breakaway" regions where Russian forces have been involved for years now). I'm aware of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, I think you and I might have already discussed those regions on HN in the past.

> Given there's a clear historical parallel (not identical, but appropriate enough) with the Cuban Missile Crisis and Monroe doctrine, I don't think it's rational to ignore the NATO "encirclement" argument as pretext

Given that there is much more recent precedent (e.g., Iraq 2003, including the preceding advocacy by groups like PNAC from which key Bush policy officials were selected) that actually fits the chain of events much better, I don't think it's rational to ignore “false and exaggerated claims of geopolitical threat, ideological terrorism, and WMD as a pretext for a war for economic gain and imperialism from people who don't even bother to not keep saying the imperialist parts out loud”, either.

Don't get me wrong, I agree with you about Iraq 2003, and I'm not saying that claims like that are always true or always false (I think it's obvious that it only makes sense to assess such claims in context). All Putin's talk of "de-nazification" as a war aim, of WMD, and a whole host of other stuff is total pretextual fiction, and absolutely makes it harder to negotiate any kind of end to the war now, because pretext has a zombie-like ability to live on and prevent peace, even if there is agreement to resolve the real causes.

But this war was a serious possibility even without those pretexts. Russia was incredibly weak, militarily and economically (both are closely linked) at the time of previous NATO expansions that mattered to Russia (1999, 2004). It's not strong now. Ukraine may be a worse quagmire than the SU in Afghanistan. But it does now seem to be able to stretch itself and probably win the immediate war against the Ukrainian military proper. They have complained about NATO expansion for 15 years, and finally have the capability to do what all great powers do: force their will through unjust means, and call it just.

The sooner there is some agreement to resolve the real causes, the less impact the pretextual bullshit will have in preventing that peace. And as I said before, if I'm wrong, possibly WW3 will just be delayed slightly, but Russia is still not strong enough to do what everyone is implying with their WW2 references, so I don't see it happening.

I should have said, they have complained about NATO expansion since the fall of the USSR (and obviously before, but that's irrelevant), when NATO gave Gorbachev assurances that NATO would not expand "one inch eastward" after German reunification. They've been very vocally critical of NATO expansion into Ukraine for 15 years (and probably longer), and the West has known that Ukraine was specifically significant for 15 years (and probably longer).