I don't see "having the crap beat out it in production" as a good strategy here
Absolutely. The people who will pay the price for that design philosophy are not the ones making the decision to use that design philosophy.
It really doesn't matter if poor security engineering is the common case, we should expect better from a modern system with the budget of a federal project and the legal requirement that we use it.
I hope I don't sound like I'm sticking up for the procurement process that generated this site. The site was bought was, I'm sure, a pile of poop. I just have trouble with people's utterly unrealistic expectations of how security works in real applications. Forget Healthcare.gov; I mean real applications, ones people rely on every day.
Nothing is secure from the start. Everything has bugs.
Nothing is secure from the start. Everything has bugs.
Sure, all aspects of programming are subject to bugs. My concern with the site is an apparent lack of design for security. Admittedly the linked article only talks about symptoms, I'm inferring poor design from a previous article which said the developers put security at the bottom of the list of priorities.
Absolutely. The people who will pay the price for that design philosophy are not the ones making the decision to use that design philosophy.
It really doesn't matter if poor security engineering is the common case, we should expect better from a modern system with the budget of a federal project and the legal requirement that we use it.