> Modern militaries don't seem to enjoy the freedom to act and maneuver that a classic general enjoyed in the field (for good reasons). Modern requirements for transparency and democracy
I think modern democracies do a much better job of separating military and civilian leadership than dictatorships do. Putin seems to be too personally involved in micromanaging his war, insisting on conquests that are simply not possible (like Bakhmut and some other places). Hitler similarly interfered with his generals and hampered his war effort that way.
Zelensky is of course involved with the war, but he listens to his generals.
> "appear weak when you are strong"
That only seems useful if you want to lure the enemy into an attack in order to ambush him, but with our modern day sensibilities about the value of life, we prefer to have no attack at all. More applicable to us is "appear strong when you are weak", although such secrets never last long, so we prefer to appear strong when strong, in order to discourage any attack.
Also, Russia appeared strong while weak, and that didn't exactly work out well when Putin called his own bluff. Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army. And he believed the West to be weak (or at least divided and disorganised), so he attacked.
It's not that these concerns are irrelevant, but they're a lot more complex than Sun Tzu makes them out to be, and it's possible to fall for your own disguise. Or maybe the civilian leadership can fall for the military's disguise.
That only seems useful if you want to lure the enemy into an attack in order to ambush him"
No, it is also good (necessary) for preparing a good offensive. If the enemy thinks you are weak in some area, he does not expect a push from that direction.
Ukraine did just that last fall very succesfull. Show off force and big noisy preparation of a offensive south and starting it loud. And then push hard, fast and unexpected in the north, after the enemy already moved more troops further south.
And then confusion and panic among the enemy, so a relativly small force could conquer vast lands.
> And he believed the West to be weak (or at least divided and disorganised), so he attacked.
That makes it sound as if Putin attacked because an opportunity presented itself.
I don't think that's why he attacked. I think he attacked because he felt he had no choice. Not because NATO was crowding into his borderlands, which is Putin's story; but because following the collapse of Soviet communism and the USSR, the rump Russia was clearly a state dependent mainly on resource-extraction, which desn't promise a great independent future. Especially with Europe's increasing development of non-fossil energy, earnings from fossil fuel exports could be expected to diminish rapidly.
But why Ukraine? Well, setting aside his deranged opinions about the historic unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the historic destiny of the "Rus", Ukraine was rapidly becoming closer to Europe, and Ukrainians were clearly happy with that prospect. Having a successful, happy fragment of the USSR on his border threatened his control over his own population.
> Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army.
Agreed! In fact everyone overestimated the strength of his army.
> Not because NATO was crowding into his borderlands, which is Putin's story; but because following the collapse of Soviet communism and the USSR, the rump Russia was clearly a state dependent mainly on resource-extraction, which desn't promise a great independent future. Especially with Europe's increasing development of non-fossil energy, earnings from fossil fuel exports could be expected to diminish rapidly.
"Rapidly" but still on a decades scale, which Putin is unlikely to live to. Meanwhile he has forced Europe to look elsewhere for energy and drastically accelerated their plans.
> But why Ukraine? Well, setting aside his deranged opinions about the historic unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the historic destiny of the "Rus", Ukraine was rapidly becoming closer to Europe, and Ukrainians were clearly happy with that prospect. Having a successful, happy fragment of the USSR on his border threatened his control over his own population.
Poland and the Baltics are already on his border, and most of the former Warsaw Pact is already in the EU and happily progressing, with quality of life drastically better than in Russia. I really don't think this excuse works.
I guess you're right, it doesn't. I don't know what I'm talking about; I'm just someone who enjoys strategy games.
I'm also extremely interested in trying to figure out what Putin was thinking when he attacked, and why he didn't just pull back when his initial blitzkrieg failed.
I happen to think his own utterances and writings are a largely-accurate presentation of what he really believes about geo-politics; but they don't answer the "Why now?" question. I think you can understand his thinking by listening to what he says. I think he really believes "there's no such thing as Ukraine".
And regarding the Baltic states: they weren't in NATO, and individually they have short borders with Russia. Ukraine has a very long border with Russia.
> And regarding the Baltic states: they weren't in NATO
They have been in NATO since 2004. Narva in Estonia is <3 hours drive from St Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia. Poland also has a large border with Belarus which is for most intents and purposes a Russian client state. And the border with NATO argument falls even further apart when you consider that Russia occupying Ukraine will gain them hundreds of km of borders with NATO member states Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania.
> I'm also extremely interested in trying to figure out what Putin was thinking when he attacked, and why he didn't just pull back when his initial blitzkrieg failed.
> I think you can understand his thinking by listening to what he says. I think he really believes "there's no such thing as Ukraine".
I guess we'll never really know about his actual reasons, but as to why he didn't pull back - he's a strongman dictator, his whole persona is a tough guy. If he gets his nose bloodied and loses massive amounts of troops, that will be a huge blow to his reputation in Russia, which he can't really afford, lest someone near him things they can do a better job.
It appears he's psychologically unable to back down. He must double down on every stupid idea, a problem more strongman dictators seem to have. Maybe he believes he cannot lose and will ultimately win if he perseveres. Or maybe he thinks he can't afford to lose because it would ruin his image and lose his power.
My mistake, you're right. But not Finland. And I wasn't counting Poland, which was a former European imperial power; I don't think of Poland and Sweden as being Baltic states, even though their coastlines are Baltic coastlines. In the same way (roughly), I don't think of Greece as a Balkan state.
> I think he attacked because he felt he had no choice.
The feeling of having no choice tends to be influenced by incentives, though. Had NATO mobilized 5 million soldiers in eastern Poland in late 2021, with the clear message that they would send those forces into Ukraine if Putin attacked, he would probably feel differently.
Personally, I think he may have felt "it's now or never". It appears he started preparing directly after the 2020 election, and he may have misjudged Biden, thinking him too weak to respond.
> That makes it sound as if Putin attacked because an opportunity presented itself.
The west still appeared to be disrupted by COVID. The US and allies sent mixed signals on Ukraine which were interpreted as the US and West will let nature take it's course. The opportunity was there for Putin, and he took it. Putin wasn't wrong. Evidence: Biden tried to evacuate Zelenskyy leading to the famous quote, "I don't need a ride, I need ammo." The surprise to everyone was Ukraine fighting back ferociously. Now, Putin needs to realize the window has closed, and it is time to stop the madness.
Of course he has a choice. "Not having a choice" is just his own excuse for the choice he made. He could have continued trading with the EU while investing in the development of Russia, but that takes actual work and isn't glamorous. (Not to mention that much of that investment would probably be eaten by corruption.)
I think he saw a rapidly closing window of opportunity. A successful Ukraine would be a threat to his own rule over Russia, because there are a lot of ties between Russians and Ukrainians, and Russians would notice if a more EU-aligned Ukraine is more prosperous than Putin-ruled Russia, and that would undermine Putin's story of saving Russia's economy (which he did, between 2000 and 2008).
With increasingly closer ties between Ukraine and NATO, and Ukraine possibly even joining at some point, he has to take advantage of the fact that Ukraine wasn't in NATO yet. And NATO didn't respond to him taking land from Georgia in 2008, and the Crimea in 2014, so he figured they wouldn't do anything this time either. Besides, he'd invested a lot of effort into dividing the EU and NATO: funding extreme-right-wing parties all over Europe, supporting Trump, supporting Brexit, all things that seemed to make the EU and NATO weaker. But he vastly overestimated our weakness and his own strength.
That wasn't possible, and as far as I'm aware it remains impossible for now. I believe it is a prerequisite for joining NATO, that you should be in control of your internationally-recognized borders. Otherwise, at the moment of joining, the whole of NATO would instantly be at war with Russia, because NATO's supposedly a mutual defence treaty organisation.
Same goes for Georgia, as far as I can see; Georgia's internationally-recognized borders place South Ossettia inside Georgia. But South Ossettia remains occupied by Russia.
[Edit] FWIW, I don't think NATO is in shape to go to war in Eastern Europe. Western countries took advantage of the end of the Cold War and the "peace dividend" to hollow-out their armed forces and ammunition reserves. As a Brit, I'm particularly ashamed of Britain's conduct, which has involved committing huge amounts of money to two spiffy aircraft carriers, which still don't carry a full complement of F35s, and which can't operate without a fleet of destroyers and frigates, not to mention supply ships. And a new generation of strategic nuclear missile submarines. Having a stockpile of 122mm artillery shells would be massively cheaper, and a better use of money.
> I believe it is a prerequisite for joining NATO, that you should be in control of your internationally-recognized borders.
It’s not a formal prerequisite, but its probably a practical one.
> Otherwise, at the moment of joining, the whole of NATO would instantly be at war with Russia
There’s no theoretical reason the Accession Protocol for Ukraine couldn’t specify particular territories as excluded from the coverage of Article 6 until some specified future determination.
It is, and that's at least part of the reason why when Ukraine asked to join NATO, they were rejected. But NATO won't rule it out entirely, and Putin took that as a reason (a necessity, he claims) to invade Ukraine.
> Western countries took advantage of the end of the Cold War and the "peace dividend" to hollow-out their armed forces and ammunition reserves.
Even with those cuts, though, NATO has a far, far larger army than Russia. And far better. Though ammo shortages are definitely a big problem.
I think modern democracies do a much better job of separating military and civilian leadership than dictatorships do. Putin seems to be too personally involved in micromanaging his war, insisting on conquests that are simply not possible (like Bakhmut and some other places). Hitler similarly interfered with his generals and hampered his war effort that way.
Zelensky is of course involved with the war, but he listens to his generals.
> "appear weak when you are strong"
That only seems useful if you want to lure the enemy into an attack in order to ambush him, but with our modern day sensibilities about the value of life, we prefer to have no attack at all. More applicable to us is "appear strong when you are weak", although such secrets never last long, so we prefer to appear strong when strong, in order to discourage any attack.
Also, Russia appeared strong while weak, and that didn't exactly work out well when Putin called his own bluff. Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army. And he believed the West to be weak (or at least divided and disorganised), so he attacked.
It's not that these concerns are irrelevant, but they're a lot more complex than Sun Tzu makes them out to be, and it's possible to fall for your own disguise. Or maybe the civilian leadership can fall for the military's disguise.