The fact a conscious mind loses capability when brain damage happens shows quite clearly that consciousness as a process is reducible to smaller non-conscious parts though.
There's also an innate problem in assuming the human experience of say, "green" is consistent. What I actually see when I see the colour green only appears consistent with the physical behaviour of light. Whether any two people really see colours the same way is highly questionable.
I think there's a consensus that you don't assume that the human experience of "green" is consistent, only that people do have such an experience. We can possibly try to "align" those experiences with communication and referring to a shared real world, but for that an interesting experiment scenario is communication between a person with the common trichromatic sight, a person with a tetrachromatic retina, and someone with partial color blindness, as the experience of "green" for them is not only inconsistent but also likely incompatible, without a possibility to align them.
> The fact a conscious mind loses capability when brain damage happens shows quite clearly that consciousness as a process is reducible to smaller non-conscious parts though.
> The fact a conscious mind loses capability when brain damage happens shows quite clearly that consciousness as a process is reducible to smaller non-conscious parts though.
There's also an innate problem in assuming the human experience of say, "green" is consistent. What I actually see when I see the colour green only appears consistent with the physical behaviour of light. Whether any two people really see colours the same way is highly questionable.