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Had a single email been altered, you can be sure that the DNC would have been shouting it from the rooftops. Being able to label the emails as 'altered' would have made for fantastic water-muddying, which is a classic defensive tactic in such a situation. Any political operative would be expected to do the same. The fact that you are (as I am) unaware of any such claim, in an episode which was at the top of the news cycle for months, would seem to be a pretty clear indicator that the emails were legit.


> Had a single email been altered, you can be sure that the DNC would have been shouting it from the rooftops.

Easy to imagine they would not in some cases. Often people do not comment on on going investigations. Or in international espionage I know it is common to hide what you know and what you do not know to keep your competitors/enemies in the dark to give your self an advantage. So the USA spy organizations may not want the DNC to show its hand.

I can not make the assumption that you are putting forth at least.


Neither of those concerns are relevant.

The DNC could have simply published one of their original emails for people to compare, without interfering in any investigation or revealing any spy techniques.


> The DNC could have simply published one of their original emails for people to compare, without interfering in any investigation or revealing any spy techniques.

Ok the DNC goes to their hard drive and opens up the email. It does not match what was in the leak. Is the email on the DNC's hard drive altered or not? After all if the email was accessed/leaked could it have been altered as well? With a simple security setup, yes it can.

Operational security is often about not tipping your hand to your adversary about what you know and what you do not know. Showing the original email in your scenario also tips your hand for what you think you know.




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