I'm not sure where GP's 25% comes from. But there have been various assessments that China intends to "reunify" with Taiwan by 2030. [1] Xi Xinping has also instructed the PLA to be prepared to invade by 2027. [2]
If you then ask yourself whether China would rather invade during the Trump administration (with its tendencies towards isolationism and "deal making") or roll the dice on a subsequent U.S. administration, you might find yourself thinking that the odds actually seem considerably higher than 25% that this could happen in the next four years.
To the extent that this narrative comes via the U.S. intelligence/defense community, one has to assume that it may biased towards exaggerating the threat. I for one hope that is the case, since I do not want to see a U.S.-China conflict any time soon. At the same time, I unfortunately don't think it's likely to be completely baseless.
If you then ask yourself whether China would rather invade during the Trump administration (with its tendencies towards isolationism and "deal making") or roll the dice on a subsequent U.S. administration, you might find yourself thinking that the odds actually seem considerably higher than 25% that this could happen in the next four years.
To the extent that this narrative comes via the U.S. intelligence/defense community, one has to assume that it may biased towards exaggerating the threat. I for one hope that is the case, since I do not want to see a U.S.-China conflict any time soon. At the same time, I unfortunately don't think it's likely to be completely baseless.
[1] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-...
[2] See, e.g., https://cimsec.org/the-maritime-convoys-of-2027-supporting-t... https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4547637-china-potential-t...