> Myth #3: Strong dividing line between diseases of the brain and body
> Everything seems to point to her being right on this one.
The problem is that most of the time people debunk this "myth" they are using some motte-and-bailey tricks.
First, there is no perfect dividing line between disease of the brain and body, but there is also no perfect dividing line between diseases of the brain and differences of the brain (do domestic abusers have bad character or a disease?) or between diseases of different organs. Nevertheless, it is highly useful to have a taxonomy of phenomena that cuts reality roughly at its joints. These divisions have important practical and moral implications, and they fact that there are gray areas does not mean the categories should be undermined.
Second, these seemingly scientific "there is no line" arguments are almost always used asymmetrically by experts to advance a normative position, e.g., my psychological disease should be treated like a physiological disease by the law and my friends because there is no perfect distinction between the psychological and physical. It is possible to go in the other direction and argue that many/most alleged psychological diseases are really just different preferences and should be treated as such; see Thomas Szasz:
This is just as well supported by "there is no line" argument as folks who want physiological-psychological disease equality. The reason the latter position is more popularly is based on values.
> Myth #3: Strong dividing line between diseases of the brain and body
> Everything seems to point to her being right on this one.
The problem is that most of the time people debunk this "myth" they are using some motte-and-bailey tricks.
First, there is no perfect dividing line between disease of the brain and body, but there is also no perfect dividing line between diseases of the brain and differences of the brain (do domestic abusers have bad character or a disease?) or between diseases of different organs. Nevertheless, it is highly useful to have a taxonomy of phenomena that cuts reality roughly at its joints. These divisions have important practical and moral implications, and they fact that there are gray areas does not mean the categories should be undermined.
Second, these seemingly scientific "there is no line" arguments are almost always used asymmetrically by experts to advance a normative position, e.g., my psychological disease should be treated like a physiological disease by the law and my friends because there is no perfect distinction between the psychological and physical. It is possible to go in the other direction and argue that many/most alleged psychological diseases are really just different preferences and should be treated as such; see Thomas Szasz:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5353517/
This is just as well supported by "there is no line" argument as folks who want physiological-psychological disease equality. The reason the latter position is more popularly is based on values.