I'm normally against prison as a deterrent because it is used against people where it wouldn't work as a deterrent. In cases such as these it might actually work if the execs of such companies were simply jailed for a very long time as though they were about equally responsible as a regular bus driver would be if they were negligent at their job and killed a bunch of people. It just might have a positive effect the next time someone thinks they might get away with cutting some corners.
I would support this sentiment usually, but in this case I don't really see a way to determine the chain of responsibility. Who do we force into prison in this scenario? The engineer(s) who made MCAS? Just the one that wrote the lines of code that monitor the airflow sensors? Do we also imprison the QA people that signed off on this? Why not also their managers? Who of the C-suite? Probably the CTO and maybe the CEO, but isn't their behavior influenced by financial pressures from the CFO. Maybe we should just put them all into jail? The FAA was supposed to monitor this stuff but didn't. Should they be jailed as well? How about any congress people that cut the budget for the FAA? The list goes on. There are negative modifiers as well: what if the person who made MCAS was a very junior engineer in his/her first week? Are they still culpable? What if the CTO can prove they were never involved?
I don't think it's all that easy who is responsible.
If the CEO's are held responsible for the deeds of the companies they lead you can bet that there would be an instant improvement of corporate accountability.
Will the engineers also be responsible? I don't see how any attribution of blame can work in a system where causes are very distributed, such as in any large corporation. There is no one person responsible and claiming there is would just lead to a different sort of injustice.
No solution will ever be perfect. But the present day one clearly does not work, it leads to endless games of externalization and avoidance of eventual responsibility.
I've seen up close what even a little bit of accountability can do to large organizations, something a bit stronger would surely still have a positive effect.
As for whether the engineers will also be responsible: REAL engineers already carry responsibility and do so without any problem at all because they know their fellow engineers would not do any different. Professional integrity that's called. Software does not even come close to those standards, nor does most of tech.
And aviation - supposed to be different - went downhill in a hurry in the last decade and a half, not too late to turn back, though for Boeing it may very well be too late to recover their reputation.
> You'd get no new broken airplane designs - which is the point of the exercise.
Nobody seems able to write software that doesn't have bugs in it, in fact it seems to be humanly impossible. So, if you're going to jail people for buggy software, no new software will get written.
Buggy software will happen. Buggy software that isn't reported when it should be, that isn't fixed, reviewed and tested shouldn't happen. Software development for aviation is pretty good, that's not where the issue lies here. The issue is a systematic attempt to circumvent proper type certification for a new aircraft, and downright trickery in order to pretend it's just a minor change to an existing aircraft when in fact the aircraft was substantially different from the previous one sharing the same type number. That's not an innocent mistake.
It is a minor change. There is nothing inherently wrong with adjusting the flight controls so one airplane flies like another. In fact, engineers try to do it, as it reduces both costs and accidents. (There have been many aircraft accidents where the pilot did the right thing for airplane X, but unfortunately was flying airplane Y. These happen even when the pilot is experienced and properly trained to fly Y.)
> Software development for aviation is pretty good, that's not where the issue lies here.
MCAS is a software system, and the rules programmed into it had human factors mistakes in it.
You might want to read Aviation Week, 19-Aug, for more detailed information.
That may be preferable to broken ones, but no I don't think that will be the outcome. The outcome will be that companies will still follow the money and that executives will make it very plain that we're all playing by the same set of rules.
Rules without accountability and enforcement are meaningless.
Charging people with crimes means they'll go to great lengths to cover it up, instead of fixing it. The aviation system is as safe as it is because the people involved don't get prosecuted for making mistakes.
Standing over people with a sword is not going to get you any risk taking. All aviation improvement, including safety improvements, will come to a dead stop.
> because the people involved don't get prosecuted for making mistakes.
And they shouldn't be. But there is a very large difference between 'mistakes' and 'intentionally circumventing processes put in place to ensure safety'. Having to draw lines is always difficult, but in this case the line has been crossed. Consider what Martha Stewart went to jail for, then compare to what happened here. If justice is to be observed as even handed there ought to be some serious consequences here, not some already rich guys getting richer with their golden parachutes, the irony of which I'm sure will not be lost on the relatives of the people who died.
The legal definition of culpable negligence is actually pretty straightforward.
I see no reason not to hold key decision-makers responsible for the consequences of decisions that aren't just misguided or incorrect, but actively and wilfully negligent of factual information - especially if they cause even more deaths by attempting to suppress that information and place blame on innocent parties.
