> The author suspects differently, he does suspect a state actor behind KAX17. Do you have better Information?
FWIW, I also expect them to be a government... but not the NSA. They might not even be a government, though.
> KAX17 at times had bandwidth capabilities of 150 Gbit/s that is getting awfully close to the full bandwidth of the uni and would get noticed and shutdown pretty quickly.
You can do this with a botnet of a mere few thousand cable modems, which means that people like me (look into who I am if you haven't) can pull this in our spare time... it just requires being a bit evil, which these people almost certainly are.
> You seem to ignore the fact that running nodes with this capabilities requires significant resources.
No: I just have a realistic model of how large Tor is, which is "ridiculously small".
> If the tor network was big enough all this wouldn't be an issue, no need for any crypto currency constructs.
So, I did cover the things Tor has right now to get this kind of scaling, and while they aren't insane they are clearly precarious: they rely on the scarcity of IPv4 addresses and manual curation by a very small cabal of people whom I would not trust to protect anyone if actually threatened running on a handful of hopefully-secure machines.
If you correctly discount the weight of these precarious solutions, the size of Tor doesn't matter. If you want to build a system where it costs a lot to register a node, you don't do "proof of IPv4"--which might not make sense at all in the future and is easy to forge--you just do something as close as possible to "proof of a giant pile of cash", as that will always have value and always be difficult to obtain in quantity.
> Effective at what? Keeping the NSA out? I suspect the NSA (as well as many others) have a good idea about a significant portion of bitcoin ownership.
I don't understand this... maybe you are trying to draw some haphazard analogy mapping to anonymity networks? What Bitcoin provides is a distributed ledger, and having a sizable control of it isn't about deanonymization but about delinearization: if you own more than 50% of Bitcoin you can reorder recent transactions (which lets you buy something expensive and then undo the transaction). You have to analyze these systems by what they intend to provide based on maintaining their trusted subset.
Sorry if I come across too confrontational, but I'm really don't understand how your proposal offers a solution and I'm trying to understand it.
> > The author suspects differently, he does suspect a state actor behind KAX17. Do you have better Information?
> FWIW, I also expect them to be a government... but not the NSA. They might not even be a government, though.
> > KAX17 at times had bandwidth capabilities of 150 Gbit/s that is getting awfully close to the full bandwidth of the uni and would get noticed and shutdown pretty quickly.
> You can do this with a botnet of a mere few thousand cable modems, which means that people like me (look into who I am if you haven't) can pull this in our spare time... it just requires being a bit evil, which these people almost certainly are.
I would argue that the size of the tor network actually would be an advantage in this case. You would need likely need to double the number of nodes in the network if you want to provide that sort of bandwidth using cable modems, that likely would be noticed quite quickly. However I agree with the general argument that the tor network is way too small to be considered "safe".
> > You seem to ignore the fact that running nodes with this capabilities requires significant resources.
> No: I just have a realistic model of how large Tor is, which is "ridiculously small".
> > If the tor network was big enough all this wouldn't be an issue, no need for any crypto currency constructs.
> So, I did cover the things Tor has right now to get this kind of scaling, and while they aren't insane they are clearly precarious: they rely on the scarcity of IPv4 addresses and manual curation by a very small cabal of people whom I would not trust to protect anyone if actually threatened running on a handful of hopefully-secure machines.
> If you correctly discount the weight of these precarious solutions, the size of Tor doesn't matter. If you want to build a system where it costs a lot to register a node, you don't do "proof of IPv4"--which might not make sense at all in the future and is easy to forge--you just do something as close as possible to "proof of a giant pile of cash", as that will always have value and always be difficult to obtain in quantity.
I still don't understand, if you require "proof of giant pile of cash" you're reducing the number of nodes so how does that help?
> > Effective at what? Keeping the NSA out? I suspect the NSA (as well as many others) have a good idea about a significant portion of bitcoin ownership.
> I don't understand this... maybe you are trying to draw some haphazard analogy mapping to anonymity networks? What Bitcoin provides is a distributed ledger, and having a sizable control of it isn't about deanonymization but about delinearization: if you own more than 50% of Bitcoin you can reorder recent transactions (which lets you buy something expensive and then undo the transaction). You have to analyze these systems by what they intend to provide based on maintaining their trusted subset.
I understand bitcoin, but I don't understand what you claim it is effective for and how it is relevant for this discussion.
FWIW, I also expect them to be a government... but not the NSA. They might not even be a government, though.
> KAX17 at times had bandwidth capabilities of 150 Gbit/s that is getting awfully close to the full bandwidth of the uni and would get noticed and shutdown pretty quickly.
You can do this with a botnet of a mere few thousand cable modems, which means that people like me (look into who I am if you haven't) can pull this in our spare time... it just requires being a bit evil, which these people almost certainly are.
> You seem to ignore the fact that running nodes with this capabilities requires significant resources.
No: I just have a realistic model of how large Tor is, which is "ridiculously small".
> If the tor network was big enough all this wouldn't be an issue, no need for any crypto currency constructs.
So, I did cover the things Tor has right now to get this kind of scaling, and while they aren't insane they are clearly precarious: they rely on the scarcity of IPv4 addresses and manual curation by a very small cabal of people whom I would not trust to protect anyone if actually threatened running on a handful of hopefully-secure machines.
If you correctly discount the weight of these precarious solutions, the size of Tor doesn't matter. If you want to build a system where it costs a lot to register a node, you don't do "proof of IPv4"--which might not make sense at all in the future and is easy to forge--you just do something as close as possible to "proof of a giant pile of cash", as that will always have value and always be difficult to obtain in quantity.
> Effective at what? Keeping the NSA out? I suspect the NSA (as well as many others) have a good idea about a significant portion of bitcoin ownership.
I don't understand this... maybe you are trying to draw some haphazard analogy mapping to anonymity networks? What Bitcoin provides is a distributed ledger, and having a sizable control of it isn't about deanonymization but about delinearization: if you own more than 50% of Bitcoin you can reorder recent transactions (which lets you buy something expensive and then undo the transaction). You have to analyze these systems by what they intend to provide based on maintaining their trusted subset.