> Just because both the brain and computing devices are physical, it doesn't follow that computers are capable of what the brain does.
My position is: Physical laws are computable/simulatable. The operation of our brains is explained by physical laws (only-- I assume). Thus, object classification, language processing, reasoning, human-like decisionmaking/conscious thought or any other "feature" that our brains are capable of must be achievable via computation as well (and this seems validated by all the partial success we've seen already-- why would human-level object classification be possible on a machine, but not human-level decisionmaking?).
Again: If you want human cognition to be non-replicable on paper, by algorithm or in silicon, you need to have some kernel of "magic" somewhere in our brains, that influences/directs our thoughts and that can not be simulated itself. Or our whole "thinking" has to happen completely outside of our brain, and be magically linked with it. There is zero evidence in favor of either of those hypotheses, and plenty of indicators against it. Where would you expect that kernel to hide, and why would you assume that such a thing exists?
From another angle: I expect the whole operation of our mind/brain to be reducible to physics in the exact same way that chemistry (or in turn biology) can be reduced to physics (which admittedly does not mean that that is a good approach to describe or understand it, but that's irrelevant).
I'm not a philosopher, but Eliminativism/Daniel Dennett seem to describe my view well enough.
If I say "qualia" (or "subjective experience") is how your brain reacts to some stimulus, then where exactly is your problem with that view?
> if mind is matter, and color doesn't exist in matter, then how can it exist in mind
"color" perception is just your brains response to a visual stimulus, and it makes a bunch of sense to me that this response seems similar/comparable between similarly trained/wired individuals. It is still unclear to me what your objection to that view is.
My position is: Physical laws are computable/simulatable. The operation of our brains is explained by physical laws (only-- I assume). Thus, object classification, language processing, reasoning, human-like decisionmaking/conscious thought or any other "feature" that our brains are capable of must be achievable via computation as well (and this seems validated by all the partial success we've seen already-- why would human-level object classification be possible on a machine, but not human-level decisionmaking?).
Again: If you want human cognition to be non-replicable on paper, by algorithm or in silicon, you need to have some kernel of "magic" somewhere in our brains, that influences/directs our thoughts and that can not be simulated itself. Or our whole "thinking" has to happen completely outside of our brain, and be magically linked with it. There is zero evidence in favor of either of those hypotheses, and plenty of indicators against it. Where would you expect that kernel to hide, and why would you assume that such a thing exists?
From another angle: I expect the whole operation of our mind/brain to be reducible to physics in the exact same way that chemistry (or in turn biology) can be reduced to physics (which admittedly does not mean that that is a good approach to describe or understand it, but that's irrelevant).
I'm not a philosopher, but Eliminativism/Daniel Dennett seem to describe my view well enough.
If I say "qualia" (or "subjective experience") is how your brain reacts to some stimulus, then where exactly is your problem with that view?
> if mind is matter, and color doesn't exist in matter, then how can it exist in mind
"color" perception is just your brains response to a visual stimulus, and it makes a bunch of sense to me that this response seems similar/comparable between similarly trained/wired individuals. It is still unclear to me what your objection to that view is.