Someone once asked how would you cope with lawful interception of corrupt law enforcement agencies, so allow me to explain TideCloak in that context: imagine a corrupt agency requests the identity information of a specific user of TideCloak: they file a subpoena from the TideCloak operator – however the root identity of the user doesn't reside there. It's with Tide's Fabric. So, the agency has to file subpoenas in all the jurisdictions that this particular user's ID is split. Let's say that's this user's authority is spread across 17 countries across 9 jurisdictions – you'll need the cooperation of all those jurisdictions to get access to a single user identity. Still possible for an Interpol-coordinated task force for a valid law enforcement operation, but that's going to be very hard to get under the radar if the agency is corrupt.
In the end, it boils down to trusting only what you can verify. Unlike any comparable system today, every cog in TideCloak's architecture is entirely verifiable to its administrators, operators and end-users – so there's no requirement to blindly trust any single component. There is no "us" to trust due to the decentralized nature of the fabric. I can explain how decentralizing each aspect works in TideCloak, but unfortunately, it’ll take more than half a page...
