There is neither a burden of proof nor an us or them in this discussion. That isn't how inquiry works, in general. I'm not saying qualia are critically important, though perhaps other people are saying that, I don't know. The point is that qualia per se is just an idea which describes a certain character of physical experience. It isn't an "ideology". It is just a philosophical notion which most people find difficult to totally dismiss.
I genuinely don't get where you are coming from. There is a set of people who dedicate their lives to thinking about stuff and many of them believe there is something about actual experience which is not adequately captured by a purely physical description.
Read the SEP Entry on Qualia if you'd like to get a grounding on it:
I think what you will notice is that philosophers are neither monolithic nor dogmatic on the subject and yet, being intellectually honest and thorough, most neither dismiss it totally or believe in its adequacy as a description.
If you don't think the question of whether AI has or does not have qualia is important I don't know what to tell you. My personal sense is that AIs of the type we have now have no qualia but I am prepared to entertain the idea that they might.
If you want a good text about this try Koch's the Quest for Consciousness. Despite your certainty about qualia and its relation to science, there are genuine observational things we can say about it and how it relates to the physical structure of brains/minds.
On the subject of qualia per se and philosophy's relationship to the physical sciences I can suggest reading about Phenomenology:
The essential idea of import here is that, whether you like it or not, you as an individual have nothing at all, at a fundamental level, other than your perceptions of the world. You must then have an account of how you proceed from such to even basic ideas like empiricism or other sorts of epistemological strategies. Imperfect, perhaps even vague, as the notion of qualia is, it (or something like it) is, fundamentally, the foundation upon which all other sorts of inquiry into the physical world depends.
There is neither a burden of proof nor an us or them in this discussion. That isn't how inquiry works, in general. I'm not saying qualia are critically important, though perhaps other people are saying that, I don't know. The point is that qualia per se is just an idea which describes a certain character of physical experience. It isn't an "ideology". It is just a philosophical notion which most people find difficult to totally dismiss.
I genuinely don't get where you are coming from. There is a set of people who dedicate their lives to thinking about stuff and many of them believe there is something about actual experience which is not adequately captured by a purely physical description.
Read the SEP Entry on Qualia if you'd like to get a grounding on it:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
I think what you will notice is that philosophers are neither monolithic nor dogmatic on the subject and yet, being intellectually honest and thorough, most neither dismiss it totally or believe in its adequacy as a description.
If you don't think the question of whether AI has or does not have qualia is important I don't know what to tell you. My personal sense is that AIs of the type we have now have no qualia but I am prepared to entertain the idea that they might.
If you want a good text about this try Koch's the Quest for Consciousness. Despite your certainty about qualia and its relation to science, there are genuine observational things we can say about it and how it relates to the physical structure of brains/minds.
On the subject of qualia per se and philosophy's relationship to the physical sciences I can suggest reading about Phenomenology:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/
The essential idea of import here is that, whether you like it or not, you as an individual have nothing at all, at a fundamental level, other than your perceptions of the world. You must then have an account of how you proceed from such to even basic ideas like empiricism or other sorts of epistemological strategies. Imperfect, perhaps even vague, as the notion of qualia is, it (or something like it) is, fundamentally, the foundation upon which all other sorts of inquiry into the physical world depends.