The EMALS system's big problems seem to be with the motor-generator-flywheel system used to power them. The ship doesn't generate enough power to drive the catapults directly from ship power. They have to wind up a flywheel, and then dump that energy using a generator when launching aircraft. The hardware for that weighs 12 tons. Whatever problem they're having has resulted in damage to the motor/generator windings, requiring pulling out the rotating component. This is apparently a difficult repair.
That has to create huge stresses on the windings. You wind up the flywheel, and then suddenly apply
field current to activate the generator. They may be trying to ramp up field current slowly to
reduce the stress. Some articles mention problems with a voltage regulator causing machine damage. Maybe the rotating machinery can't take a full-power turn-on.
Details on the system seem rather vague. Some published articles say there are four motor-generator-flywheel sets; others say only two. Isolating failed units electrically for maintenance is apparently difficult. Unclear why.
This unit "passed factory acceptance testing" in 2008.[1] These problems should have been discovered and fixed years ago. The manufacturer is Kato Engineering, part of Emerson Electric, acting as a subcontractor to General Atomic. They make a range of generators for various applications. So this is coming from a company with a long history of making generators. But generators are usually continuous-duty, not something that experiences shock loads like this flywheel rig. Apparently nobody insisted on some serious testing like running this thing through 50,000 cycles into a dummy load.
The linear motor of the catapult itself seems to be working OK.
The new arresting gear shouldn't have been a problem. That's mostly a paddles-in-water brake, something that's centuries old. How did that get screwed up?
Overall, the Ford series of carriers uses electricity for functions that, on other carriers, involve piping steam around. Most newer Naval ships are Diesel or gas turbine powered, and don't generate steam as a by-product. Nuclear plants do generate steam, which has been convenient for carrier catapults. The new British carrier series (if it gets built) is to be non-nuclear, and they want to use the EMALS launcher on some of the ships (maybe). That's part of a big mess - without a catapult, they have to buy the VTOL/STOL version of the F-35, which has its own problems.
There's an amusing book, "Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks", by H.G. Bowen, from WWII. Bowen was a U.S. Navy engineering officer and eventually was in charge of most Naval propulsion systems during WWII. He was a real hard-ass on contractors, and often sent back large, expensive items like final drive gears back as rejects. Admiral Arleigh Burke ("31 knot Burke") wrote that his ships wouldn't have been able to go 31 knots without Bowen's work. When it really has to work, you need people like that who can say no.
There was a plan for an upgrade, removing the ski-jumps and adding an EMALS.[1] This would allow using F-18 aircraft, among others. But that didn't work out.
The author of your link isn't taken seriously by anyone.
Adding EMALS to the UK carriers would only be useful for future naval UAVs. The UK really doesn't want to have to keep pilots current at doing conventional deck landings, it is too expensive and you can't rapidly change the mix of F-35 and helicopters on each carrier.
The sticker price of the F-35B isn't the real cost to the UK as it manufactures a fairly large part of it. The sticker price of the F-18E/F is what would have to be paid plus the cost of a number of T-45s for training plus the cost of replacing the results of a steady stream of airframe losses during normal use.
The expectation is that if the new carriers were ever full of F-35s then a fair number would have USMC markings.
Canada is trying hard to snap out of the insanity of the affordability of the F-35.. but pressures from local contractors tied up in the program are going to make it very hard.
Each EMALS flywheel unit stores 121 MJ.[1] This is roughly the energy in a gallon of gasoline.
Here's a big ultracapacitor bank, from Maxwell. This one is intended for temporary energy storage for buses, trucks, and trains, so it can take some banging around.[2] Capacity is 144 Watt-hours, or about half a megajoule. Weighs 64Kg, not including fans. So it would take about 250 of those units to equal one flywheel unit, for a weight of 16 metric tons.
The flywheel unit weighs about 11 metric tons. So using ultracapacitors increases weight, but it's not out of the question. Might be simpler. If the system were being designed today, it might well be capacitor-powered. No moving parts, unit-replaceable if damaged, and low-maintenance.
The EMALS system doesn't actually need 121MJ to launch.[3] Each launch uses maybe a quarter of that. Apparently the idea is to have enough energy stored for several launches on several catapults.
(A Marx generator is a setup for getting a high voltage at low current, by charging capacitors in parallel and then switching them to series. They're useful for powering some physics experiments and for making big sparks. The Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago used to have a big one, their old "Million Volt Lightning Generator". Not useful in this application.)
you are mis-citing Arleigh Burke's nickname. You are TECHNICALLY correct but quite misleading. The nickname was actually deeply sarcastic (at least initially). The design speed for the Fletcher class was THIRTY FIVE knots not 31. He was limited to 31 because of I think mechanical issues was the USS SPENCE. He was initially called 31 knots as a way of calling him tardy and slow..
from arleigh burke wikipedia
"He usually pushed his destroyers to just under boiler-bursting speed, but while en route to a rendezvous prior to the Battle of Cape St. George, a boiler casualty to USS Spence (DD-512) (a jammed boiler tube brush used for cleaning) limited his squadron to 31 knots, rather than the 34+ they were otherwise capable of. Thereafter, his nickname was "31-knot Burke," originally a taunt, later a popular symbol of his hard-charging nature.[2]"
This story lacks perspective. They are 25% over budget. For a government defense program that just is not that bad. The reason they are over budget is because they are using a ton of new systems and new technology and guess what it is buggy. NASA blew up a ton of rockets before they got one to work, and blew up even more getting them to work reliably. Given the new technology 25% is pretty damn good. They will work out the issues. There are numerous military technologies that where less then stellar in the 1st run. It is like anything else, it gets better over time and effort. If you say hey, this worked for the last 50 years we should not change then I guess we should be flying bi-planes?
Obviously we'd need expertise to tell if (say) the budget was already hugely cushioned in expectation of bugs so that the overrun really is outrageous. But agreed, this is not obviously bad at all, and the author hasn't given us detailed info to think otherwise.
More importantly: the Ford is the first in the new generation of as many as ten aircraft carriers.
Basically, all carriers currently in service are of the Nimitz class, and will be replaced one-by-one over the next 40 years with ships based on the Ford. Lessons learned and tech developed will be amortized over those future ships.
I think there is a huge difference between NASA trying to find a viable rocket design for manned flight and building an aircraft carrier - they already have designs for catapult and arresting systems that are much more reliable and cheaper than the new ones they decided to try out on the new class of carrier ( and using the same metaphor with NASA, they chose a company that had never designed a rocket engine to design rockets for manned space travel to put on top of a Saturn V stage 1), and if they continue to stick with the new unproven designs, they won't be able to deliver for many, many more years, if ever.
If they had stuck with the proven design with just improvements, they might have been able to deliver the ship three years ago on time.
The new electric only system means they committed to not routing steam from the nuclear power plant to the catapults so that would be a major retrofit for that one completed new style carrier. The new electric systems when they do fail, they disable the entire catapult launch capability of the aircraft carrier, the contractor made a really poor design decision here that they apparently cannot fix. The steam catapults can be taken offline individually and worked on, leaving the others in service.
The big issue is that the EMALS system is easier on the airframes. In a conventional steam catapult, the steam head hits the piston face at max pressure and expands as it accelerates the aircraft, but max acceleration occurs at the beginning. This means there's much more load on the aluminium components of the airframes. As aluminium has no elastic limit, all deformation is bad. The Navy goes through a lot of airframes compared to the air force.
The EMALS system is intended to spread the load out continuously during take-off so the max load is much lower, thereby dramatically increasing the lifespan of the airframes.
There was a more balanced story awhile back that talked about this in detail and it said they believe they can make software tweaks and a few other changes to resolve that. However they where not 100% and where doing testing.
They did not just say, hey this steam thing sucks, let's do something different. While a mature technology it has its issues. The routing of the steam pipes and battle damage issues, the fact that it cannot be tuned exactly based on weight load, etc. They had a reason beyond steam sucks. It will get worked out.
Yeah, it all sounds like tuning / refinement issues rather than fundamentally flawed systems. "Rip it all out and replace it with steam" is a non-technical kneejerk, not a reasoned response.
"This is the way we've always done it" is the reason why this ship is so over budget in time and money.
Anyone who has been in IT should have seen the story play out at least once in their career: some legacy system that's been hobbled together to keep running for so long because it worked... but now that a decade or more has passed there's finally some catalyst that says you _must_ upgrade. The problem being that now the upgrade is rip-and-replace rather than micro updates over time. That's what's happening here, on many systems at once.
#lean, #agile and the fundamental principals of Small Batches seem to be at odds with programs like carrier development and defence contracts in general. It's very unlikely that the lessons from IT fields will ever make their way into projects like this.
I can understand the perspective, too, though. Stuff has to work. You're not emailing a new build to them mid-cruise. This means there should be a large paper trail and signoff on any project, which makes any team hesitant to anything but incremental changes.
I'm not sure what the ultimate solution would be that keeps the reliability aspect but allows for more risky/rapid development.
"On paper, the Beiyang Fleet had the superior ships,[2] included two pre-dreadnought battleships, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, for which the Japanese had no counterparts. "....."Though well drilled, the Chinese had not engaged in sufficient gunnery practice beforehand. This lack of training was the direct result of a serious lack of ammunition. Corruption seems to have played a major role; many Chinese shells appear to have been filled with cement or porcelain, or were the wrong caliber and could not be fired."
"Li wanted to delay the battle against the Japanese fleet, thus allowing the Chinese more time to equip their ships with additional ammunition. However, the imperial court called him a coward and his recommendation was turned down."
"Defense spending analyst Winslow Wheeler concluded from flight evaluation reports that the F-35A "is flawed beyond redemption";[196] in response, program manager Bogdan suggested that pilots worried about being shot down should fly cargo aircraft instead."https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-35_Lightning...
I don't think U.S. is at the terminal stage yet, as Qing China was at that time - but it certainly rhymes.
Qing's warships are just good on paper, but the men in charge of them lack actual real-world experiences wielding them effectively.
While F35 Zumwalt Ford are all products driven by US military's real-world experiences, guided by their requirements, and addresses real issues. And I have no doubt that these weapons can be used effectively in their designated use cases.
Their failure is that the engineering work did not finish quick enough to land their impact in appropriate time frame.
Prompted by the November 22, 2016, break-down of Zumwalt in the Panama Canal with both propellers seized, Mike Fredenburg analyzed the program for the National Review and concluded that the ship's problems "are emblematic of a defense procurement system that is rapidly losing its ability to meet our national security needs."[93] After detailing problems relating to the skyrocketing costs, lack of accountability, unrealistic goals, a flawed concept of operations, the perils of designing a warship around stealth, as well as the failure of the Advanced Gun System, Fredenburg concludes:
The Zumwalt is an unmitigated disaster. Clearly it is not a good fit as a frontline warship. With its guns neutered, its role as a primary anti-submarine-warfare asset in question, its anti-air-warfare capabilities inferior to those of our current workhorse, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and its stealth not nearly as advantageous as advertised, the Zumwalt seems to be a ship without a mission.
The F35 was a Lockheed bureaucratic coup: they got buy in from the Marine Corps, which has very little organic technical prowess compared to the Air Force and Navy, by pitching the VSTOL version up front. Once they had buy-in from the Marines, DoD released a short-fused competition announcement, which gave the Boeing team very little lead time to produce a competent competitive airframe, the X-32, which looks like an obese guppy (1).
As for airworthiness, it should be noted Lockheed has no, no commercial airframe business. Boeing's commercial business exceeds all military programs in production scale. Observers of the competition generally agreed (1) Boeing could have produced better airframes given a more reasonable timeframe, (2) separate airframes (as Boeing proposed and eventually happened in the F35 anyway) would provide better performance per dollar.
As for the Zumwalt, I'll just leave Robert Work's paper (2) as an exercise for the reader.
The Ford is too big to say much of anything about "the Ford". Carriers are huge investments. On investment scale, it's equivalent to building a city from scratch. If you haven't been on one, you probably can't wrap your head around the scale of the thing. Nuclear reactors, an airport, 5-6000 people, enough munitions to level a small city. And it's own flotilla of warships.
On another failed warship note, the Vasa, built in Sweden in the 1620's barely made it off the dock before sinking but was amazingly well preserved. Worth seeing if you are in Stockholm.
The story of the Vasa is a great lesson on the dangers of changing specifications while a project is underway. Not exactly the lesson of the apparent debacle of the Ford, which is more a lesson on the dangers of using a lot of new unproven technology in a major project.
Yeah, I don't know why the littoral combat ship was such a big problem. It's for near-shore patrol, which has to be the easiest job any navy has to do. Even the really piddly ones have to deal with that, and they do so with a wide variety of patrol boats, corvettes, and frigates. The USN could have picked any one of dozens of designs in current operation, made a few tweaks for taste, and put them in service.
Wow, one of the contributors is Pierre Sprey. I would take his criticisms very seriously. He's basically the father of the A-10, which he came up with when he studied WWII records and interviewing soldiers the aircraft was meant to support. The Air Force hated it and still does to this day but that plane proved to be cheap, durable, and useful. The A-10 is pretty much the opposite of these fancy weapons projects.
I understand that ground troops love the power of the A-10, basically the "tank of the skies". Not sure why we can't have classes of distinct planes now like bomber, fighter, ground-support, and reconnaissance. Pick 1 area and be the best possible plane at doing that. The jack of all trades plane seems to perform poorly at all those things.
The USAF could transfer the A-10s to the US Army ( as has been proposed many times since the 1970s ) and focus on the supra-tactical missions, but that would require them to swallow their pride and end the Johnson-McConnell 'agreement'.
That dates back to 1966 and forbids the Army to operate armed fixed-wing aircraft. The USAF would rather keep the A-10s, no matter how unenthusiastically, than ever permit the Army to take control of the air-support mission. It is ridiculous that such 'pride' has any part in national security decisions.
The Air Force hates the A-10 because it's ugly and low-tech, and the AF is all about sexiness. The A-10 is the most Soviet-looking piece of hardware in America's arsenal. But it works very, very well.
Referenced from a recent HN posting on "What really happened to Vista" - seems amazing prescient about precisely this sort of situation, master writing and a super quick read:
Just a short sample (It's all worth reading - and it involves battleships!):
"...do you realize that there has been no basic change in armaments for over a century? It is, I am afraid, the result of a tradition that has become conservative. For too long, the Research Staff has devoted itself to perfecting old weapons instead of developing new ones. It is fortunate for us that our opponents have been no wiser: we cannot assume that this will always be so."
The wiki says it's 484 megajoules, delivered in 3 seconds. That is equivalent to 134 mega-watthours,
For a potentially more useful arbitrary metric, that's a bit less than two Model S batteries. Except it delivers all the energy in seconds, and charges in 45 seconds, and isn't limited to a few hundred charge cycles. It's a kinetic flywheel storage system, but I wonder if it would be built today using a giant lithium-ion pack (many Tesla PowerWalls, basically) or a supercap array.
I don't think this is that arbitrary - presumably the charge is delivered over 3 seconds, and the question is, how much power did that represent - 12,000 homes is a pretty good way of mentally visualizing how much power is being delivered.
I guess it depends on what you mean by "everybody would understand". Most people I know would get glazed eyes if I used terms like those. How many people really have context for understanding what those terms mean? Most people can understand what meter is since there are so many items laying around that are approximately 1 meter long.
You conveniently ignored part "without ambiguity".
I don't think it is much to expect that one would be able to connect a electricity bill where one pays for monthly energy usage stated in kwh to article where energy is also stated in kwh.
I think it is too much. I pay my hydrobill and I still have no idea how to visualize a hwh. However saying 12000 homes for 3 seconds makes sense for me. It is roughly the same power that a large neighbourhood would use.
Also, what does the ambiguity matter in this situation? This isn't a technical paper.
I'd wager few people look at the kilowatt hours on their electric bill. They look at the dollars. I know that my monthly electric bill is about $100. I would have no idea how many kilowatt hours without looking.
I work in the energy metering industry, but 12,000 homes over 3 seconds is still a more meaningful measurement of power for me than 72 kWh (or whatever the value they were trying to capture was). It really is a lot of power to send in 3 seconds.
We aren't fighting a major war right now. We aren't facing off against a similarly-powerful navy. So if you see the need for carriers at all, going forward, then now's a good time to experiment. Throw all the new systems in one carrier. If some of them take years to make them work right, well, we learned at a time when we could afford to learn.
They could have deployed something like 2 Nimitz class ships for the unit cost of the Ford (more when you consider the money spent on developing the Ford class).
I think we're at a point where the value of a traditional aircraft carrier is questionable (for the cost), and likely to decrease in the coming decades.
A smaller, possibly submersible craft that could launch and catch drones would probably be able to replace carriers in a variety of missions at vastly reduced cost. Pilots can be offloaded to military bases; launching/catching systems can be as powerful as the drones can be engineering to support, for shorter landing and takeoff distances; required storage space is less, crew is less, and cost is less for drones. DARPA has already done a little work in this direction - http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/darpa-develops-system-launch-retrie...
The counterpoint is that foxtrotalpha article where when we borrowed a Swedish diesel attack sub for testing and it managed to get multiple attack runs in every time in simulated attacks on US carrier groups without getting caught.
You don't need to sink an aircraft carrier, just keep it at long range.
A country like Egypt, Iran or China could keep carriers out of territorial waters or block key choke points in their region with diesel subs or mine. A moderate projection of force could block the straight of Malacca and damage operations.
Even if you didn't sink the carrier, you could wound it, which would be worse than a sinking in some ways. At best you can keep it a few hundred miles away, which will render its future complement of short-range F-35s safely neutered. Alternatively, you probably just need to sink a few container ships to get the desired outcome.
> You don't need to sink an aircraft carrier, just keep it at long range.
At which point you haven't neutralised it; it's just become a 'fleet in being'. You still have to account for it. You may be able to protect your home waters from it, but you can't project power when it's around.
Those are just the new carriers which can't be deployed until they can prove it works as long as the Senate (from the article) is forcing the Navy to do according to established protocol.
The military is always in a bind with contractor selection. If the don't choose the lowest bidder they get hauled up in front of a Senate committee full of people grandstanding for the next election accusing them of taking care of cronies.
Particularly at the rate we build ships these days, if you only chose companies that have done it before you're not going to have many bids to choose from.
No relation to the Ford, but speaking as someone who works for one of the big defense contractors the underbidding thing is a real issue. One of our competitors (also not related to the Ford) that stole some business from us a while back is currently eating some serious crow on some promises they couldn't fulfill... but they did get the contract. That's serious money in their pocket.
Likewise I'm pretty sure the average Dog Dating App startup has better equipment than we're given, although to be fair what we have does the job, just not nearly as well as it could. Not to mention the mountain of legacy equipment and code that no one ever wants to spend money to replace or upgrade properly (once again, underbidding). For every F-35 or USS Ford there are hundreds of smaller programs wither much tighter (also underbid) budgets that you never hear about (either because they're classified or just too boring for media coverage). But it has to be that way, otherwise we don't get the business at all.
Don't get me wrong I like my work and my coworkers, I'd certainly rather be where I am than Silicon Valley, but the red tape and budgetary constraints are a repeating source of frustration at all levels, and it sucks that there's not really all that much we (at least anyone remotely close to my pay grade) can do about it. At the end of the day it's up to our customers to set the bidding process and pick the winners. A realistic bid is likely a lost contract.
I've been there. This is not an easy problem to solve - they do have vetting procedures and sometimes reject bids because they think the contractor can't do the job. But companies are pretty good at making sure the boxes are all checked during the bidding process.
I had a relative in the Air Force, and his group was in charge of salvaging programs that failed because the contractor couldn't deliver. They would get half-finished satellites and boxes of parts arriving at the loading dock and then try to figure out what to do. Is someone criminally culpable? Can we do a contract to finish this, or do we need to start over?
According to him you could just never tell - sometimes the contractors you were sure would fail actually delivered, and sometimes the old reliables went belly up or just kept asking for more money.
Yeah I'd say the issue there is that traditional defense contractors are highly silo-ed, quality can vary drastically from program to program. I've worked on programs that I'd pit against Google and programs where the culture was a bunch of math majors who learned to code in the 70s and haven't updated since the 90s. Just last year I had to review a 500 line FUNCTION in NEW CODE.
Thankfully I'm no longer attached to that program, had to continuously bite my tongue and pick my battles in code reviews to avoid getting a reputation. Even nicely telling people 15-20 years my senior "go spend two days refactoring this crap" was a non-starter. To be fair the code did work, I doubt a user would ever notice. But I felt bad signing off on the review all the same.
I sdhould point out that not all the old-timers are a problem. I'm currently working with some 20-year guys who are VERY up to date and open to new ideas; and the company is trying to modernize from the top-down, but some programs have taken to it better than others and some have outright resisted. Given that these programs are only staffed after a bid is won, I'm not sure what kind of vetting process could catch these kinds of inefficiencies.
Is there some reason we can't make the penalty of cost overruns that the contractor eats it, with the provision that the government is not allowed to change the specs once committed, after a preliminary speccing phase where they work with a few bidders to see their proposals? I imagine that we'd start seeing much more realistic bids in a hurry, with potential overruns built into the bid.
Periodically we try fixed price contracts and it never really works out. It's fine if you're ordering hammers or assault rifles - something that gets built all the time in quantity.
But when you're building an aircraft carrier there are just too many unknowns, so you run into trouble in the very beginning when nobody wants to bid on it. Then if it looks like the overrun will be too large the contractor goes bankrupt and you end up with a half-finished ship and a gaping hole in the capability it was supposed to provide.
> The military is always in a bind with contractor selection. If the don't choose the lowest bidder they get hauled up in front of a Senate committee full of people grandstanding for the next election accusing them of taking care of cronies.
No, they (or, rather, contractors) solved that problem by assuring that all contracts are divied up between as many states and Congressional districts as possible, so that anyone in Congress attacking any procurement is attacking jobs in their own district, and cost controls are less important because the overruns are also producing work, often also widely distributed.
Of course, this also produces the problem (for the military, not contractors) that any attempt to impose accountability on contractors has political problems that are similarly widespread.
The military is always in a bind with contractor selection. If the don't choose the lowest bidder they get hauled up in front of a Senate committee full of people grandstanding for the next election accusing them of taking care of cronies.
Isn't there some famous economics paper somewhere that shows strategies like median bid produce much better outcomes?
Do you have a reference to this? I’m particularly curious if they address the secondary effects this will have on bids, and if the strategy then remains viable.
I partly agree, but it doesn't sound like the Navy did their homework to check that the systems would even work.
From the article:
> It was also supposed to increase the lifespan of aircraft by putting less stress on their airframes. Unfortunately, recent tests of land-based prototypes showed that the system actually overstressed F-18 airframes during launch.
How do they just now discover that? Nobody thought to build a prototype on land first before agreeing to put it on a carrier?
It sounds like some defense contractors sold a bunch of neat ideas to the Navy and decided they'd work the kinks out as they came up.
The other problem is that there just aren't many companies that build aircraft carriers, and it's a very small market. According to Wikipedia there are only 37 aircraft carriers in the whole world, so nobody's going to do the R&D if they're not getting funded to do it.
> Nobody thought to build a prototype on land first before agreeing to put it on a carrier?
The article does talk about "land testing" so I assume they have a mock-up somewhere in the desert to test this stuff in a place where failure doesn't send the pilot/plane into the ocean.
I think the problem is that they were still testing these technologies at the same time that they were building the ship, so now there's only so far they can go in modifying them from their original assumptions while still staying withing the power/space/layout specifications the ship was designed around.
Yes I believe this is correct. When they do get it working on land (http://www.henselphelps.com/projects/electro-magnetic-aircra...) it will very likely deviate so far from the original assumptions incorporated into the design of the carrier that huge retrofits will need to be made to the carrier to apply the changes.
Either they will do that, or simply cut corners and fail to report it accurately. This will fly under the radar until some tragedy. But the root cause of that will likely be covered up too.
A big problem is the concurrency of development and production. I'm unaware of programs that have gone right, but the more substantial boondoggles have had that issue.
The worst that can happen to General Atomics is that they don't get any new contracts after they're done building 3 (3!) fleet carriers. But building 3 carriers will give them enough expertise that they'll be able to bid on future shipbuilding contracts, and will probably land a few -- the Pentagon doesn't like letting contractors go out of business, and they'll recognize that General Atomics' giant Ford is at least half their own fault. It wasn't General Atomics that put out a contract for a fleet carrier that used every innovation at once...
Besides, I'm sure General Atomics had the sense to build factories in rustbucket towns and subcontract out to at least 26 states, preferably about half red and half blue; once your procurement system turns into a big enough jobs program, no one will dare to touch it.
Welcome to the cozy, comfortable world of defense contracting, dedicated to equipping the US to fight another world war, but only if the enemy is at least as cronyist as we are. The good news is that our only likely enemies for a world war actually are as cronyist as we are, or significantly worse -- but if any new Prussia ever rises in the world, we are _so_ dead.
I agree that the procurement system is dysfunctional, because of dynamics unrelated to suitability, but there are (at least) another two things in play:
1. Nobody really knows what you'll need until the fighting starts.
2. Once the fighting starts, the necessities of wartime production begin to dominate the necessities of peacetime politics.
But frankly, I hope never to find out whether the USA's carriers are necessary, sufficient or useful in a roughly-equal bunfight.
Any potential future naval conflict will be over one way or another long before any new ships are built. The construction lead time on those vessels is years.
Granted, but as WW2 demonstrated, there are industrial learning curves and economies of scale that can take you from months per ship to ships per month.
Not a perfect analogy in the details, but I think reasonable in the dynamics.
No this is impossible. Ships today are an order of magnitude more complex than in WW2. And there is very little spare industrial capacity capable of doing the specialized work necessary.
You're assuming that when total industrial wars begin, everyone decides to fight with only and exactly what they started with. That capacity never increases, that there are no learning curves.
From our sample set of n=1, this isn't realistic. Production would rise, by hook or by crook. If it ran long enough, you'd see carriers coming off the docks every month or two, with their battle groups completely filled.
You simply don't understand how shipbuilding works. Regardless of urgency or funding it takes years to scale up production. By the time that happened, any possible large-scale conflict between advanced near-peer adversaries would be long over. Modern weapons are just too accurate and destructive to make long wars of attrition possible any more. Within a few months one side or the other would suffer crippling losses and then have to decide between surrendering or going out in a blaze of nukes.
This article is a bit too one-sided for me to take seriously.
The cost overruns seem modest compared to what I see occur regularly in big aerospace projects (not just 25% or 50% but 300 or 500%). F35 cost is absolutely absurd, for instance.
I saw basically no mention of the extra capabilities that a fully electric ship like this could provide, it all was just a long list of down sides.
So in other words, just as the current Administration is finding fixing one ship will be met with great resistance, a war of buts, and gnashing of teeth the same can be said for any attempt by anyone in fixing the government.
there are just so many excuses to throw money at it and worse they are used to it. they purposefully create holes that are too expensive or painful to get out of.
being ex military and a Libertarian I always get the same result, we spend too much on the wrong stuff "just because". the sad part is neither party up there wants to fix it, it is not that they can't, they are just to invested in not
That has to create huge stresses on the windings. You wind up the flywheel, and then suddenly apply field current to activate the generator. They may be trying to ramp up field current slowly to reduce the stress. Some articles mention problems with a voltage regulator causing machine damage. Maybe the rotating machinery can't take a full-power turn-on.
Details on the system seem rather vague. Some published articles say there are four motor-generator-flywheel sets; others say only two. Isolating failed units electrically for maintenance is apparently difficult. Unclear why.
This unit "passed factory acceptance testing" in 2008.[1] These problems should have been discovered and fixed years ago. The manufacturer is Kato Engineering, part of Emerson Electric, acting as a subcontractor to General Atomic. They make a range of generators for various applications. So this is coming from a company with a long history of making generators. But generators are usually continuous-duty, not something that experiences shock loads like this flywheel rig. Apparently nobody insisted on some serious testing like running this thing through 50,000 cycles into a dummy load.
The linear motor of the catapult itself seems to be working OK.
The new arresting gear shouldn't have been a problem. That's mostly a paddles-in-water brake, something that's centuries old. How did that get screwed up?
Overall, the Ford series of carriers uses electricity for functions that, on other carriers, involve piping steam around. Most newer Naval ships are Diesel or gas turbine powered, and don't generate steam as a by-product. Nuclear plants do generate steam, which has been convenient for carrier catapults. The new British carrier series (if it gets built) is to be non-nuclear, and they want to use the EMALS launcher on some of the ships (maybe). That's part of a big mess - without a catapult, they have to buy the VTOL/STOL version of the F-35, which has its own problems.
There's an amusing book, "Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks", by H.G. Bowen, from WWII. Bowen was a U.S. Navy engineering officer and eventually was in charge of most Naval propulsion systems during WWII. He was a real hard-ass on contractors, and often sent back large, expensive items like final drive gears back as rejects. Admiral Arleigh Burke ("31 knot Burke") wrote that his ships wouldn't have been able to go 31 knots without Bowen's work. When it really has to work, you need people like that who can say no.
[1] http://www.ga.com/emals-motor-generator-passes-acceptance-te...