Listen, while I broadly agree with your grander point (Britain wanting a war with Germany and taking any excuse given for it) your argument for this is flatly moronic; the assassination of the archduke was not Britain's pretext for entering the war! That was Austria-Hungary's pretext for invading Serbia. Britain's pretext was the German invasion of Belgium. Read a fucking book.
While Britain's decision to enter World War I was indeed triggered by Germany's invasion of Belgium, it's important to consider the broader context. In the years leading up to the war, Britain had engaged in a naval arms race with Germany, driven by fears of Germany's growing military and economic power. British leaders, including Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, viewed war with Germany as inevitable and believed it was better to fight sooner while Britain still held a naval advantage.
Britain's system of alliances, particularly the Entente Cordiale with France and Russia, made it likely that any conflict involving these powers would draw Britain into a larger war. When the July Crisis erupted following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, British leaders did little to prevent the escalation of tensions. Despite last-minute efforts by some, such as German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg's plea for British neutrality, Britain remained committed to its alliances and the belief that war with Germany was necessary.
It's worth noting that other European leaders, such as French President Raymond Poincaré and Russian Tsar Nicholas II, also played significant roles in the outbreak of the war. However, Britain's long-standing rivalry with Germany, its naval arms race, and its commitment to alliances that would likely trigger a larger conflict all contributed to its readiness to enter the war when the opportunity arose.
There’s a much simpler theory of the war, which is that it was Germany that was worried about a foreign rival catching up to them—Russia—which is why Germany pushed for the war to start. It’s interesting to see this theory projected onto the British, but there’s a fatal flaw with this projection. The first declaration of war was by Austria-Hungary against Serbia. Britain was not in a position to manipulate the situation as to encourage that; Germany was. And Germany would have known that an Austro-Hungarian war on Serbia would draw in Russia, which is how they get the Russo-German war they actually wanted.
How, exactly, mechanistically, does Britain manipulate this crisis into an Anglo-German war? They didn’t make Austria-Hungary declare war. They didn’t even declare war alongside the French. And they certainly didn’t make Germany invade France by way of Belgium in order to give Britain a pretext. It sounds to me like Germany wanted war with Russia and was confident they could also afford war with France (having kicked their asses in 1870 already) but would have really preferred to keep Britain out of it.
If there is a criticism one can levy against the British, it might be that they simply weren’t forceful enough in making that consequence clear to the Germans ahead of time. The “alliances that would likely trigger a larger conflict” were in fact a consciously designed system of balances of power meant to deter exactly that type of large scale war, in the tradition that was established 99 years previously in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. It’s easy to dismiss that system because it failed catastrophically in 1914, but the fact that it had mostly worked since 1815 was unprecedented in European history. The 99 years between the Napoleonic and First World Wars were the most peaceful 99 years of European history since at least the Roman Empire; check back in 2044 to see if we can break that record.
> The 99 years between the Napoleonic and First World Wars were the most peaceful 99 years of European history since at least the Roman Empire;
You make a good point about the "Long Peace" between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. While there were indeed several conflicts during this period, they were generally shorter and more localized.
The Revolutions of 1848, which affected many European countries.
The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878)
The Serbo-Bulgarian War (1885)
The Greco-Turkish War (1897)
And there are others that I missed
> Germany wanted war with Russia and was confident they could also afford war with France (having kicked their asses in 1870 already) but would have really preferred to keep Britain out of it.
Yes I also agree however had Britain remained neutral and not created alliances that it knew would put it in conflict with Germany is it possible that the Germany vs. Russia conflict might have remained a regional war (like others I mentioned above) and so continuing the so called “long peace”? Instead there was an escalation to a global conflict. So what motivated Britain to make these alliances that caused the escalation? Is there a better explanation than “Thucydides Trap”? (See my sibling post about this.)
“Thucydides Trap" suggests that when a rising power threatens to displace an existing great power, it often leads to war. Russia, Britain, and Germany found themselves in this predicament before World War 1, with each nation acting rationally to protect its own interests. However, the complex web of alliances and the fear of losing power ultimately led to a global conflict that no one truly desired.
For instance, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, where the German Empire you seem to idolize was effectively born. Also the same war that gave the German Empire a degree of overconfidence about their chances against France.
> however had Britain remained neutral and not created alliances that it knew would put it in conflict with Germany is it possible that the Germany vs. Russia conflict might have remained a regional war (like others I mentioned above)
Did Britain create the alliance between France and Russia? They certainly weren't a party to it, because that wasn't their casus belli for entering the war. Their casus belli was the German invasion of Belgium. My contention is that if Britain was less neutral and more proactive about creating alliances that could put it in conflict with Germany, they could have successfully deterred the First World War.
> Did Britain create the alliance between France and Russia?
Britain did not create the alliance between France and Russia - that alliance was formed independently in 1894 as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Britain's casus belli for entering WWI in 1914 was Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, not any direct alliance obligations.
However, I would argue that Britain's shift away from "splendid isolation" and toward the Entente with France and Russia in the early 1900s, while stopping short of hard alliance commitments, still had the effect of emboldening France and Russia in their disputes with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in particular eased long-standing tensions between Britain and Russia.
So in that sense, while Britain didn't create the Franco-Russian alliance, British diplomatic moves in the pre-war years did strengthen the Entente bloc and alter the balance of power in a way that made France and Russia less likely to back down in a crisis. A more fervently neutral Britain may have left France and Russia feeling less confident.
> My contention is that if Britain was less neutral and more proactive about creating alliances that could put it in conflict with Germany, they could have successfully deterred the First World War.
In the lead-up to WWI, there was a prevailing belief among European powers that any war would be short. Many did not foresee how devastating and prolonged the conflict would become. So even a more hardline British policy may not have been seen as a strong enough deterrent in 1914.
Additionally, a more assertive Britain risked further inflaming tensions and sparking a crisis. The European alliance system meant any conflict had the potential to spiral out of control - more British alliances could have simply added fuel to the fire. And if war came, Britain would then be obligated to join from the start, rather than having the option to stay out.
> German Empire you seem to idolize was effectively born
I disagree with your characterization that I "idolize" the German Empire. My argument is that the outbreak of World War I was primarily caused by the "Thucydides Trap" dynamic - the dangerous instability that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace an established power. In this case, Germany's rise in the late 19th/early 20th century threatened the European balance of power that had long been anchored by British dominance.
I don't believe in the simplistic "evil Germans started WWI" narrative that was promoted by the war's victors. This narrative served to justify the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles placed on Germany, which most historians agree was a key factor in the rise of Nazism and the eventual outbreak of World War II 20 years later.
Portraying it simplistically as "evil Germans" against the noble Allies is not productive and does not do justice to the immense tragedy of the war and its aftermath.
My contention is we should strive to analyze this world-shaping event objectively and resist nation-centric narratives shaped by wartime propaganda. I believe examining it through the lens of great power competition and the "Thucydides Trap" is a more constructive approach.
If you have evidence showing that I "idolize" Imperial Germany, I would appreciate if you could quote where I expressed those sentiments. But I suspect this is a misreading of my arguments about the war's root causes.
> Britain did not create the alliance between France and Russia - that alliance was formed independently in 1894 as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Britain's casus belli for entering WWI in 1914 was Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, not any direct alliance obligations.
And the idea of maintaining a balance of power in the first place was part of the legacy of the Congress of Vienna following the Napoleonic Wars. It wasn't a uniquely British policy.
> However, I would argue that Britain's shift away from "splendid isolation" and toward the Entente with France and Russia in the early 1900s, while stopping short of hard alliance commitments, still had the effect of emboldening France and Russia in their disputes with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in particular eased long-standing tensions between Britain and Russia.
> So in that sense, while Britain didn't create the Franco-Russian alliance, British diplomatic moves in the pre-war years did strengthen the Entente bloc and alter the balance of power in a way that made France and Russia less likely to back down in a crisis. A more fervently neutral Britain may have left France and Russia feeling less confident.
Germany's goal in 1914 was to attack Russia, so Russia's confidence is of little relevance. Do you have any evidence that France was more confident in allying with Russia because they felt they could trust Britain to help? Because that doesn't seem at all consistent with the history of Franco-British relations. And, as discussed above, it's also perfectly explainable in terms of maintaining the balance of power, which had been the consensus method of maintaining peace for the past century.
> I disagree with your characterization that I "idolize" the German Empire.
You're furthering a theory in which Britain is somehow to blame for the outbreak of the First World War. I assumed that your attempt to rehabilitate the historical legacy of the German Empire was motivated by some sort of fondness for the German Empire. If I'm mistaken, please accept my apologies.
> My argument is that the outbreak of World War I was primarily caused by the "Thucydides Trap" dynamic - the dangerous instability that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace an established power.
Yes, this was exactly the dynamic taking place between Germany and Russia.
> In this case, Germany's rise in the late 19th/early 20th century threatened the European balance of power that had long been anchored by British dominance.
There are multiple problems with this idea, most of which I have already enumerated, but I will re-enumerate them for your convenience:
* Britain and Germany operated in very different spheres. Britain was a global thalassocracy while Germany was a land power with mostly Eurasian concerns. Germany was attempting to develop sea power on their own, but they were never particularly close to eclipsing Britain on that front.
* Even if Britain had the goal of engineering the outbreak of a war with Germany, they did very little that contributed to the outbreak of such a war. Meanwhile, Germany took several such actions.
> I don't believe in the simplistic "evil Germans started WWI" narrative that was promoted by the war's victors. This narrative served to justify the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles placed on Germany, which most historians agree was a key factor in the rise of Nazism and the eventual outbreak of World War II 20 years later.
That's a non-sequitur; even if the Treaty of Versailles was too punitive, it doesn't follow that Germany didn't start the war.
(For what it's worth, the most punitive effects of the Versailles Treaty had been effectively waived or ameliorated long before the Nazis took power. The consequences of the Versailles Treaty did motivate support for the Nazis in the 1920's, but by the end of the 1920's, hyperinflation was over and Germany had successfully renegotiated itself into a much stronger economic position. What really helped the Nazis after that point was the start of the Great Depression. But this is a tangent.)
> Portraying it simplistically as "evil Germans" against the noble Allies is not productive and does not do justice to the immense tragedy of the war and its aftermath.
Some simplistic historical narratives also turn out to be mostly true. For example, would you make the same claim about the Second World War that you're making about the First?
I'm not particularly interested in moralizing about history. But here are the concrete actions Germany took which served to either start or expand the war:
* Germany gave diplomatic encouragement to Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia in the first place.
* When Russia joined the war in defense of Serbia, Germany responded by declaring war on Russia, knowing that Russia and France had a defensive alliance.
* When France joined the war in defense of Russia, Germany attacked the neutral country of Belgium.
Britain could have stayed neutral at this point, and yet a world war would have still broken out purely by virtue of Germany's actions. Let's contrast the actions the British took, which you attribute the outbreak of the war to:
* Britain eased tensions with Russia and improved relations with France. (Very strange to start a war by improving relations with your traditional enemies!)
* After Germany was already in a war with Russia, France, and Belgium, Britain entered the war and refused German demands to remain neutral.
My objection with your theory here is that you haven't provided any credible mechanism by which Britain could have possibly engineered the start of an Anglo-German war, particularly when the causal links in that chain included many actions that were entirely within Germany's control. Can you please address that particular objection? You can say "Thucydides Trap" until you're blue in the face but the facts don't fit the theory in this instance.
> You're furthering a theory in which Britain is somehow to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.
If you believe this you misunderstood me.
There was a regional war (the “long peace” had many of these) which only became a global war when the British empire got involved. What I pointed out was that British involvement was optional. The British Empire was concerned about maintaining a balance of power in Europe. German dominance threatened this balance hence the British empire wanting war with Germany and declaring war on Germany. Belgium was a convenient pretext.
> I assumed that your attempt to rehabilitate the historical legacy of the German Empire was motivated by some sort of fondness for the German Empire. If I'm mistaken, please accept my apologies.
My argument is that the outbreak of World War I was caused by the "Thucydides Trap" dynamic and I do not believe the simplistic “evil Germans were responsible”.
Nor do I believe the British or Russians were responsible. To cast blame is to misunderstand the "Thucydides Trap".
> Even if Britain had the goal of engineering the outbreak of a war with Germany, they did very little that contributed to the outbreak of such a war. Meanwhile, Germany took several such actions.
When above I said “WW1 was wanted by British leadership who were locked in an arms race with Germany that they could not sustain much longer and wanted a war with Germany while they were ahead” I did not say “Britain had the goal of engineering the outbreak of a war with Germany”. You misunderstood me.
> My objection with your theory here is that you haven't provided any credible mechanism by which Britain could have possibly engineered the start of an Anglo-German war, particularly when the causal links in that chain included many actions that were entirely within Germany's control. Can you please address that particular objection?
I may want a new car, however I am not going to get a new car unless my current car needs big repairs but I am not going to crash it for that purpose to “engineer” the situation. Similarly British leadership who were locked in an arms race with Germany (that they could not sustain much longer) wanted a war with Germany (they were ahead) but it would be foolish to engineer war on purpose.
At the start of WW1 the British Empire played a dominant role in the global economy -- it was perhaps about one-quarter to one-third of the global economy. Adding to this the economic contributions of English-speaking allies like the United of States of America, which was rapidly industrializing and increasing its economic output, the fraction could reasonably be estimated to range from approximately 30% to 40% of the world's GDP being either English-speaking or under British control at the beginning of World War I.
Would we call it a “world” war if 30-40% of world GDP was not involved? Did the British Empire have to be involved? Were they attacked? No, there was a treaty about keeping Belgium neutral that was used by the British to declare war on Germany. Did Britain have to declare war if it did not want war?
To help answer this question let’s look at a more recent example: the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. It was signed in December 1994 by Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The signatories offered assurances against the use of force or coercion against Ukraine and pledged to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine. Could this treaty be used as a reason to declare war on Russia? Yet nobody wants war with Russia so nobody declared war on Russia. So going back to the British Empire, if it did not want war with Germany did it have to declare war due to Belgium?
> That's a non-sequitur; even if the Treaty of Versailles was too punitive, it doesn't follow that Germany didn't start the war.
It may look like two separate issues however if victors need to justify a punitive treaty are there no incentives to write the history about the start of the conflict in a biased way? Did you witness the start of WW1 in person? Understanding biases in how history is recorded is important is it not?
> (For what it's worth, the most punitive effects of the Versailles Treaty had been effectively waived or ameliorated long before the Nazis took power. The consequences of the Versailles Treaty did motivate support for the Nazis in the 1920's, but by the end of the 1920's, hyperinflation was over and Germany had successfully renegotiated itself into a much stronger economic position. What really helped the Nazis after that point was the start of the Great Depression. But this is a tangent.)
> Some simplistic historical narratives also turn out to be mostly true. For example, would you make the same claim about the Second World War that you're making about the First?
Simplistic historical narratives belong in patriotic propaganda. “Why did your family members and friends die? They died for our country! They died for freedom! Democracy!”
You come across as smart so why would you accept simplistic historical narratives?
What you say may be true but how do you explain that World War II is often viewed as a continuation of World War I? Do you doubt that unresolved issues and punitive conditions of the Treaty of Versailles left Germany economically and politically destabilized? Do you doubt that the harsh penalties, including significant territorial losses, disarmament, and crippling reparations, fostered deep resentment among Germans? Do you doubt that this environment allowed extremist parties like the Nazis under Adolf Hitler to rise to power? Do you doubt that Hitler's aggressive policies were aimed at overturning the Treaty of Versailles and restoring Germany's stature? Nothing to do with WW1?
Personally I file it alongside Marxism, Asimov's Psychohistory, and all the other Grand Theories Of History that try to pretend human behavior is simple and predictable.
> As for the "Thucydides Trap", there's plenty of criticism on Wikipedia:
Notice many of the criticisms that you linked to focus on whether the trap applies to the current dynamics between the USA and China. The mere existence of such debates implicitly accepts the validity of the trap pattern itself.
Other criticisms question the trap's applicability to different historical situations and its underlying mechanisms, such as assigning blame for the resulting conflicts. However, these arguments overlook a crucial aspect of the trap: "incredibly obvious" security moves by one party can provoke equally "obvious" security responses from the other, potentially escalating into a devastating war that neither side truly desires. This can occur even when all parties act rationally, as the challenge to the established "pecking order" drives the trap.
> Personally I file it alongside Marxism, Asimov's Psychohistory, and all the other Grand Theories Of History that try to pretend human behavior is simple and predictable.
It's essential to distinguish the "Thucydides Trap" from grand theories of history like Marxism or Asimov's Psychohistory. Rather than attempting to simplify and predict human behavior on a grand scale, the trap is better understood as a cognitive bias that can lead groups into conflicts with one another. The numerous examples listed on Wikipedia support the existence of such biases:
While human behavior may indeed be unpredictable at times, it is be unwise to dismiss the influence of cognitive biases on group dynamics and decision-making.
Before World War I, Britain observed Germany's rapid rise and perceived it as a threat to its own global dominance. This situation is a classic example of the Thucydides trap, named after the ancient Greek historian who noted that when a rising power threatens to displace an existing great power, war becomes more likely. In this case, Germany's growing industrial and military strength was seen as a direct challenge to Britain's hegemony.
Germany, on the other hand, wanted to emerge as a stronger power than Britain while avoiding direct conflict. German leaders pleaded with Britain to remain neutral and not declare war on Germany. However, from the British perspective, war with Germany was deemed necessary to suppress its increasing power and maintain Britain's position on the world stage.
British leaders may not have actively sought to start a war, but they believed that confronting Germany was crucial to protect their national interests. See my reply to sibling comment with more details.
Today there is a similar situation with China being the rising power and America seeking to suppress it.
