> Of course, Australia has a quietly privacy-phobic regulatory regime so we can guarantee [1] that Five Eyes countries and possibly others are reading emails sent through Fastmail.
That’s a wildly unfair characterisation, and not in the slightest bit supported by your citation. The Assistance and Access Act which that article is talking about (though it doesn’t even name it!), although a dodgy piece of legislation in the opinion of most technologists, is completely irrelevant to Fastmail, because Fastmail doesn’t offer end-to-end encryption. Fastmail was always subject to the Telecommunications Act, which allows Australian police access with warrants, and Fastmail has always made no bones about the fact that it complies with legal warrants. But that’s nothing like what you’re describing.
(Disclosure: I was a Fastmail employee from 2017–2020.)
Email encryption _is_ end-to-end encryption. You just explained why the law doesn't apply to what they did, and the parent explained why they didn't do it because of the law. These two are not in conflict.
I’m not sure what you’re saying. The sentence I quoted is written in the present tense, saying that Fastmail is compromised, not as a hypothetical “if they did PGP, it’d be broken for this reason”.
That’s a wildly unfair characterisation, and not in the slightest bit supported by your citation. The Assistance and Access Act which that article is talking about (though it doesn’t even name it!), although a dodgy piece of legislation in the opinion of most technologists, is completely irrelevant to Fastmail, because Fastmail doesn’t offer end-to-end encryption. Fastmail was always subject to the Telecommunications Act, which allows Australian police access with warrants, and Fastmail has always made no bones about the fact that it complies with legal warrants. But that’s nothing like what you’re describing.
(Disclosure: I was a Fastmail employee from 2017–2020.)