OMZ Global (AS34329) is an industrial process company (eg steel, manufacturing, ship building, etc). I'm going to assume someone who shouldn't have had access to BGP is trying to use it to block GoogleDNS or similar inside the corporation.
That or some pretty hilariously heavy-handed state-sponsored hijacking.
IIRC the only commonly access service hosted in that IP block is their DNS servers. There are easier ways to hijack DNS traffic than trying to hijack the entire prefix via BGP.
A casual browse through the other entries seems to suggest that people mess up BGP announcements all the time. My favourite one below involves the AS belonging to S & S Discount Market Pvt Ltd.
> A casual browse through the other entries seems to suggest that people mess up BGP announcements all the time.
While true, incorrect bgp announcements happen all the time, I think this is one of the cases that Hanlon's Razor probably does not apply: most of the time they are not a result of people messing up - rather the bad announcements come from spammers/malware spreaders needing new IP space because their current (likely hijacked) IP space has gotten blacklisted and is no longer effective.
I'd be willing to bet this is the case; this only covers 8.8.8.0 to 8.8.8.255 so not 8.8.4.4 so it wouldn't be that effective at blocking Google DNS; only 1 IP would be blocked.
Why would they be blocking it? Google promotes 8.8.8.8 as the primary dns server, and, as far as I know, as long as it keeps answering, clients won't fall back to the secondary 8.8.4.4.
Heads up this happened a few days ago, not currently hijacked.
Handy tool though, bookmarked it - using the event graph to display route changes as detected over time is a great visualization - would be really cool if there was the same event graph covering the entire internet (though I suspect without some cleverness in both design and implementation, the quantity of data would be prohibitively large for building a useful visualization).
These are often the result of mistakes. Even if OMZ were a tier 1 provider in RU, the impact would still be limited - I can't see how this could be intentional.
Roskomnadzor "works" by publishing a list of IP addresses and domain names for ISPs to download. A copy of it is leaked to http://reestr.rublacklist.net/ in real time. Each ISP implements blocking in its own way: DNS blocking, transparent Squid proxy, firewalls or nothing at all sometimes. Nobody really cares if something is actually blocked. BGP hijacking for the purpose of blocking websites is really unlikely at this point.
Yes, you're right, I thought it was like here, in Portugal, but they actually block IP addresses and/or use deep packet inspection to do it, as far as I researched now.
That or some pretty hilariously heavy-handed state-sponsored hijacking.