Happy to agree-to-disagree but I will push on it just one bit more.
Let's take the chess analogy. I take it you agree that I would very reliably lose if I played Magnus Carlsen at chess; he's got more than 1000 Elo points on me. But I couldn't tell you the "attack path" he would use. I mean, I could say vague things like "probably he will spot tactical errors I make and win material, and in the unlikely event that I don't make any he will just make better moves than me and gradually improve his position until mine collapses", but that's the equivalent of things like "the AI will get some of the things it wants by being superhumanly persuasive" or "the AI will be able to figure out scientific/engineering things much better than us and that will give it an advantage" which Yudkowsky can also say. I won't be able to tell you in advance what mistakes I will make or where my pawn structure will be weak or whatever.
Does this mean that, for you, if I cared enough about my inevitable defeat at Carlsen's hands that expectation would be religious?
To me it seems obvious that it wouldn't, and that if Yudkowsky's (or other rationalists') position on AI is religious then it can't be just because one important argument they make has a step in it where they can't fill out all the details. I am pretty sure you have other things in mind too that you haven't made so explicit.
(The specific other things I've heard people cite as reasons why rationalism is really a religion also, individually and collectively, seem very unconvincing to me. But if you throw 'em all in then we are in what seems to me like more reasonable agree-to-disagree territory.)
> That said, EY is absolutely from a Daatim or Chabad household
I think holding that against him, as you seem to be doing, is contemptible. If his ideas are wrong, they're fair game, but insinuating that we should be suspicious of his ideas because of the religion of his family, which he has rejected? Please, no. That goes nowhere good.
Let's take the chess analogy. I take it you agree that I would very reliably lose if I played Magnus Carlsen at chess; he's got more than 1000 Elo points on me. But I couldn't tell you the "attack path" he would use. I mean, I could say vague things like "probably he will spot tactical errors I make and win material, and in the unlikely event that I don't make any he will just make better moves than me and gradually improve his position until mine collapses", but that's the equivalent of things like "the AI will get some of the things it wants by being superhumanly persuasive" or "the AI will be able to figure out scientific/engineering things much better than us and that will give it an advantage" which Yudkowsky can also say. I won't be able to tell you in advance what mistakes I will make or where my pawn structure will be weak or whatever.
Does this mean that, for you, if I cared enough about my inevitable defeat at Carlsen's hands that expectation would be religious?
To me it seems obvious that it wouldn't, and that if Yudkowsky's (or other rationalists') position on AI is religious then it can't be just because one important argument they make has a step in it where they can't fill out all the details. I am pretty sure you have other things in mind too that you haven't made so explicit.
(The specific other things I've heard people cite as reasons why rationalism is really a religion also, individually and collectively, seem very unconvincing to me. But if you throw 'em all in then we are in what seems to me like more reasonable agree-to-disagree territory.)
> That said, EY is absolutely from a Daatim or Chabad household
I think holding that against him, as you seem to be doing, is contemptible. If his ideas are wrong, they're fair game, but insinuating that we should be suspicious of his ideas because of the religion of his family, which he has rejected? Please, no. That goes nowhere good.