I've often wondered about that. In fact, I've come up with an utterly
ridiculous theory to explain it, which is total bull but quite entertaining,
so here goes:
My theory, let's call it Automobile Honest Aposematism theory (AHA), in short,
posits that market forces compell car manufacturers to honestly signal the
quality of their cars with the cars' design and colouring, or risk financial
punishment meted by disappointed consumers.
In short, producing a cheap-o car that looks like a Ferrari would cause
consumers to punish the car maker responsible, obviously by not buying their
product, but also these days by ridiculing the cheap fascimile in social media
etc.
In the animal world, it is understood that signalling of various attributes
(aggression, mating fitness etc) is predominantly honest, despite the obvious
advantages of false signalling, and there is work suggesting that this honesty
is maintained by punishment [1] [2] [3] (but note [5]).
There is also an alternative interpretation of AHA, the Handicap Alternative
to AHA (HA-AHA) which posits that sports' cars' design is an example of the
Handicap Principle [4], according to which high-cost singalling is only affordable
by the truly fit, or in other words, you'll only be flash with your car
designs and colours if you can afford to be flash.
The two interpretations are not necessarily competing: selling a cheap car for
a lot of money to cover the high cost of its high-quality, but dishonest,
signalling will very likely incur a harsh punishment by market forces.
And, er. That's AHA in a nutshell :)
____________________
[1] Evolution of Honest Signaling by Social Punishment
However, this is more applicable to cross-species, rather than intra-species,
behaviour, unlike in the case of paper wasps where it concerns competition
between members of the same genus.
My theory, let's call it Automobile Honest Aposematism theory (AHA), in short, posits that market forces compell car manufacturers to honestly signal the quality of their cars with the cars' design and colouring, or risk financial punishment meted by disappointed consumers.
In short, producing a cheap-o car that looks like a Ferrari would cause consumers to punish the car maker responsible, obviously by not buying their product, but also these days by ridiculing the cheap fascimile in social media etc.
In the animal world, it is understood that signalling of various attributes (aggression, mating fitness etc) is predominantly honest, despite the obvious advantages of false signalling, and there is work suggesting that this honesty is maintained by punishment [1] [2] [3] (but note [5]).
There is also an alternative interpretation of AHA, the Handicap Alternative to AHA (HA-AHA) which posits that sports' cars' design is an example of the Handicap Principle [4], according to which high-cost singalling is only affordable by the truly fit, or in other words, you'll only be flash with your car designs and colours if you can afford to be flash.
The two interpretations are not necessarily competing: selling a cheap car for a lot of money to cover the high cost of its high-quality, but dishonest, signalling will very likely incur a harsh punishment by market forces.
And, er. That's AHA in a nutshell :)
____________________
[1] Evolution of Honest Signaling by Social Punishment
https://ai.vub.ac.be/sites/default/files/camready_0.pdf
[2] Social punishment of dishonest signalers caused by mismatch between signal and behavior.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20727756
[3] A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper wasp.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15538369
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handicap_principle
[5] There are also examples of cheating behaviour that does not incur penalties; see Batesian Mimicry:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batesian_mimicry
However, this is more applicable to cross-species, rather than intra-species, behaviour, unlike in the case of paper wasps where it concerns competition between members of the same genus.