I am an EA of long standing, though not very active on the movement side of things. I think SBF is a big deal, at least in so far as it prominently exposed a moral weakness in the movement. A heavy use of Bayes' rule coupled with a focus on the best uses of dollars led in my eyes to SBF being seen less as a successful EA celebrity and more of a moral exemplar. We're trying to effectively improve the world! SBF has developed a magic money printing machine which will make the world awesomely better by generating dollars for EA causes! Earn-To-Give proven the best strategy because of unlimited upside risk! We should be more like SBF!
I had two problems with this: firstly that a movement focusing on extracting money from the megarich rather than 10% tithes from the public more generally may potentially generate more cash (good!) but will probably do so most effectively with thought leadership and fundraising teams and donor care and castles for conferences of important people. This loses a distinctive simplicity and non-heirarchy that feels important.
The second is that I had much less sympathy with the 'longtermism' sub-sect than SBF and many of the richer and increasingly more prominent Californian types do[0]. And that the Good Old-Fashioned EA focus on cheap but unglamorous interventions on malaria, cash transfers etc. were being increasingly overshadowed in the public eye.
So I don't think it reflects badly on EAs that SBF turned out to be shady (as you say, all groups have a worst member). But it should prompt some awkward questions about the extent that the movement was taken in by the smoke-and-mirrors act. And ideally a reconsideration about whether chasing the money and interests of SBF-types is the right direction for the movement.
[0]: I find it suspicious that the equations demonstrating the infinite importance of fairly recherché concerns on the specifics of AI safety, for example, just happen to line up with the research interests of some EA-adjacent people. That suggests people aren't discounting sufficiently for their own group biases.
I had two problems with this: firstly that a movement focusing on extracting money from the megarich rather than 10% tithes from the public more generally may potentially generate more cash (good!) but will probably do so most effectively with thought leadership and fundraising teams and donor care and castles for conferences of important people. This loses a distinctive simplicity and non-heirarchy that feels important.
The second is that I had much less sympathy with the 'longtermism' sub-sect than SBF and many of the richer and increasingly more prominent Californian types do[0]. And that the Good Old-Fashioned EA focus on cheap but unglamorous interventions on malaria, cash transfers etc. were being increasingly overshadowed in the public eye.
So I don't think it reflects badly on EAs that SBF turned out to be shady (as you say, all groups have a worst member). But it should prompt some awkward questions about the extent that the movement was taken in by the smoke-and-mirrors act. And ideally a reconsideration about whether chasing the money and interests of SBF-types is the right direction for the movement.
[0]: I find it suspicious that the equations demonstrating the infinite importance of fairly recherché concerns on the specifics of AI safety, for example, just happen to line up with the research interests of some EA-adjacent people. That suggests people aren't discounting sufficiently for their own group biases.