Crystal structure is a pattern, and various properties of crystals are explicable in terms of the pattern of atoms within them. The pattern of bases on a DNA molecule determines what genes are encoded on it. It is semantically and epistemically pointless to argue that this makes them nonphysical, and inconsistent to use this argument only for mental phenomena. Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of argument will probably end up at the useless metaphysical position that all is pattern and nothing is physical.
Of course patterns can be said to overlay physical objects - or that physical objects instantiate patterns, for that matter; there are all sorts of ways of making the point. But is it your position that, on account of this, crystals are not physical? Patterns are ubiquitous in the universe, and if being overlain by or instantiating a pattern is a criterion establishing that something is not physical, then what, if anything, is physical?
In the case of the mind/matter debate, the question is whether minds are physical processes, not whether they are physical objects. If having a pattern disqualifies a process from being physical, then even simple processes such as resonance would not count as physical, leading to the question of what, if anything, counts as a physical process?
You are correct when you say "You can abstractly describe the pattern of a crystal without looking at a crystal", but that is what physics does with everything in its domain! If you were to say that physics describes and explains the physical but not itself physical, I might even agree, but that is not the issue under discussion in the mind/matter debate.
Numbers are not physical, but you see three objects all over the place. A number is a category. The number "three" exists as a property that I can use to group physical objects (or even other categories). So I can group together three pencils or three cars. The only physical properties that cars and pencils have in common is that their both physical...maybe they're the same color...but I have grouped three pencils and I have grouped three cars, so now they share a property of "three", but "three" is not an intrinsic physical property of pencils, nor cars. It's a potential metaphysical property, but only becomes manifested once an observer groups three pencils.
My argument is that a "mind" cannot be a purely physical process in the same way that a video game is a purely physical process. The computer instructions are stored in my hard drive and encoded, and it's a physical process for my computer to retrieve those instructions and follow them, but the game itself is something the user interacts with by watching what's happening on the screen an interacting with it. The computer program of course has a physical component, but lives mostly in the layers of abstraction from 1s and 0s up to "flashy lights on screen", but none of those things mean anything if a mind isn't watching the screen, paying attention, and interacting with it.
Here's a question that boils down what I'm trying to say: If you have a pet bird that sits next to you as you play Fallout New Vegas, and taps the keyboard occasionally, is your bird playing Fallout? Is playing Fallout a purely physical process?
> Here's a question that boils down what I'm trying to say: If you have a pet bird that sits next to you as you play Fallout New Vegas, and taps the keyboard occasionally, is your bird playing Fallout? Is playing Fallout a purely physical process?
With regard to your question about the bird, what do you suppose a 'yes' answer would imply, and ditto for a 'no'? It is unclear to me that this question would have any relevance to the one you follow it with, yet you present it as if an answer to the first question would settle the second.
On further reflection, and a re-read after a night of sleep, I agree with you that my example at the end was not a clear indication of what I'm pointing at. I was trying to reveal that "reality" is more than just physical processes, and "mind", especially, maps onto physical processes, but only relationally.
A bird watching Fallout and pressing keys on your keyboard with its beak is not participating in the story of Fallout the way you are. You are watching a story and tracking a narrative and making decisions about which keys to press. But this is a bit of an obscure analogy.
Let me try a different one. You just sat down in your favorite chair after a long day of work, and you ask your young son to please bring you a cold drink from the refrigerator. He cheerfully runs to the refrigerator, grabs a beverage, and runs back to you, handing it to you.
The process of you vibrating your vocal cords which make a physical vibration of air that goes into his ear and vibrates his eardrum that then sends impulses to his brain and, later, his body that end up with you holding a cold beverage in your hand...those are all physical processes. But the relationships between sounds and "words", between words and sentences, between sentences and movement...none of that is physical. The relationship with your son obviously has a physical component, but the meaning behind your genetic connection to your son is largely metaphysical.
Another analogy: if a tree falls in the forest, does it make a sound? I am firmly in the camp of "no". Does the tree create vibrating air waves when it falls and hits the ground? Of course. But a "sound" is an abstraction that forms in the mind of someone who is there watching (and more importantly, hearing!) the tree hit the ground. That "sound" is a metaphysical concept that we map onto the physical world, and the ability to make these distinctions, to categorize our incoming sensory input, is what enables us to perceive anything at all. Without that structuring, categorizing, and filtering of incoming data, the world would be overwhelming and we would be paralyzed.
Am I a solipsist who only believes that what is in my mind is "real" and that the physical world around me is an illusion? No. The first and best lesson I ever had that the physical world is real is getting punched in the face. That will knock solipsism right off the list of being a possible worldview.
I believe reality is an interplay of concepts and physical, "potential" or "raw" matter.
One more analogy: cooking. When I want to make bread, for example, I have a recipe, which is a concept. It is an abstract concept of how to transform raw materials into a new thing: bread. So you gather raw ingredients, and you combine them following a particular order. You let the yeast feed on the sugars and make nice little CO2 bubbles in your dough, causing it to rise. You then put it in the oven and after some heat and time, you remove what used to be flour, water, and yeast, and you put it on the counter to cool. It has been transformed and you call it "bread".
The classic materialist move is to now just say "yeah but it's just flour, water, and yeast." Which is physically true. However, those ingredients have specific interactions that happen when combined, and further interactions that happen when exposed to high heat for a certain duration of time, and when we remove it from the oven, we don't say "come get some flour, water, and yeast that have been transformed through chemical processes, heat, and time!" No. It has a new name now. It has switched categories. It has changed ontological levels and changed from three ingredients into a new identity: bread.
I hope you enjoyed your toast, but what I have to say here might not be quite so palatable.
Let's start with the cooking example, as it epitomizes the difficulty in all of them.
What you call "the classic materialist move" - to just say "yeah but it's just flour, water, and yeast" - is a rather simplistic parody of the full physical description of the process, and it does not even begin on the explanation of the process that science can give. A materialist would have no problem with saying that bread is different from its ingredients, whether considered either separately or collectively, and she could go along with calling this an ontological difference. The thing, though, is this: just because flour, water, and yeast are physical things, and they have now been turned into something that is in a different ontological category - namely bread, or baked goods - it does not follow that this bread cannot be a physical substance, and this argument provides no justification for the premise that it is not.
At this point, you may be thinking that you had no intention of saying bread is nonphysical, but if so, then that only emphasizes the point, as, in the rest of your analogies, you are doing the equivalent of exactly that (for example, concepts of sound are not ontologically the same as sound waves and the latter are physical, and from this, it is supposed to follow that the former are not.) The general schema here is this invalid syllogism:
Major premise: X is physical.
Minor premise: Concepts of X are not in the same ontological category as X itself.
Conclusion: Concepts of X are not physical.
Once we remove the ineffective ontological argument from your posts, all we have is a number of claims that mental phenomena cannot be physical phenomena, presented without any reason given to think they are true, and in the parallel thread where I am debating geye1234 [1] I explained why, for a conclusion of this sort to be taken as a fact - i.e., a justified true belief - you need to give readers a reason to think your conclusion is justified, which in turn means giving them a reason to think its premises are.
By the way, what is potential matter, as opposed to the alternatives of raw and physical matter?
