No it’s not. It was in the 70 something range in early 2020 and lately it’s been 90 something. And regardless you still have to demonstrate support for your conclusion, which is that his compensation is aligned with shareholders. It’s not.
What we actually have here and with CEO pay in general at large organizations is what’s pretty well known as a principal/agent problem, where the manager class sets the rules for themselves in a way that results in the transfer of assets from shareholders to themselves.
It was ~$55 in March 2020, and most recently closed at $105. But the two key points you seem to be missing are:
1. Not all incentive packages are tied to share price. Many of them are tied to other metrics that the (shareholder elected) board decide are appropriate. This is where the bulk of Pichai’s comp comes from.
2. When they are tied to share price, they tend to be benchmarked. In this case Pichai’s share price incentives have been benchmarked against the S&P100, against which Google has been doing perfectly well. The reason for this is because directors generally don’t task CEOs with preventing economic downturns, and they typically want any incentives they create to be as effective under those conditions as they would be at any other time.
The shareholders are absolutely setting the rules for the executives here.
It’s no worse than picking a market high preceding an ongoing recession as a reference, as the parent commenter did. The point is that his stock performance incentives are not tied to the absolute value of the stock, as the parent commenter is mistakenly claiming. Most of his performance based incentives don’t even relate to stock price, as the parent commenter is also mistakenly claiming. But the ones that do are tied to the stock’s performance against a benchmark. That benchmark has had the same ups and downs as the rest of the market, and Google’s stock has been tracking against it very well. Something that is an achievement, and that’s what google’s shareholder elected directors decided to reward him for with performance based incentives.
These are very simple concepts, and while you can be forgiven for not already knowing them, aspiring to retain your ignorance certainly isn’t admirable.
What we actually have here and with CEO pay in general at large organizations is what’s pretty well known as a principal/agent problem, where the manager class sets the rules for themselves in a way that results in the transfer of assets from shareholders to themselves.