Even without Trump, there are lots of people in the US who have been relatively dissatisfied with the general trend of the US the last 60-ish years. Small-c conservatives have been just as horrified by the available options as small-l liberals have been.
I doubt even the most radical president could do much to reverse or slow that trend. The strong central government permanent war surveillance state seems so much bigger and more powerful than even the highest office. It’s not like breaking up or not breaking up Google is gonna change the fact that feds can read everyone’s gmail without a warrant.
I personally believe that the office of the president’s effect on long term policy or institutions is generally massively overstated. Their main lever seems to be supreme court appointments and Trump has already pulled that one in his first term (to predictably destructive results). I am unsure whether that is because presidents generally “color inside of the lines” and haven’t attempted sweeping and radical reform, or because the institutions ultimately have more inertia than the temporary machinations of the executive office.
I guess we’ll see if the institutional destruction he seems to seek a) is even possible or b) may result in unexpectedly good outcomes. Then again, most of the stuff he says he seems to speak just for the momentary sake of speaking it; only a small fraction relates to things he plans (or is effectively compelled) to do. I lost count of all of the promises he made, good and bad, that not only weren’t kept, but weren’t even ever mentioned again.
I remain skeptical that his fervent drive during the campaign will translate into fervent reformation action, now that he has obtained what he wants. Despite the constant media hand-wringing, his first term wasn’t as apocalyptic as everyone made it out to be, despite his two main legacies both being perhaps the most destructive things he could have wrought: the supreme court appointments and the insanely massive mismanagement of a deadly pandemic.
His more hardworking and ideologically-motivated support staff have had a lot more time
to plan on his behalf this time around, however. Perhaps his weaponized ignorance will be deliberately wielded this time around and his second term will turn out to be massively more destructive than his first, but that is a very high bar to clear given the outsized effect that mismanaging the pandemic response caused. Not many presidents can have that much preventable death in their legacy, even if they explicitly try.
> Their main lever seems to be supreme court appointments
The President has far more power than that.
- Veto Power: Blocks congressional bills; overrides require a two-thirds majority, which is rare.
- Executive Orders: Directives to federal agencies that bypass Congress (limited by courts and future presidents).
- Foreign Policy Leadership: Sole power to negotiate treaties (requiring Senate ratification) and recognize foreign governments.
- Pardon Power: Can pardon federal offenses, unchecked by other branches.
- Appointment Authority: Nominates not only Supreme Court justices, but federal judges, and cabinet members, shaping long-term policy and judicial interpretation.
What goes along with that is ability to get people elected (or not) by backing them, both actually and monetarily. Trump killing the immigration bill during Biden's term is a good example, and he wasn't even President (yet) at the time. I expect he'll focus on more palatable legislation during the first two years, to keep the senate majority through 2028, but we'll see.
Vetos almost definitionally aren’t destructive as they prevent things from happening.
Executive orders are a big one. I imagine there will be many legal challenges as a result of novel applications of executive authority here. Fortunately whatever he does here can be just as easily reverted in a few years.
Foreign policy is another huge one, and this is probably where he can do lasting damage to the US and its allies.
Pardon power is another like veto: all it does is restrain the government (in this case, from punishing criminals). Not much damage.
Appointments to anything other than the Supreme Court are, in my view, not that big a deal. Activist judges below the Supreme Court will eventually get their rulings overturned if they are too extreme.
I think people overestimate the damage that can be wrought, absent some external crisis/threat (eg covid, or a war, etc) that results in mismanagement in response.
> Vetos almost definitionally aren’t destructive as they prevent things from happening.
Government funding flows through congress, and being able to veto it means Trump gets enormous control over what goes into it, because legislatures generally won't put things into it that he will refuse to approve, and conversely will put things in that he will approve. Outside of his war powers it's probably the most extreme power in the US.
There are three checks against this that I know of. One is if Congress is not aligned party wise, they can punt to a large degree. Non-issue for Trump since they control Congress. Second is 2/3 majority but given our highly partisan state, unlikely to play any role. Third is perception, Congress and President and play the blame game, which affects their re-election. But given Trump's level of influence that is also unlikely to be a playable card, at least in the near future.
In all Trump has an enormous ability to shape this country through this power alone.
> Pardon power is another like veto: all it does is restrain the government (in this case, from punishing criminals). Not much damage.
Yes but if he's pardoning people he knows, and in particular in a quid pro quo fashion, he can use it to effectively do illegal things without doing them himself. It's a serious loophole.
Overall if people are voting for him because they like what he's doing that is one thing. But I suspect many people voted for / not against him because they ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ and say what's the worst that can happen. And the answer is a _lot_. Though I still believe electing an election denier is the biggest issue, because its the simplest way to short-circuit our institutional protections in the future.
He only realistically has two years to get any legislation through, the last two years he won't have the house with him so either he is on the defensive or just doing appointments (he will start the term with negative approval rating, and probably will never get above that, so the house definitely flips in 2026 like it did in 2018).
The question is how much damage can he do in two years? If he goes full loco and starts a global trade war with everyone via high tariffs, while at the same time juicing interest rates via a politicized fed, we will be in a depression within a year or two. If he uses his political capital more wisely, we might avoid that economic hit but have longer term damage to worry about. Thankfully, Trump is pretty impulsive, and he doesn't have a long list of good advisors to choose from (not that he would listen to them anyways), so I'm really just worried about the first scenario.
I doubt even the most radical president could do much to reverse or slow that trend. The strong central government permanent war surveillance state seems so much bigger and more powerful than even the highest office. It’s not like breaking up or not breaking up Google is gonna change the fact that feds can read everyone’s gmail without a warrant.
I personally believe that the office of the president’s effect on long term policy or institutions is generally massively overstated. Their main lever seems to be supreme court appointments and Trump has already pulled that one in his first term (to predictably destructive results). I am unsure whether that is because presidents generally “color inside of the lines” and haven’t attempted sweeping and radical reform, or because the institutions ultimately have more inertia than the temporary machinations of the executive office.
I guess we’ll see if the institutional destruction he seems to seek a) is even possible or b) may result in unexpectedly good outcomes. Then again, most of the stuff he says he seems to speak just for the momentary sake of speaking it; only a small fraction relates to things he plans (or is effectively compelled) to do. I lost count of all of the promises he made, good and bad, that not only weren’t kept, but weren’t even ever mentioned again.
I remain skeptical that his fervent drive during the campaign will translate into fervent reformation action, now that he has obtained what he wants. Despite the constant media hand-wringing, his first term wasn’t as apocalyptic as everyone made it out to be, despite his two main legacies both being perhaps the most destructive things he could have wrought: the supreme court appointments and the insanely massive mismanagement of a deadly pandemic.
His more hardworking and ideologically-motivated support staff have had a lot more time to plan on his behalf this time around, however. Perhaps his weaponized ignorance will be deliberately wielded this time around and his second term will turn out to be massively more destructive than his first, but that is a very high bar to clear given the outsized effect that mismanaging the pandemic response caused. Not many presidents can have that much preventable death in their legacy, even if they explicitly try.