Tying in the US seems a bit forced here. WWI as a result of Franco-Prussian war I can understand, US civil rights not-so-much.
That Germany was 'destined' to lose is a non-starter anyways. From my understanding it was Britain's decision to enter WWI that really shaped the outcome, and that it was far from a foregone conclusion that Britain would enter a continental European war. If the British didn't get involved, Germany's chance of taking Paris is much better, denying the two front war Germany (rightly) saw as a worst case scenario.
Having read a lot of books on the lead-up to WWI, and a few more on the conduct of WWI myself, I must say that the entire thesis comes across as rather forced.
First off, it's rather well-known that Germany's fear of a two-front war and encirclement led to much of its preliminary war plan. On the other hand, the circumstances that led up to such a scenario were not preordained from its construction. It was largely a result of the early 20th century Germany managing to piss off just about everybody else with amazingly inept foreign diplomacy. In particular, Germany decided to give up its relationship with Russia, which France eagerly took advantage of and bound the two countries fairly close together. Germany's naval race with Britain also did much to antagonize it for no real gain.
Also, Alsace-Lorraine is much oversold as a cause of war. It's true that France did want Alsace-Lorraine back. But many in France were not prepared to go to war to actually achieve that aim. Instead, the situation in France post-Franco-Prussian War was to try to find allies that could help divert German attention, and their allies were the Russians who needed lots of help to even minimally qualify for that role and the British who went to rather great lengths to try to avoid actually fulfilling their commitment when August 1914 came around (Germany marching through Belgium gave Britain the political cover to actually commit).
As for whether or not Germany could win, that's a difficult what-if to answer. The Schlieffen Plan was, in the abstract, a masterpiece of precision planning and timetabling. But the plan also had very little room for change if things didn't work out. Belgium put up an unexpectedly fierce resistance, Austria-Hungary had a surprisingly hard time in Serbia, and Russia was doing better at first than Germany expected. In the end, the German momentum and logistics chain was incapable of carrying them to Paris, which completely ruined their plans and any hope of a quick end to the war. And Germany was completely unprepared for that scenario (to be fair, no one else was).
Correct, if Germany had continued Bismarck's foreign policy [1] then the next war (if it came) would have looked very different. Antagonizing Russia in the Balkans, France in Morocco, and Britain on the high seas were rather gratuitous moves between 1900 - 1914, driven by Wilhelm II's personality more than by any geopolitical factors.
It's amazing how much hubris it took to sink the Second Reich. As far as I can tell, Germany was on track to win the war as late as spring 1917. They had the resources and the right strategy: defensive in the West (retreat to the Hindenburg Line) and offensive in the East. The last crucial mistake was resuming unrestricted submarine warfare at the same time. This predictably drew the US into the war. By summer 1918, the benefits of defeating Russia and Romania in the East were nullified by American troops pouring in at a rate of 10,000 a day, and the war's outcome was pretty much sealed.
In mid-1917, the French army mutinied and was likely unable to resist a concentrated German offensive if it came; the British pushed on a major offensive in Flanders in part to prevent the Germans from realizing this. In 1918 (by which time the French army had recovered from mutinies), the Germans tried their Spring Offensive. And it failed for pretty much the same reason their original push in 1914 failed: their logistic systems just couldn't sustain the offensive long enough to prevent Allied reinforcement.
Even without US involvement, France, Britain, and Germany were effectively all devoid of manpower. Once the Spring Offensive failed, there really wasn't any ability on any side to carry on offensive operations, at least to the point of producing a clear end to the war. So the first country to fall apart from the stalemate would be the one to lose it all. And Germany certainly seems the strongest contender for being the first to fall. It was having problems keeping even its soldiers well-fed, and the Spring Offensive produced a very indefensible salient. Germany's hopes of victory died at the Second Battle of the Marne, and they probably would have died there even had the Americans not started streaming to the front lines.
Agreed that the French mutinies presented a unique opportunity for the Germans but it's hard to predict how it would have played out. Would the Kerensky Offensive have done better if the Germans had sent more troops attack the French? Would the French troops have rallied if confronted with an actual German offensive?
Regarding 1918, the Germans were pushing so hard and getting stretched because the AEF was streaming in [1]. (American divisions were involved in plugging holes at the Second Marne BTW.) The Germans had a superiority of 300,000 men going into spring 1918, and inflicted 150,000 more casualties than they took during the Spring Offensive. Unlike 1914, there was no rush to beat the French before the Russians mobilized. If it wasn't for the US intervention, it would have been offensive after offensive until the Entente caved in.
> Antagonizing Russia in the Balkans, France in Morocco, and Britain on the high seas were rather gratuitous moves between 1900 - 1914, driven by Wilhelm II's personality more than by any geopolitical factors.
Wilhelm II was even planning an invasion of America in the late 1800's/early 1900's, an attempt at gunboat diplomacy[1].
I really dont see how Germany could win in Spring 1917. The german generals had all the data and they were deperate, they launched all out offensives and stratrgy not because they thought it would bring sertain victory but rather because they were desperate.
>As far as I can tell, Germany was on track to win the war as late as spring 1917.
So did this fact provide the ground for the belief, which helped lay the groundwork for the success of the Nazi movement, that Germany had lost the war because it had been betrayed by its leadership?
That would be my feeling, although the German military was actually betrayed by the Germans themselves: the economy collapsed taking the government down with it.
I saw on an AHC program the German calculation about unrestricted sub warfare: that they could choke Britain in six months, but it would take the US two years to ramp up a real fighting force. So it made good sense, but a miscalculation in a different way.
It was a severe miscalculation. First, Germany already had a strategy to win the war - beat Russia first - and any attempt to knock out Britain at the cost of involving the US was a major distraction. Second, even if US troops took longer to arrive, the US Navy was ready to help defeat the submarine campaign right away [1].
Your version is a somewhat closer reflection of the version of what is taught in school today (ie. there is no magical 1869). However, the actual conflict was sparked over Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand's assassination. You excluded some fundamental points that help understand a much broader series of issues (namely, a very late unification of Germany causing upset in many alliances, region-wide instability beyond Germany and a crumbling Austro-Hungarian empire desperate to cling to power).
As an example, read Aethelric's post here as it is important in explaining the seeds that set Germany as it was in 1869.
The region we now know as Germany was a series of small towns with mostly independent rule. With instability (especially crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), Germany established formal alliances quickly as the political climate grew in intensity.
Franz Ferdinand was shot, the European states fought and the US (with late entry) injected fresh ideas, troops and supplies, which decisively turned the tides of a messy war.
So, 1869 was more like a traffic light that triggered the car crash. Without understanding the history, you can't really understand each participant's trajectories or motives. To limit the answer to "1869" is only slightly more informative than limiting the answer to "Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand's assassination".
Yes, Britain. We take it for granted today but Britain and France being allies was quite an amazing thing. They had been traditional enemies for about 800 years (let's not forget about the Napoleonic Wars earlier in the century either). The Crimean War in 1853 saw them united against a common enemy - Russia.
The Crimean War was also significant because Austria-Hungary, though not much of a belligerent, turned on Russia which left them without allies when facing Prussia in 1866 and of course the two Empires were critically still enemies when the Archduke was assassinated.
One can keep going backwards in history with cause and effect, but for the two points above, I like to see the Crimean War as the turning point of the European alliances that were in place at the start of "the Great War".
In the long run, Britain will always tend to ally against the dominant continental power. This is because Britain's enduring interest is to ensure that western Europe doesn't unite under one power, as this would threaten Britain itself. Before German unification, the dominant continental power was usually France.
(I believe this is also why Britain joined the EU in the first place - it's not a threat if Britain has a seat at the table.)
The upshot of this is that Britain was always going to enter WWI once it looked bad for France - if not Belgium, some reason would have been found.
>In the long run, Britain will always tend to ally against the dominant continental power.
Without that, the modern era would probably never have happened. That is because one state would have probably converted Europe into an empire, dominated by a single culture and religion, instead of the great competition of ideas and technologies that happened because there were so many independent states.
One could argue that the Europe of the many states only lead to the horrors and suffering of the world wars, while a multiculturaly diverse but politicaly uniform Europe, built by, say, Napoleon, could have been a United States of Europe. Not being a bunch of countries inflicted so many different nationalisms has worked pretty nicely for them.
I doubt that anything as diffuse as a nation will have a tendency that can be explained in such rational-seeming ways. It's possible that Britain tended towards jealousy towards the dominant continental power, but it is difficult to compare such a theory to reality.
The dominant continental powers have been Rome, France, Germany and Russia. Each have, to put it mildy, their own special characteristics.
* Rome conquered and held on to (most of) Britain.
* France was Britain's neighbour. Each was a potential invader of the other right through the middle ages and most of the modern period.
* Up to 1945, Germany was an extraordinarily belligerent power that made enemies of just about everyone.
* Similarly Britain was a rival of soviet Russia only as part of a broader alliance that went far beyond any attempt at realpolitik.
For all the noise and heat regarding the EU, post cold-war Europe is a remarkably friendly place. By historical standards, there is "against" any more.
The argument was that the US had gained a "defend the rights of man", i.e. Democracy, attitude because of the Civil War (though honestly with the early end of Reconstruction, I'm not sure it's valid). This attitude eventually encouraged the US to come directly into the War, though the US had been giving significant support to England and France prior to that point.
I agree that it's weak though. And Britain is definitely the reason Germany wasn't capable of overrunning France. America at best made it clear that Germany could not win. While 120,000 troops lost by the US is far less than the Europeans, that is by no means a small number, especially considering such brief involvement.
There really was no reason to ever believe the US would ever get involved in WWI. Even WWII there was no indication the US would actually enter the War directly until the Japanese forced the choice.
> Even WWII there was no indication the US would actually enter the War directly until the Japanese forced the choice.
That seems like conventional wisdom, but the U.S. started a large military build-up before Pearl Harbor. The military draft began in 1940. And of course the U.S. was actively supporting the UK through lend-lease.
There were still isolationists in Washington and even prominent supporters of Hitler in the public sphere (if you ever wonder how misguided people can be, remember that), but certainly there were many indications that the U.S. would enter the war.
But, until Pearl Harbor and the Philippines there was no clear pretext for the US to declare war. And had they not attacked, it's not clear that FDR could have gotten congress to declare war. Some of those prominent supporters were significant industrialists like Ford, they would have fought intervention by all means.
I've heard that too, but how did the draft, Lend-Lease, and the build-up get passed through Congress before Pearl Harbor if there wasn't sufficient support?
Maybe the first and third were seen as necessary to protect a neutral country? Or being short of declaring war, they were less objectionable? But I'm just guessing ...
> I've heard that too, but how did the draft, Lend-Lease, and the build-up get passed through Congress before Pearl Harbor if there wasn't sufficient support?
Lend-Lease had fairly staunch resistance, as it basically shredded any pretense of neutrality. The draft and the military build-up were supported in large part due to neutrality--the need to have a sufficiently strong military to deter potential aggression (this was the strategy of Switzerland). When FDR extended the draft term from 12 months to 18 months, it passed by a single vote in the House.
My guess is that most people were already aligned with the Allies, and there was money to be made. I think the arguments for Germany were less of a "let's join Germany" and more of a "let's just not get involved", thereby seeding the European continent to Germany.
But, yes the US had a constant stream of arms being supplied to Britain and Russia during the period before the war.
If the US's involvement was because of 'defend the rights of man', it sure took it's time getting properly involved. It doesn't even really make sense, because it's not like the Germans were going to enslave the French if they won.
During WWI and WWII, the US made a fortune selling armaments to the allies and then joining the war towards the end. In WWII we claimed an equal share of the spoils, at least in Europe. England, France, US and the USSR split the spoils of WWII but the USSR definitely deserved 3/4 of it for their sacrifice.
I always akin it to tag team wrestling. The first guy beats the other team almost silly, then tags out and the fresh guy comes in fresh and finishes them off.
World wars aren't a 1 on 1 fight though. WW1 was a 3 on 2 fight and the US involvement early would have made it 4 on 2, tipping the scales considerably.
Yes, but the US was staunchly isolationist during that period (since it's founding). In fact, the founding fathers wrote extensively about not getting involved in European wars; military isolationism was in our DNA. That's hard to believe today. Wilson actually campaigned on an anti-war platform (as did FDR).
... You mean apart from the Indian wars which annexed territory, the Mexican-American war which annexed territory, and the Spanish-American war which annexed territory? Then there was the War of 1812, where the US tried and failed to annex Canadian territory. Or the Barbary wars.
The US not wanting to involve itself in internal European wars does not mean it was militarily isolationist. The US has been projecting military power beyond its borders pretty much since its inception. Military power projection is in the US's DNA, not isolationism.
I would say that invading the territory of other nations and annexing it counts as involving yourself in the affairs of other nations. Historically, the US didn't want to interfere in Europe, absolutely, but it stuck its fingers in pretty much every other pie, excluding sub-Saharan Africa.
I mean, how do you characterise sending warships to scare Japan into opening up for trade in 1868 as 'isolationism'?
Isolationism doesn't mean never projecting military power, it means not getting involved in alliances that don't serve, or barely serve our own interests.
George Washington's farewell address addressed this:
"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities."
Thomas Jefferson said that one of the "essential principles of our government" is that of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."
Monroe:
"In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense."
Seward:
"defending 'our policy of non-intervention—straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations'...[t]he American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."
You seem to be arguing that the US projects military power in it's own interests. That's undeniable, but claiming that as a counterpoint that we weren't isolationist in the 19th century is not what isolation means. For recent examples: invading Afghanistan was for our own interests; we were attacked by a group sheltered by their government. Iraq was not. Syria is not. Balkans in the 1990s was not. Panama was because of the canal and trade routes. WWI and WWII ultimately was in our best interests but it wasn't obvious at the time, particularly early on, and the cost was immense. Right now, we are so intertwined in alliances that if just about any country goes to war outside of sub-saharan Africa, we are automatically at war.
Your definition of isolationism makes no sense. The alliances that France had with the UK and Russia at the start of WWI served France's own interests, for example, yet France wouldn't be painted as isolationist. Countries make alliances that serve their own interest - how often do you see countries making alliances for net loss?
And despite you quoting several people including terms like "forbearing at all times, and in every way ... intervention and interference", I have already furnished you with more than a few examples of the US actively intervening and interfering. The US not only meddled a heap in the Americas, but also outside it's own area (like the Philippines and Japan, already mentioned). Neither does 'non-intervention' square with things like backing Cuba in a war of independence against Spain. That's the living, breathing definition of 'intervention'.
You seem to be missing my point that the US was politically isolationist with respect to Europe, but it wasn't isolationist outside of Europe.
> Afghanistan was for our own interests; we were attacked by a group sheltered by their government. Iraq was not. Syria is not. Balkans in the 1990s was not.
This is all total propaganda. Iraq was 100% in the US's interests (or perhaps better put, the incumbent government's interests), and the US fabricated a casus belli to invade, against the wishes of its allies, and with no quality intelligence. Syria is a leftover from the Iraq debacle; the US would lose considerable international reputation if it just shrugged and walked away from the consequences of the clusterfuck it caused in Iraq. There was no alliance requiring that the US invade unilaterally in the case of Iraq, and the consequences of that populist action are now tearing Europe apart. There is more to national interests than conquering territory and acts of military revenge.
If the US got itself involved in conflicts that weren't in its interests, then it'd be much more involved in sub-Saharan Africa. Or filling eastern Ukraine with gung-ho marines and reverting the annexation of Crimea. I don't expect any nation to act against its interests, but if people are going to persist with the myth that the US really is the 'world cop', then it's a corrupt cop who looks the other way when there's no kickback coming its way.
England definitely slowed Germany down but Germany was decidedly winning.
Prior to US involvement, the front line was quite close to Paris. After, it was just over the border of Germany, and then as you said, they knew it was over. US' involvement was huge.
Well, obviously it was centuries ago but it has ebbed and flowed since then. For the 20th century though a lot of Scottish nationalism originated in the Scottish renaissance (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scottish_Renaissance).
No, the US broke a stalemate. The Germans were near Paris for most of the war - the location of Paris is what makes the Schieffen plan attractive. The US took a year or so to get onto a War production footing, but then her production started to force the issue. In combat, US helped to stem the German 1918 spring offensive, and were most decisive in the final offensive.
There really was no reason to ever believe the US would ever get involved in WWI.
On the contrary, I think it is exceedingly likely that the US will always intervene (if it has the capacity to do so) if a single military power looks like taking over most of Europe. It's why the US intervened in both WWI and WWII, and created NATO.
Absolutely. Obviously the Civil War did play a role (there's nothing in history that isn't connected in some way), but trying to set it up as a major cause of WW1+2? No thanks.
To me, the whole article seems to be the author trying to shoehorn history into his idea that the events of the year 1866 would somehow predestine the next half century. He brings up some interesting observations, but his main thesis doesn't hold water.
It's not even a case of "blowback" - such as could be argued about 19th century US imperialism and militarisation in Asia leading to it being dragged into WWII by Japan - his argument seems little more than the USA became a united country in 1866, and that united country would later show up five minutes before the end of two world wars to show Europe how it's done, saving everyone's ass[1].
By that reasoning, everything the USA has been involved in stems from "1866". Or various British Acts of Union led to two world wars. Or the Magna Carta, or the French Revolution, or anything before 1914 that involved any of the participants.
Furthermore, even if we un-ironically believe "1866" led to the US cavalry riding to everyone's rescue in two world wars, that is the end result, not setting the stage.
I know some people love to believe everything must revolve around the USA, but trying to argue that the two greatest events of the 20th century actually stemmed from 19th century internal American politics that meant relatively little to Europeans even at the time seems pretty desperate.
[1] Before anyone downvotes for this interpretation of what he wrote, he literally states the following simplistic, insulting garbage about WWI (where US involvement was barely more than symbolic): "[the USA] would intervene to defeat Germany just in the nick of time".
I wonder how he feels about the USSR intervening to defeat Japan just in the nick of time in WWII.
The US Civil war did preserve a powerful United States but its impact was probably much greater in showing how modern wars would be fought, with much less lining up with muskets and firing in orderly lines and far more repeating rifles and rapid movements. You could also say Sherman's march presaged "total war". Railroads and steam power changed logistics forever. The transition was far from complete though.
I still don't get how Franco-Prussian war was the cause for WW-I after nearly 45 years. Sure, French were pissed off with Prussia in 1870 but then almost two generations passed by before WW-I. The whole article talks about France and Germany as if they are each single person fighting with other and waiting for 45 years to take revenge. Lots of things changes during two generations - governments, art, politics, economies... So connecting dots like this doesn't make any sense.
Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a source of ongoing resentment by the French. As was France's loss of its status as the dominant land power in Europe. War was not inevitable, but the unresolved issues from the Franco-Prussian war ensured that the two dominant continental powers would be enemies. France's desire to be secure against Germany leads it to form an alliance with Russia, which then puts Germany in a terrible situation of being surrounded by two great powers. You're right, it's not like two people held a grudge for 45 years, but the war made it likely that the two nations would fight each other again.
And then the Treaty of Versailles went on to cause the forced repairations and subsequent hyperinflation and depression in Germany leading to the Nazi takeover and WW2.
An interesting anecdote, France weathered the world depression of the 30s much better than other countries because they kept getting reparation payments from Germany.
When I hear this I think of the main plot of the fantasy book "The Magic of Recluse" [1] where the increase of Order (good) came with the resultant increase in Chaos (evil).
The analogy is that the Allied powers could probably have avoided the post-tranquility strife by not asking for The German Empire could not give.
By creating this imbalance, they fed the very outcome they dreaded (another Great War).
In the Recluse Saga Chaos is not evil, and Order is not good. It is exactly that. Order and Chaos. Albeit most Chaos wizards tend to be evil, and most Order wizards tend to appear more evil. A lot of the heroes in the saga are actually Grey, or those who use a balance between Chaos and Order. Cyador, for example, was a decent empire despite being inherently Chaos.
You essentially argue that the alliamce system caused the WW1 but I don't think that argument works very well. An alliance system alone does not cause war. The questiom is why within a given international situation some people start a war.
The reason the relation did not change was not just Alsace-Lorraine, there are other issues. So I really think it can not be called a root cause of WW1.
I suppose it comes down to whether you're arguing what started the war or what started the world war. Without the alliances, Austria-Hungary would have invaded Serbia and that would have been it.
Other comments have greatly expounded on this, but I would point out that 45 years isn't long if you figure that government and military leaders would have been in their 50's and 60's and would have had vivid memories of such a drastic event, even if they were too young to participate directly. They could have also lost older relatives in the fighting.
I don't think you understand the extent of the distrust and resentment that existed between the French and the Germans. It goes back much further than 1871.
You could probably go back to the Middle Ages, but let's start with Napoleon. His invasion of the German territories officially destroyed the last vestiges of the Holy Roman Empire. This, of course, was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire any longer; but it did symbolize the national identity of the Germans at the time. (You ought to know that German national identity does not hinge on a political nation state but rather on a shared language, culture and history.) Apart from this abuse of national pride, Napoleon's armies of occupation were seen as evil oppressors, and his forced recruiting of soldiers for the Russian expedition didn't help either.
Napoleon's defeat, though a great relief to the rest of Europe, was a blow to the French pride. (As far as I am aware, he is still a national hero in France to this day.) It was followed by the Vienna Congress and the reordering of Europe, after which there was a period of relative stability. However, the distrust remained, especially as Prussia became more and more powerful.
Come 1871, defeat in the Franco-Prussian War was an absolute disaster for France. It was the greatest humiliation imaginable, both militarily and politically. Its armies outclassed, its king captured, it had to watch as the enemy paraded through the streets of its beloved capital. Adding insult to injury, Bismarck proclaimed Wilhelm of Prussia Emperor of the united Germany in the mirror hall of Versailles - the holy of holies of the French monarchy.
France could not forget. In the next four decades, it watched Germany's growing power with growing fear, seeking alliances to protect itself. At the same time in Germany, France continued to be presented as the historical archenemy. (In this period, a huge statue was built depicting an ancient Germanic tribal leader, Hermann. Symbolically, his raised sword points towards France.)
Everywhere in Europe, nationalistic fever ran high. The lead up to the Great War was an incredibly tangled mess of bad diplomacy that ignited animosity rather than allay it. Everybody knew war was coming, and nobody was trying very hard to prevent it. After all, they thought, it would be short, it would be glorious, and there would be the chance to right old wrongs.
When war came, almost everybody rejoiced. The Franco-Prussian war was still very much in living memory, and the military leaders of France and Germany were baying for blood. Four years of the deadliest war ever seen stilled the peoples' thirst for blood, but not the hate. Now it was France's turn to humiliate Germany, which it did it's utmost to accomplish with the Treaty of Versailles. (Signed, of course, in the same hall of mirrors that had seen Germany's triumph in 1871.)
France tried to ensure that Germany would never be able to fight another war. Of course it failed, and of course the attempt only served to increase German hatred. Hitler and his party then played a masterful game of psychology with the German people, in which the "shame of Versailles" had a very prominent part. War broke out again, the French defenses broke, and once again German soldiers paraded through Paris. Not one to forgo symbolism, Hitler had the French government sign their surrender in the same railway wagon that had seen the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne (which hat ended fighting on the Western Front in 1918). I need not go into the brutality of the ensuing occupation of France.
With this long history of mutual hatred, it is an incredible feat of the post war governments of Germany and France that they managed to forge a friendship between their nations. A lot of the credit is due to Charles de Gaulle and the first German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Their Elysee Treaty of 1963 paved the way for what has become a very close international friendship and the center piece of the European Union. But it was a long road.
> Napoleon's defeat, though a great relief to the rest of Europe, was a blow to the French pride. (As far as I am aware, he is still a national hero in France to this day.)
Yes, to this very day he has a tomb fit for an Emperor[0]. Established in 1861, only a short ten years before the Franco-Prussian War.
It does make sense. The antecedents of World War I can be traced back to the demise of Charlemagne and how he chose to split his empire among his three sons. Obviously there are many proximate causes that contributed to the outbreak of the war, the fundamental instability of the French German relationship is a huge contributor. The Franco Prussian War crowned what was essentially the anti-Christ to the French in their own capital and united France and Russia in containing a unified Germany's expansion
As I remember The Guns of August, The British government was not aware that its military had promised the French assistance, and did not intend to participate in the war until informed about it.
I imagine some rather awkward conversations took place.
That Germany was 'destined' to lose is a non-starter anyways. From my understanding it was Britain's decision to enter WWI that really shaped the outcome, and that it was far from a foregone conclusion that Britain would enter a continental European war. If the British didn't get involved, Germany's chance of taking Paris is much better, denying the two front war Germany (rightly) saw as a worst case scenario.