> Our analysis focuses on the AMD K8/K10 microarchitecture since these CPUs do not use cryptographic signatures to verify the integrity and authenticity of microcode updates. Note that Intel started to cryptographically sign microcode updates in 1995 [15] and AMD started to deploy strong cryptographic protection in 2011 [15]. We assume that the underlying microcode update mechanism is similar, but cannot analyze the microcode updates since we cannot decrypt them.
I was kind of disappointed this wasn't on a modern processor. Finding a way to hack microcode updates on a modern Intel CPU would be HUGE, both as an attack vector, and because the Intel ME unit is a binary black box that prevents any modern Intel CPU from being completely security audited.
This seems like a really complex addition to the hardware. My first thought was that when process scaling fails and IF instruction sets stabilize more, they may be able to remove this flexibility and gain some power/area/speed benefits. My second thought was - maybe Intel already does that when a CPU has been out a while, they could bake the microcode more firmly into gates after it's been out a while.