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I now understand your first point.

> The point about losing keys is that if I can plausibly claim that I “lost” control of my key then I can claim that an imposter signed a message that apparently came from me. So even with digital signatures you usually need additional controls (hardware, processes, legal/regulatory etc) to really guarantee non-repudiation.

Depends on the use-case right? For example,foss projects use gpg signatures for non-repudiation and authentication,but they can also say "the key was compromised x weeks ago". I think there is only so much a communication protocol can do.

For where oauth2 would be used,I believe what some (like OP) want is session level authentication and non-repudiation. To say "I was really speaking to <other end>" as opposed to being able to say "Specific payloads and transactions with <other end> were really made with non-repudiability". For the latter,like you suggested, a protocol with awareness of the specific data,transactions and payloads is needed. Oauth2 and TLS are session aware not application aware.



Right. Most applications and protocols only need authentication. Non-repudiation is kind of an extreme security property, rarely needed outside of legal/financial transactions.




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