If you re-read my post, you'll see, that we are not contradicting each-other.

If you have the time/money/infrastructure/knowledge/trusted_personnel to design/make/test/etc entire processors, then now with RISC-V you can in theory make secure systems.

Also remember, that your effort needs to already start at the level of tool-chain, and other tooling, all the way down to the transistor. Otherwise you'll have a trust problem with regards to your compilers/synthesizers/etc.

But that is quite a high barrier for entry for anybody smaller than a decent sized country.

> So, with RISC-V, you have even less assurance, that the processor IC really contains what you expect, and nothing more.

What you wrote, quoted above, has it completely backwards.

If you haven't produced the processor, and the tooling, and the base components all by yourself?.

shrug someone is wrong on the internet... you have a choice to learn something, or keep trying to pretend to have been right... nobody cares...

I enjoy learning every day. And -generally- I'd like to know, where my knowledge has limits.

You seem to care, and claim to be wise, so please, do enlighten me, where I'm wrong. We may be misinterpreting, what the other one is trying to say.

I'll try to re-word what I mean: If your "system" uses standard off-the-shelf parts (CPU/SOC/Mem/...), then the fact, that you can go out to the shop, and buy standard replacements, means that you can be reasonably sure to be able to thwart/detect a targeted attack on your supply-chain easier, than if your device contains a e.g. custom, specific CPU for that device, that could contain god knows what extensions to the instruction set, and that you can only get a replacement for from that one specific vendor.

Or where do I have dent in my logic?