First, I believe you are right that the CCP believes that "giving Hong Kong the freedom to operate does not work." I believe you are right that the CCP believes that "the same applies to Taiwan." I believe you are right that the CCP does not see the multiparty democratic system in Taiwan as a positive thing.
If Taiwanese people really care about retaining multiparty democracy, then everything you said is a good reason for Taiwan to be wary of PRC attempts to gain more control over Taiwan.
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Second, I don't know what the average person on the street in mainland China thinks about the HK protest movement or Taiwanese democracy. Today, when the successes of the PRC are more salient to most people than its failures, the average person in mainland China may well look down on the perceived disorder of democracy.
What comes up may come down. Mainland China has had some incredible decades as it industrialized and caught up. That is a typical phenomenon (not a uniquely Chinese one) when an authoritarian country introduces liberalization to their economy. It is harder for authoritarian countries to maintain growth when they are already mostly caught up with peers, because decentralized economic decision making becomes much more effective than centralized decision making. Decentralized economic decision making is a form of decentralized political power, and the authoritarian country is eventually forced to choose between maintaining a monopoly of authority or pursuing further growth.
At least, that's the thesis of economists like Daron Acemoglu. And the PRC is currently trending away from economic decentralization and toward a re-centralization of decision making.
Mainland China now faces some severe economic and geopolitical headwinds; maybe the PRC will navigate them wisely and earn yet more prestige. Or maybe the PRC will fail to respond adequately to new challenges because of the weaknesses of its authoritarian model. And since the PRC's authoritarian system relies almost solely on efficacy as a source of legitimacy, its legitimacy may prove extremely fragile in the face of a downturn in fortune.
Whatever comes to pass, it will not be a result of a Chinese exceptionalism. Perhaps centralized, one-party states without elections and with limited free speech will prove the dominant governmental model in the next era of history. But, historically, states like that seem to have been mostly outlasted by more liberal peers.
If Taiwanese people really care about retaining multiparty democracy, then everything you said is a good reason for Taiwan to be wary of PRC attempts to gain more control over Taiwan.
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Second, I don't know what the average person on the street in mainland China thinks about the HK protest movement or Taiwanese democracy. Today, when the successes of the PRC are more salient to most people than its failures, the average person in mainland China may well look down on the perceived disorder of democracy.
What comes up may come down. Mainland China has had some incredible decades as it industrialized and caught up. That is a typical phenomenon (not a uniquely Chinese one) when an authoritarian country introduces liberalization to their economy. It is harder for authoritarian countries to maintain growth when they are already mostly caught up with peers, because decentralized economic decision making becomes much more effective than centralized decision making. Decentralized economic decision making is a form of decentralized political power, and the authoritarian country is eventually forced to choose between maintaining a monopoly of authority or pursuing further growth.
At least, that's the thesis of economists like Daron Acemoglu. And the PRC is currently trending away from economic decentralization and toward a re-centralization of decision making.
Mainland China now faces some severe economic and geopolitical headwinds; maybe the PRC will navigate them wisely and earn yet more prestige. Or maybe the PRC will fail to respond adequately to new challenges because of the weaknesses of its authoritarian model. And since the PRC's authoritarian system relies almost solely on efficacy as a source of legitimacy, its legitimacy may prove extremely fragile in the face of a downturn in fortune.
Whatever comes to pass, it will not be a result of a Chinese exceptionalism. Perhaps centralized, one-party states without elections and with limited free speech will prove the dominant governmental model in the next era of history. But, historically, states like that seem to have been mostly outlasted by more liberal peers.