> See, that requires trusting that all CAs actually respect the CAA records. AFAIK, CAA records aren't validated by end-user client software during SSL negotiation.
I think the CAB rules require respecting CAA records? If a CA gets caught on that, they'll have some amount of hell to pay.
Client software can't go back in time to verify what the CAA records were at the time the certificate was issued. CAA records are not intended as a means to revoke previously issued certificates, only an indication of which CAs are _currently_ allowed to issue new certificates.
That said, I agree with you, but the general consensus doesn't seem to, that we de facto trust registries/registrars as stewards of domain ownership, so we may as well de jure make them CAs, since they already have an account relationship.
I found your last paragraph especially well phrased!
You're also on point regarding the CAA records. But to me the current system still feels too reactionary. I'd love to see a system where we need to put less trust in all third parties playing by the rules pinkie-promise. Diginotar, StartSSL and Symantec are all examples of CAs gone wild, and I think we've just seen the tip of the iceberg yet.
The CA/B mailing list can't do much about shady behaviour they don't know anything about.
I do trust in Mozilla to ensure that the game rules for CAs are strict enough that my trust in the green lock isn't 0. It's not 100% either but it's above 50%. When I connect to a website and it has SSL, I'm fairly certain it's the right place.
Most likely there will never be a replacement for it, any PKI requires some third party to vouch for an endpoint otherwise you get easy MitM (I believe there is a proof floating around somewhere from the area of Signal Theory).
I think the CAB rules require respecting CAA records? If a CA gets caught on that, they'll have some amount of hell to pay.
Client software can't go back in time to verify what the CAA records were at the time the certificate was issued. CAA records are not intended as a means to revoke previously issued certificates, only an indication of which CAs are _currently_ allowed to issue new certificates.
That said, I agree with you, but the general consensus doesn't seem to, that we de facto trust registries/registrars as stewards of domain ownership, so we may as well de jure make them CAs, since they already have an account relationship.