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> But causal processes can _generate_ rational argument.

There is no reason for thinking this. A causal process can be associated and simultaneous with an argument, but it can't generate it, except by accident. The state of mind '2+2' may be followed by the state of mind '4', but it could just as easily be followed by the state of mind '5'. Causal processes may make us believe one or the other, but they will not make one correct and the other wrong; nor will they be sufficient to explain how one answer is correct and the other wrong.



That's why I said 'can'. I didn't say 'always'.

A deterministic computer program _can_ generate rational argument; e.g. it can use logical deduction a.k.a. forward-chaining.

Your claim seems to be that causality (governing the behavior of human thought and action) does not _necessarily_ result in rationality (in that human)? Of course -- this is obvious.

This seems like a miscommunication. Perhaps an unavoidable one? :)


> Your claim seems to be that causality (governing the behavior of human thought and action) does not _necessarily_ result in rationality (in that human)? Of course -- this is obvious.

That's not my claim. Basic observation of oneself or others make this, as you say, strikingly obvious :)

My claim is rather that causality can't be a sufficient explanation for rationality. By this I mean that we can't explain rational thought by referring to the cerebral states that are associated with it. Remember your original claim that 'free will' is an illusion, because what impacts me at time T is [limited to] my state at time T-1, and my environment.[0] I take this to mean that my state at T is caused solely by my state at T-1 and envt. IF you're right about this, AND IF I'm right that causality can't be a sufficient explanation for rationality, then it implies that rationality is impossible.

Why can't causality be a sufficient explanation for reality? We can't explain rational thought by referring to the cerebral states associated with it, because the question of whether a thought is rational is indepedent of its associated cerebral state. There are cerebral states associated with 2+2=4 (rational), and cerebral states associated with 2+2=5 (irrational). But neither of these cerebral states is itself right or wrong. Only the thoughts associated with them are right or wrong.

I know that 2+2=4. It's not just that I have a series of successive, causal states that make me think this; it's that the content of the thought is correct. My mind has grasped a truth about reality. Similarly, someone who thinks 2+2=5 is wrong. It's not just that he has a series of successive, causal states that make him think thus; it's that the content of his thought is incorrect, and his mind has failed to grasp a truth about reality. When we say thought is correct or incorrect, rational or irrational, we refer to the content of the thought, not the brain state.

Thought must be about something other than the brain state to be right or wrong. But if thought is entirely generated, and sufficiently explained, by causal processes, it can only reflect the brain state, and can't be right or wrong. Since thought can be right or wrong, it follows that rational thought is something more than the product of causal processes, and is (at least partially) independent of them.

[0] I have added the words in square brackets myself, but I think that's your meaning.


To expand the conversation a bit with the hopes of breaking out of what seems to be some kind of language trap ... Let's talk about how a person and a computer can arrive at / prove truth.

A person's brain can generate true concepts in many ways. One way is careful logical thinking based on true premises. Another is some other manner of thinking (pick whatever you like) which ends up being true.

Speaking of combinatorics and algorithms now, there are many ways to validate truth. It depends of course on the style of logic in play. Depending on the set of logical primitives available (e.g. modus ponens), there are many different computational pathways get from a set of premises to a conclusion. In other words, there are many ways to prove the Pythagorean Theorem.

I don't think we'll disagree. But maybe? Or maybe we'll get clear on some language barrier?


Thanks for giving it another try.

> My claim is rather that causality can't be a sufficient explanation for rationality. By this I mean that we can't explain rational thought by referring to the cerebral states that are associated with it.

I'm zooming in on "explain" here. And I'm not getting it.

I'm not agreeing or disagreeing -- I'm not even following -- and I have some guesses as to why:

1. Are you offering a critique of the lack of free will argument I made?

2. If so, I'm not able to figure out where it lands: for? against? something else?

3. Either way, I haven't yet figured out what you mean by "explain" here.

4. Most broadly, I'm not seeing why this matters. I want to understand, but I haven't yet figured out how to get there.

If you are laying out a known philosophical position, could you please point me to a resource that explains it?


> We can't explain rational thought by referring to the cerebral states associated with it, because the question of whether a thought is rational is [independent] of its associated cerebral state.

If you had to write this over again to a broader audience, would you choose the word _explain_ here? In the context of this conversation especially, 'explain' is highly overloaded. Which sense do you mean? Perhaps what you mean is closer to _assess_ or _prove_?

Are you essentially saying this: the rationality of a statement is _assessed_ by the degree to which it adheres to the logic of rationality?

Since this is obvious, I'm inclined to think I'm still not following what you are actually trying to get across.


Ok, I think I'm working my way towards the part of the argumentation that has a bearing on free will.

> But if thought is entirely generated, and sufficiently explained, by causal processes, it can only reflect the brain state, and can't be right or wrong.

Not so. The above claim is confusing two things: (1) how a thought is generated (causality); (2) what a thought represents (conceptualization)

Whether a conceptualization is true or false is _independent_ of its causal origins.

This is obvious to me. But not to you? Or is more miscommunication afoot?


> When we say thought is correct or incorrect, rational or irrational, we refer to the content of the thought, not the brain state.

Yes, I agree. You've setup an example that emphasizes _conceptual_ understanding of what a person is thinking _about_.

This part is obvious too. But you want to take it further. I'm trying to puzzle that out next.




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