My M4 Max 128GB ... 90% of the time is like you say.
10% of the time, Windowserver takes off and spends 150% CPU. Or I develop keystroke lag. Or I can't get a terminal open because Time Machine has the backup volume in the half mounted state.
It's thousands of times faster than the Ultra 1 that was once on my desk. And I can certainly do workloads that fundamentally take thousands of times more cycles. But I usually spend a greater proportion of this machine's speed on the UI and responsiveness doesn't always win over 30 years ago.
If you take actions to deliberately weaponize your product against children in particular, whatever it is -- you shouldn't be surprised when liability attaches. That's what this verdict is about.
On the flipside, look at the success of TCAS. It doesn't have a perfect operational history. It hasn't completely eliminated midairs, either. But it took a relatively rare event and further reduced the frequency by about a factor of 5.
I wouldn't be so quick to rule out that there's some kind of relatively easy technological double check that could greatly reduce incidents. The fact that we've not gotten there despite years of effort to reduce runway incursions doesn't mean that it's not possible.
Yeah but TCAS works inside each airplane. ATC (and ground operations) require coordinating across multiple types of aircraft, at airports across the world, with high precision AND humans in the loop (there are A LOT of edge cases).
This is a REALLY hard problem that the US cannot solve alone. It would require extensive global coordination.
Not insurmountable, but this is not something you can easily roll out piecemeal. If even a single aircraft lacks the compatible equipment you're back to the existing system.
TCAS is fantastic - absolutely stellar example of effective automation.
But calling a replacement of major ATC functions with software a "simple fix" is a perfect illustration of why this is a bad idea. Nothing about human-rated safety-critical software is simple, and coming at it with the attitude that it is? In my view, as an experienced pilot, flight instructor, spacecraft operator, and software engineer, that thinking is utterly disqualifying.
Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL, which didn't prevent this accident.
I don't know. At some point, you need to do all the systems engineering. But "why not just ......" is a perfectly reasonable place to start looking at a problem and sometimes the answers really are that simple.
> Besides, there already are a lot of "simple" fixes in place for this problem, e.g. RWSL
It'll be interesting to hear why RWSL didn't help, as it is supposedly deployed at LGA.
Looks like RWSL did indeed warn for this accident. So maybe RWSL needs to be made more obnoxious (or just speakers in ground vehicles that blare when you're approaching a red RWSL threshold).
And, of course, training to really actually comply with RWSL.
There's a lot of similar history from early TCAS where it failed to save the day because of human factors, training issues, and tuning.
There are three categories of runway incursion types: operator/ATC error, pilot error, pedestrian/vehicle. Even if someone 'knows' that they need to "hold short runway 12", they can still have a brain fart and go through the hold short line.
Unless you want to argue that all vehicles taxiing have to operate (SAE Level 4) autonomously?
What you describe is a software Advanced Persistent Threat and not a "spy chip" as reported by Bloomberg. People have been reverse engineering firmware since forever, no any evidence of booby-trapped firmware was found or reported.
Us splitting hairs is moot: the claims of subversion - whether by sw or hw - were unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, and remain so to date.
Run continuously, non-delayed, but only sweep the order book at a random time every [1,2) seconds. Run for something like our current extended market hours.
Everyone gets the benefit of fast-enough execution and strong liquidity.
Crazy high-frequency gamesmanship goes away. Smart quantitative plays are still possible.
Diversifying away from NASDAQ-tracking index as a component of my investments will be extremely tax costly. Maybe more costly than the gavage (as the NASDAQ/SpaceX folks seem to be betting).
And most people won't even be informed that this is happening.
Large markets need to be run in the public interest...
> high-bandwidth, low-latency mesh network in a contested electronic environment.
Hard to win at jamming, when you're further away and the opponents are frequency agile.
1. They can use directionality more effectively to their advantage
2. Inverse square law works against you (unlike e.g. jamming GPS where it works for you).
3. They can be frequency agile, strongly rejecting everything outside of the 20MHz slice they're using "right now"-- and have choices of hundreds of those slices.
Fighters already have radars that they expect to "win" with despite that being inverse fourth power, a longer range, and countermeasures. They can send communications-ish signals anywhere over a couple GHz span up near X-band. Peak EIRP that they put out isn't measured in kilowatts, but tens of megawatts.
My concern is less total link loss than what happens under degraded or intermittent connectivity. If the wingman still depends on the manned aircraft for tasking or weapons authority, then the interesting question is how it behaves when the link is noisy rather than gone.
All the unpredictable and chaotic environmental influence is, being uncontrolled and unknowable-- effectively random.
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