On "finger's crossed" - I think it's important to say that the majority of web traffic has switched over to PQC algorithms for key exchange that are not susceptible (thanks Cloudflare). We're not close to building a machine suitable for running Shor's in a practical sense, so even potential "store now, break later" attacks are now kinda pointless. Things like SSH keys are trivially revokable and often have enforced expirations, so they're not really a viable attack vector anyway.
The symmetric encryption used for the vast majority of actual encryption has always been safe. Grover's algorithm does not scale appropriately (exponential on key length) unlike Shor's and cannot be parallelized. Worst case, AES-128 becomes as week as AES-64. So we bump it to AES-256 and we're back at the same difficulty as before (impossible). There's a degree of confidence this will always hold true.
The symmetric encryption used for the vast majority of actual encryption has always been safe. Grover's algorithm does not scale appropriately (exponential on key length) unlike Shor's and cannot be parallelized. Worst case, AES-128 becomes as week as AES-64. So we bump it to AES-256 and we're back at the same difficulty as before (impossible). There's a degree of confidence this will always hold true.