That's why intensity matters as well. Napoleon was keenly aware of this, writing that the moral factor was equivalent to about 3x the physical. But he also organized his armies to move faster and lighter, using cover and concealment to find ways to flank his enemy or attack in the rear rather than seeking an open plain for a head-on clash. Later in his career, when he developed a taste for pure mass over maneuver and position, he suffered several defeats similar to those he had inflicted on others.
What I meant in my comment above, though, is not that Napoleon didn't care about such topics, but that Clausewitz doesn't always do a good job of writing about them on the tactical level. I absolutely think he's worth reading, but he's the opposite of Sun Tzu - a mass of dense, heavy, and often abstract text. There are multiple poor or incomplete translations of his famous On War which don't help. His smaller works like Principles of War and Tactics are much better starting points.
What I meant in my comment above, though, is not that Napoleon didn't care about such topics, but that Clausewitz doesn't always do a good job of writing about them on the tactical level. I absolutely think he's worth reading, but he's the opposite of Sun Tzu - a mass of dense, heavy, and often abstract text. There are multiple poor or incomplete translations of his famous On War which don't help. His smaller works like Principles of War and Tactics are much better starting points.