To me, it felt like nothing could stop Turkey from becoming the most powerful and influential European country by the end of 21st century. But then Erdogan happened. Oh well.
Countries can be less or more democratic, it's not a simple boolean.
But if it was a simple boolean, then no, voting to cease being a democracy means you are in fact (either way) no longer a democracy. The opposite result would be a paradox.
But Erdogan was not suddenly delivered from outer space. Erdigan was the mayor of the Turkish capital for quite some time, and then got elected president, by a reasonably honest vote.
That is, the views which Erdogan embodies have been brewing within the public, and are widespread enough. It may not have been visible at the time, or not as clearly, but it was there.
True, but remember that all politicians are also demagogues to some degree, so his views (especially after more than 20 years in power) may not necessarily align with his base.
It's not unusual for the candidate people didn’t vote for to be the one who would actually defend their rights better.
West Asia is not Europe geographically. People there are not ethnically European, do not speak Indo-European (PIE-derived) languages and are mostly Muslims. The final bit of disrespect was conversion of Saint Sofia cathedral into a mosque. It stopped being European the moment Greeks lost it.
It’s pretty big, and young-ish by European standards, so I can see someone buying this if Turkey had joined the EU and followed the democratisation and growth path that some (though by no means all) EU entrants do, especially if they also bought into the ever-popular narrative of German decline.
In the late 20th century, Turkey was an EU entrant candidate, and looked in better shape on the democratic, corruption-reduction and economic criteria than some other candidates. Then, of course, Erdogan happened, and that was the end of that. But, pre-Erdogan, "Turkey will join the EU and see the same sort of rapid progress other EU entrant states have" wasn't a ridiculous idea.
The EU can be a relatively effective machine for rapidly dragging countries forward, though a certain amount of cooperation is required.
> The change you need for them to be at the level of Europe is cultural and that takes many generations.
Some of the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states have seen extremely rapid change and progress under the EU, particularly on democratisation and corruption reduction. Others, not so much; the EU can lead a horse to water, but it has difficulty making it drink if it doesn't want to (notably see Hungary). But you're certainly not talking _multiple generations_.
Yeah. Under Erdogan, Turkey's GDP grew like crazy. And most notably the military export quadrupled. Now instead of 2100, 2050 seems more likely the year when Turkey becomes the most influential European country.
Turkey was in the same position as India in the 90s: in the beginning of their demographic transition, without significant oil and gas reserves. In the 90s it was clear the Turks had a better grip on their transition economics (large infrastructure projects, national corporation grabbing international importance). Since the late 2000s however, for some european observers, it seems that they might have missed their chance.
However, like with India, the "demographic dividend" window started on the late (~2023 for Turkey, ~2021 for India), unlike China and its one=child policy which kickstarted the demographic dividend extremely early in their demographic transition. For some (including me), this hsorten the window and i personnaly think they will exit this window before 2040, 2045 at the very best, but others (economists more than demographs) it won't have an impact on the duration and end in ~2050. In any case, the next 20/30 years are the true test for India and Turkey, so any person saying that its "too late" for either of those countries is wrong.
