> You already have to operate as if an exit node could be bad, it's not that different.
Tor's anonymity is guaranteed by its probability and temporary nature of exit nodes. Every Tor client uses the same algorithm to select an exit node, and a single exit node in a circuit is typically discarded within a few minutes for web browsing. Further, Stream Isolation selects different exit nodes for different destinations. Effectively, it means the correlation between an individual Tor user and a particular exit node is practically zero (and tracking at Layer-7 is often better than breaking Tor).
It's like discarding and selecting one of the 1,000 dead-drops at a time, and all of them are being used by a million people. On the other hand, purchasing a VPS is like setting up a single, permanent dead-drop just for yourself. The correlation is almost-certain, and the cost of getting a new one is high.
It may be a solution to a very specific problem where pseudonymous access is needed, like using a VPN/VPS to bypass the Tor blacklist of your E-mail account, and ONLY TO ACCESS your E-mail account. But for greater applications which requires anonymity, or very-shortlived pseudonymity, it's generally unsuitable. You don't want to ruin your valuable VPS that you've spent half-an-hour to purchase via Bitcoin, only to bypass the blacklist of a random website.
Some may suggest a pool of VPS servers can be provided, and well, be purchased on-demand via Lightning Network's micropayment (old-school Cypherpunks will love this idea, the idea had been around since the 1990s, and has eventually become feasible today!). But it effectively recreate the Exit Node infrastructure that Tor is using.
Tor's anonymity is guaranteed by its probability and temporary nature of exit nodes. Every Tor client uses the same algorithm to select an exit node, and a single exit node in a circuit is typically discarded within a few minutes for web browsing. Further, Stream Isolation selects different exit nodes for different destinations. Effectively, it means the correlation between an individual Tor user and a particular exit node is practically zero (and tracking at Layer-7 is often better than breaking Tor).
It's like discarding and selecting one of the 1,000 dead-drops at a time, and all of them are being used by a million people. On the other hand, purchasing a VPS is like setting up a single, permanent dead-drop just for yourself. The correlation is almost-certain, and the cost of getting a new one is high.
It may be a solution to a very specific problem where pseudonymous access is needed, like using a VPN/VPS to bypass the Tor blacklist of your E-mail account, and ONLY TO ACCESS your E-mail account. But for greater applications which requires anonymity, or very-shortlived pseudonymity, it's generally unsuitable. You don't want to ruin your valuable VPS that you've spent half-an-hour to purchase via Bitcoin, only to bypass the blacklist of a random website.
Some may suggest a pool of VPS servers can be provided, and well, be purchased on-demand via Lightning Network's micropayment (old-school Cypherpunks will love this idea, the idea had been around since the 1990s, and has eventually become feasible today!). But it effectively recreate the Exit Node infrastructure that Tor is using.