> Even in WW2 where air power was far more powerful, it's still debated how much it contributed to success.
The allies certainly had tactical air superiority in the last few months of the war, which hammered German Armour, but didn't in itself wipe out dogged resistance. The Luftwaffe was pretty scarce over the battlefields because it was occupied trying to stop the bomber offensive over Germany itself. The bombers themselves didn't really begin to properly dismantle German manufacturing until 1945. So air power did contribute to success in the end, but not as anticipated before the war.
Air power did little to destroy German industry, that is correct. But, and this is a big but, it was very successful at denying the German military gasoline, without which its military machine was crippled.
The Air Force was very, very effective at supporting the ground troops. Whenever the soldiers got stuck on the ground, they'd call in the P-51s to wreck whatever was blocking them. The tanks and Wiederstanden were highly vulnerable to air attack, as well as getting their supply lines cut off.
The Kriegsmarine's super battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz were destroyed by air attack. Japan's super battleship Yamato suffered a similar fate.
Germany ran out of gas because it didn't have a domestic source, and couldn't seize it in the Middle East, nor in the Caucasus region.
The Army Air Corps was decent at interdiction missions (trains etc.) and hunting tanks when given free reign; but they were tied to escort missions for far too long. Considering how much money and manpower was invested in the 8th AF, the returns were marginal. German industry was accelerating production until the very end of the war, and proved very resilient to strategic bombing.
The Bismarck, Tirpitz etc were all a waste of resources and never did much to influence the war other than to tie down the Home Fleet. The sinking of the Yamato and its sister ship Musahi were non-consequential to the outcome of the war.
Germany's oil supply came largely from Ploiești which was destroyed by Allied bombing. The lack of gasoline, particularly high octane gas, crippled the Luftwaffe. High octane gas, in plentiful supply, led to Allied fighters having a huge performance advantage over the Luftwaffe fighters.
The battleships did not influence the war because of air power. Without airplanes, the battleships would have carpeted the Atlantic seabed with the convoys that kept Britain in the war. The Yamato also became ineffective because of air power.
My grand-uncle flew in B-24s on the Ploesti raid (Operation Tidal Wave). It had no effect on Axis petroleum production. It's considered one of the biggest failures in WW2 airpower.
Airpower had minimal affect on stopping the Kriegsmarine from wreaking havoc in the Atlantic. The German fleet was too weak, in fact the sacrifice of the Hood led to the demise of the Bismarck. If it wasn't a torpedo from a Swordfish jamming the rudder, the rest of the Home Fleet would have crushed it eventually. The Graf Spee fared no better in the South Atlantic.
The Yamato (and Musahi) were part of a mistaken Mahanian strategy for a single decisive battle (akin to Tsushima) that would settle the entire Pacific campaign. What really one the war in the Pacific was the USN submarine fleet which put a stranglehold on Japan.
> Airpower had minimal affect on stopping the Kriegsmarine from wreaking havoc in the Atlantic.
This seriously underestimates it. Airplanes were effectively used to locate and track U-Boots and other ships, vectoring in a destroyer to sink them. Airplanes located and tracked the Bismarck, airplanes crippled it so it could not maneuver, and then the British navy pounded it into oblivion. Without Allied airplanes, the Bismarck could have sailed into any convoy and sunk it all with near impunity.
I.e. with aircraft, the Kriegsmarine could not hide. Neither could the Tirpitz.
The US wrecked Japan's fleet at Midway, all done with air power. Aircraft did a lot of the sinkings in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
The allies certainly had tactical air superiority in the last few months of the war, which hammered German Armour, but didn't in itself wipe out dogged resistance. The Luftwaffe was pretty scarce over the battlefields because it was occupied trying to stop the bomber offensive over Germany itself. The bombers themselves didn't really begin to properly dismantle German manufacturing until 1945. So air power did contribute to success in the end, but not as anticipated before the war.