Strictly speaking this is not correct. JSTOR and MIT cannot bring criminal charges; only the US government may. They can bring civil charges on their own behalf in addition to the criminal charges, and whether the 2 parties agree to settle out of court is relevant to any civil charges brought against the defendant. This is the basis for the difference between civil and criminal law - civil law covers disputes between 2 parties and serves as a framework if the 2 parties cannot reconcile.
On the other hand, criminal actions are not just about the grievances between the defendant and the victim of the crime. In principle, crimes are committed against the people themselves (hence the case naming scheme exemplified by the United States vs. X or The People of Illinois vs. X). Even if the victim isn't particularly interested in pursuing the prosecution, the prosecutor is still within his rights to try the case. Indeed, in many violent crimes such as rape, the victim is not interested in aiding the trial. While this can sometimes derail the prosecution, it need not. Pursuing the case absent the victim's full cooperation cannot ipso facto be considered prosecutorial abuse.
a) it is MIT and JSTOR that have primary discretion in whether a criminal case moves forward (it is the government's sole discretion)
b) MIT and JSTOR are in fact responsible for bringing criminal charges (they are not - they can only bring civil charges)
c) that the prosecutor is responsible for the severity of the penalty and/or the defendant's emotional response to that penalty
My disagreement with your third assertion was more implicit so let me clarify a bit.
First, it is not the prosecutor's job to question whether a law's penalties are in proportion to the crime it proscribes when deciding whether to bring a case. Discretion over the severity of the punishment is left to the sentencing phase of the trial if the defendant is convicted, and it is highly likely that Aaron's sentence would not have been the maximum had he been found guilty (a fact I am sure his lawyers made him aware of).
Second, under what reasonable standard can a prosecutor be held personally responsible for the emotional state of the defendant? Should it be acceptable for criminal defendants to pressure prosecutors into dropping cases by threatening self-harm or suicide in the hopes that a public outcry will harm the prosecutor's career? Try to ignore for a moment that the defendant in this case has your sympathies. Would you accept that tactic from a serial killer or rapist?
It may be that the law itself is unnecessary or counterproductive. I'm certainly open to the argument that at least publicly funded research ought to be open to the public. Yet it is still the law of the land. From the facts of the case, Aaron committed an obvious crime and behaved as though he knew it were a crime. The potential price of civil disobedience is that you will in fact end up punished for it. In the end, his story (like Rosa Parks and others before him) may end up bringing about the change he wants. But to say that the prosecutor abused her authority or was personally responsible for his death is an emotional response without basis and runs counter to the very idea of a criminal justice system.
I didn't make any of those assertions. Other people in this thread might have, but I didn't.
it is not the prosecutor's job to question whether a law's penalties are in proportion to the crime it proscribes when deciding whether to bring a case.
I didn't say it was. I agree that the prosecutor doesn't decide what the possible charges and punishments are; those are taken as given. But the prosecutor certainly does decide which cases to prosecute at all, and how aggressively to prosecute them. As I understand it, this case was prosecuted extremely aggressively.
under what reasonable standard can a prosecutor be held personally responsible for the emotional state of the defendant?
I didn't say he was (I realize others in this thread have, but I didn't); I agree he isn't. But that's irrelevant to whether or not this prosecution was way too aggressive for the actual harm done; IMO it was.
The potential price of civil disobedience is that you will in fact end up punished for it.
This is quite true. But it doesn't make the punishment fair or just.
to say that the prosecutor abused her authority...runs counter to the very idea of a criminal justice system.
Maybe it runs counter to the idea of a perfect criminal justice system, but the one we have is far from perfect, and prosecutors know that. In a perfect system, every instance of a given offense would be prosecuted the same, every defendant would get a fair chance to defend themselves, and we would have a reasonable expectation of a just outcome. In the system we have, because so many things have been criminalized, there are far more offenders of the letter of the law than can possibly be prosecuted, and defendants are at a huge disadvantage vs. the system. So who actually gets prosecuted, and what chance they have at a fair hearing, ends up being decided by the prosecutor's judgment, which is often colored by their personal beliefs or political leanings. Under those circumstances, IMO it is quite legitimate to question a prosecutor's judgment when a case is treated far more aggressively than seems warranted by the actual harm done.
On the other hand, criminal actions are not just about the grievances between the defendant and the victim of the crime. In principle, crimes are committed against the people themselves (hence the case naming scheme exemplified by the United States vs. X or The People of Illinois vs. X). Even if the victim isn't particularly interested in pursuing the prosecution, the prosecutor is still within his rights to try the case. Indeed, in many violent crimes such as rape, the victim is not interested in aiding the trial. While this can sometimes derail the prosecution, it need not. Pursuing the case absent the victim's full cooperation cannot ipso facto be considered prosecutorial abuse.