A portable computer people tend to fit into their daily life is their smartphone.
Android RISC-V port was demonstrated over a year ago. I fully expect some RISC-V smartphones will hit the market as soon as chips with high performance cores are ready.
Realistically, that means RVA22 (TBA in spring) + 6 month (assuming best case scenario immediate tapeout) + whatever time it takes to validate such a device built around the new chip.
I use a small laptop for pretty much all my daily life stuff. I do have a phone that I use for occasional mobile web access, navigation, etc. but my main computer is a laptop. I rarely browse or surf with the phone. I'd like to have a small linux tablet that I can use familiar dev tools on, but the inkplate 10 looks more attractive to me than this weird slab-like thing. The slab thing inherits too much from gaming devices, imho. Nothing wrong with gaming if that's what you're into, but the TRS-100 of yore was revered as a writing device and its keyboard was better suited for that purpos.
I am afraid data audit is not just about data changes. The real challenge is how to audit the data read which people should not do.
Since there is no redo logs generated for data read, CDC could not help in this case. It will reply on the audit traces, the SQL capture and cache, etc. But it's costly.
That should be captured in security, right? I.e. if someone has access to data the assumption is they are able to read it. Security audit can be done without the grain of select statements but rather the grain of changes to provisioning. Fundamentally, you have an issue even if someone did not actually read what they should not but could. Select audit can be useful for performance tuning but I would not classify it as “audit”, rather monitoring.
> if someone has access to data the assumption is they are able to read it.
This is not the case in most production for two major reasons:
1. Row-level security is expensive and hard to manage, so in most cases, users are granted the select privilege on table level. But indeed, it doesn't mean they should have access to all the rows in that table.
2. Power users should not have production accounts all the time. The production accounts should only be activated when power users have to perform the changes during the production change window.
So financial institutes usually generate two kinds of reports for audit/regulation purposes.
1. Report on the privileges and roles, which tells if a user should have those privileges and roles. This is a periodically static report.
2. Report on the actions a user has performed to see if these actions are part of the changes. This is a dynamic report in which we have to capture the select statements.
I can see the point around expensive row level security. Cannot see how it is harder to manage than to monitor though. Designing around risk acceptance of manual detective rather than preventative controls does not make this approach generally applicable or best practice, just a feasible one with conditions.
I now 100% feel necessary to build a Discord channel for OSS projects.