To add to this discussion, I must note what I don't see many mentioning here.
One doesn't need to do any shady stuff with baseband or stockpile on zero day vulns.
The current mobile ecosystem is such that any supported device (recieving updates and such) sends its unique identifier to the manufacturer before recieving OTA updates. And devices by default check for updates on a regular bases.
Basically the manufacturer can always target and track individual devices. And provision indivisualised signed updates. Not just at the country level but targeted to specific IMEI.
Coming to more concrete examples, Google is known to do AB testing with their Pixel line of devices, setting custom profiles for some users.
Xiomi had previously shown capability to actively disable devices that move outside of legal sale regions.
Samsung uses such capabilities for enterprise devices in Samsung's Enterprise/Knox platform. And consumer devices can be thought of as enterprise devices under the manufacturers domain.
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So the government only simply needs to send these companies warrants to target, bug and track specific devices or registered customers.
Online platforms are already subjected to data requests from law enforcement which they must conform to (atleast those with supporting warrant).
Some try to recuse themselves from such compelled intrusion of their customers by employing end to end encryption (e2ee).
With this provision and manufacturer cooperation, they could get direct full control of the ends (personal devices). Obviating the need to "break" encryption.
Why deal with a dizzying cloud of services in wide range of jurisdictions when you can have full access to citizen devices with cooperation of a handful of manufacturers.
In summary, this is not just feasible, the elements for an organised remote control system are already present in current smartphone ecosystem. In form of signed updates by manufacturers that can target particular IMEI devices. One just needs this law to wade through the legality issues.
A solution to avoid such sweeping surveillance capability would be to convince manufacturers to not receive identifiable data before provisioning updates. And have a public ledger of officially signed image hashes, like those of of domain certificate transparency lists.
One doesn't need to do any shady stuff with baseband or stockpile on zero day vulns.
The current mobile ecosystem is such that any supported device (recieving updates and such) sends its unique identifier to the manufacturer before recieving OTA updates. And devices by default check for updates on a regular bases. Basically the manufacturer can always target and track individual devices. And provision indivisualised signed updates. Not just at the country level but targeted to specific IMEI.
Coming to more concrete examples, Google is known to do AB testing with their Pixel line of devices, setting custom profiles for some users.
Xiomi had previously shown capability to actively disable devices that move outside of legal sale regions.
Samsung uses such capabilities for enterprise devices in Samsung's Enterprise/Knox platform. And consumer devices can be thought of as enterprise devices under the manufacturers domain.
---
So the government only simply needs to send these companies warrants to target, bug and track specific devices or registered customers.
Online platforms are already subjected to data requests from law enforcement which they must conform to (atleast those with supporting warrant).
Some try to recuse themselves from such compelled intrusion of their customers by employing end to end encryption (e2ee).
With this provision and manufacturer cooperation, they could get direct full control of the ends (personal devices). Obviating the need to "break" encryption.
Why deal with a dizzying cloud of services in wide range of jurisdictions when you can have full access to citizen devices with cooperation of a handful of manufacturers.
In summary, this is not just feasible, the elements for an organised remote control system are already present in current smartphone ecosystem. In form of signed updates by manufacturers that can target particular IMEI devices. One just needs this law to wade through the legality issues.
A solution to avoid such sweeping surveillance capability would be to convince manufacturers to not receive identifiable data before provisioning updates. And have a public ledger of officially signed image hashes, like those of of domain certificate transparency lists.