> *"in the absence of a law that compels us to write software, which is unconstitutional btw"
I'm not sure that's true. Consider telcos, for example. They're required to write software to make it easy for law enforcement to tap into phone calls, given an appropriate warrant. Telcos aren't just allowed to throw up their hands and say, "sorry, we don't have the capability to let you do that".
And regardless, the law need not compel them specifically to write software, it need only make them liable for any illegal material stored in iCloud, with or without their knowledge. So if someone is caught with CSAM on their iPhone, for example, and it's discovered that person had iCloud backups enabled (or whatever it is), then the government would have pretty clear pretense for a warrant to search that user's iCloud files.
Granted, Apple could then implement end-to-end encryption so even they would not be able to access the files, but that might not even be a good enough defense, if it can be proved that the phone itself had uploaded CSAM to iCloud.
> They're required to write software to make it easy for law enforcement to tap into phone calls, given an appropriate warrant.
Not exactly right. They are required to make it technically possible to tap a phone line, which can be as simple as giving access to cables. It's not necessary to give investigators a tap-from-home capability and free foot massages.
> it need only make them liable for any illegal material stored in iCloud, with or without their knowledge.
I can see a mall lawyer ripping up that requirement three ways - Apple has an army of way better educated legal representation.
There is also the issue that once the government had access, that the telco could not create a fake software layer to just use this excuse. And if they create a real and required software layer, then there was an expectation to have similar access as before.
This is great reason to never grant it in the first place. It forever locks access and security at that point in time.
I'm not sure that's true. Consider telcos, for example. They're required to write software to make it easy for law enforcement to tap into phone calls, given an appropriate warrant. Telcos aren't just allowed to throw up their hands and say, "sorry, we don't have the capability to let you do that".
And regardless, the law need not compel them specifically to write software, it need only make them liable for any illegal material stored in iCloud, with or without their knowledge. So if someone is caught with CSAM on their iPhone, for example, and it's discovered that person had iCloud backups enabled (or whatever it is), then the government would have pretty clear pretense for a warrant to search that user's iCloud files.
Granted, Apple could then implement end-to-end encryption so even they would not be able to access the files, but that might not even be a good enough defense, if it can be proved that the phone itself had uploaded CSAM to iCloud.