I attribute a lot of the higher expenditure and lower efficiency to the continued insistence that outsourcing to contractors, effectively picking winners in a "market" to give monopoly status, is a better way to provide government services. These firms have little if any accountability to the electorate, no incentive to set reasonable prices, get anything done efficiently, and in some cases don't even produce working services
Similarly, bringing a drug to market with a patent is not a competitive marketplace, by design, and it consistently creates an outcome wherein people are charged exorbitant sums of money because of this non-competitive market. Doing a bunch of government-backed R&D and then getting a patent for it is the government picking a winner, not creating a market
Basically, it seems like the government was and remains a lot more efficient when it directly builds the capacity to provide goods and services it determines to have an interest in providing, rather than try to do this through "the market" (again, this is almost never an actual market)
> outsourcing to contractors, effectively picking winners in a "market" to give monopoly status
In principle this is supposed to be a competitive bidding process, and then the winner is chosen by the most competitive bid rather than the government. In practice the process is corrupt and regulatory barriers are created to prevent smaller companies from submitting bids or project requirements are set such that only one company can satisfy them.
The problem here is corruption, which has nothing to do with whether the corrupting entity is a corporation. Public sector unions lobby for the same kind of labor-inefficient practices because they know that more jobs give them more members which give them more power, even (or especially) when the jobs are unnecessary or inefficient.
The advantage that existed pre-WWII is that neither large government contractors nor large public sector unions already existed in order to lobby for corrupt practices and their continued existence, so the government could just pay someone to do work and then have them to return to the private sector when the work is done. But WWII created such a large apparatus dependent on taxpayer revenue that it had enough lobbying power to sustain its continued existence, and now it needs to be disassembled before we can have nice things again.
But probably the best way to do it is under anti-corruption. You still want roads and ships to be built, but if you could get the corruption out of the bidding process then they'd be built by smaller and less consolidated companies with less individual lobbying power, and then you could address efficiency issues without having to fight a multi-billion dollar corporation or huge public sector union because that inefficiency is their profit margin/job. Another possibility would be anti-trust -- break the big government contractors up.
No, the problem would exist even if the bidding process was completely fair, because it still creates a situation where a long-standing project creates stable returns for a company while decoupling the service it provides from both market forces and public accountability. It is the worst of both worlds: shielded from market forces by having its customer be the government, providing a government service shielded from public accountability by the corporate veil
Yes, we should reduce corruption and break up existing entrenched players, but the core issue is in the structure of that kind of arrangement. I do also think that there's no good reason to have a "corporate veil" in the first place, but that's a broader problem
> it still creates a situation where a long-standing project creates stable returns for a company while decoupling the service it provides from both market forces and public accountability.
But that's just a mechanism for the corruption. The contract for the design of something and its manufacture and maintenance should each be separate bids. Even each stage of the design should be a separate contract that could go to someone else. The government says "we need a design for a ship" and they put it out to firms who submit their proposals and then the government picks one and buys it outright. Then they say "we need a design for a propulsion system for this ship" and take bids again. If you need to modify the ship's design some to facilitate it, that's fine, because none have been built yet and the necessary change gets incorporated into the design before you put out contracts to build any of it.
What you want is for each of the contracts to be as small as practicable, to maximize the number of potential bidders. None of this "single contract to design and build an entire fleet of ships and maintain them for 30 years" nonsense.
Yea, that does seem like a reasonable way to design less corrupt mechanisms for these processes, but I think the standard way piecemeal designs like that get rejected is by arguments to "efficiency" (Nevermind that efficiencies gained by bundling require some pretty strict discipline within a firm, mostly benefit the firm, and are easily dwarfed from the government's perspective by the inefficiencies taken on by the problem we're talking about)
That's the "monopolies are efficient" argument. Look, see, they can amortize their fixed costs over so many more units if they have the whole market.
Claims that you can increase the efficiency of a system by reducing competition should be met with the same level of skepticism as claims that you can violate of the second law of thermodynamics.
But let's try one that should get their ears to perk up. Monopoly suppliers are systemic risk, which is a threat to national security.
Similarly, bringing a drug to market with a patent is not a competitive marketplace, by design, and it consistently creates an outcome wherein people are charged exorbitant sums of money because of this non-competitive market. Doing a bunch of government-backed R&D and then getting a patent for it is the government picking a winner, not creating a market
Basically, it seems like the government was and remains a lot more efficient when it directly builds the capacity to provide goods and services it determines to have an interest in providing, rather than try to do this through "the market" (again, this is almost never an actual market)