There are at least two different ways to interpret the data on industrial policy support for EV makers.
China’s trading partners could point to 15 years of sustained regulatory and financial support for domestic producers, which has fundamentally altered the playing field to make it much harder for others to compete in China or anywhere else where Chinese EVs are sold.
By contrast, defenders of China could point out that the data show that subsidies as a percentage of total sales have declined substantially, from over 40% in the early years to only 11.4% in 2023, which reflects a pattern in line with heavier support for infant industries, then a gradual reduction as they mature.
In addition, they could note that the average support per vehicle has fallen from $13,860 in 2018 to just under $4,800 in 2023, which is less than the $7,500 credit that goes to buyers of qualifying vehicles as part of the U.S.’s Inflation Reduction Act.
It would be interesting to compare that to Western and US support for fossil fuel cars with substantial government support of the oil and gas industry.
> These estimates reflect the combination of five kinds of support: nationally approved buyer rebates, exemption from the 10% sales tax, government funding for infrastructure (primarily charging poles), R&D programs for EV makers, and government procurement of EVs.
The first two (and maybe part of the fourth) I can understand, but the rest are too much of a strech to count as a government subsidy. Every government builds roads and other car-related infrastructure. Every government purchases vehicles for its own use. Every government subsidizes R&D in new fields.
That support did total some US $231 billion over 14 years from 2009 through until 2023.
You can see more at: https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinese-ev-dil... (June 2024)
It would be interesting to compare that to Western and US support for fossil fuel cars with substantial government support of the oil and gas industry.