> If you are free and able to vote but won't do it, it's hard for me to feel too much pity for your situation.
What if I vote, but people with interests aligned with mine tend not to? What if those people not voting are acting as rationally as the people who vote frequently?
Consider these two groups, who get the same number of votes, live under the government for the same amount of time, but rationally have different incentives to vote:
Home-owner:
* Bob moves in, lives there ten years.
Renters:
* John moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Phil moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Mike moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Jess moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Fred moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
If we assume these people are self-interested, Bob will, on average, vote more than the renters, because Bob values future-Bob's well-being more than John values Fred's. It's only through the altruism of John, Phil, Mike, and Jess that Fred will get to benefit from a government that accounts for his interests.
It's also true that each renter has an incentive to vote for things of short-term value and to discount long-term benefits, so maybe it's okay that Bob ends up more represented. But "John isn't voting as much as Bob" isn't a case of John being less responsible than Bob. It's that they legitimately have different incentives.
> so maybe it's okay that Bob ends up more represented
In this example, I'd say it is very legitimate that the Bob has over time more influence how local things are run, since he's a long-time local that has to live with it. All the others are transients that come and go.
Collectively, the others live with it for the same amount of time. Their incentives are lower to improve things locally, but the impact on them is the same.
What if I vote, but people with interests aligned with mine tend not to? What if those people not voting are acting as rationally as the people who vote frequently?
Consider these two groups, who get the same number of votes, live under the government for the same amount of time, but rationally have different incentives to vote:
Home-owner:
* Bob moves in, lives there ten years.
Renters:
* John moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Phil moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Mike moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Jess moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
* Fred moves in, lives there two years, moves out.
If we assume these people are self-interested, Bob will, on average, vote more than the renters, because Bob values future-Bob's well-being more than John values Fred's. It's only through the altruism of John, Phil, Mike, and Jess that Fred will get to benefit from a government that accounts for his interests.
It's also true that each renter has an incentive to vote for things of short-term value and to discount long-term benefits, so maybe it's okay that Bob ends up more represented. But "John isn't voting as much as Bob" isn't a case of John being less responsible than Bob. It's that they legitimately have different incentives.