Those are not really F-35 equivalents; they aimed for different points in the design space.
Both Russia and China cannot match the US on very low observable technologies, so they have tried to make the most low observable platform they could and then attempt the air combat problem with different technologies that they ARE good at. The J-20 has doubled down on having very long range, capable air to air missiles, as well as being highly datalinked with other Chinese platforms.
The Russians don't have nearly as good AAMs so they're just trying to be as maneuverable as possible.
I have a much higher opinion of the J-20 than I do the SU-57.
The Gripen is not a dual-capable aircraft, meaning it isn't certified to carry nuclear weapons. This makes it a tough sell to NATO nations who must align themselves to NATO's strategic goals [0], which call for nations to contribute dual-capable aircraft. Nor is the Gripen independent from US supply chains. It uses the General Electric F414-GE-39E engine.
If you're a NATO nation looking for a non-US jet that can satisfy your dual-capable needs, your only option is the Rafale.
I did not realize that, thank you. I simply assumed that with the bomber role came the ability to carry a small (<500 pound) tactical nuke. Is this more of a certification issue or an actual hardware issue?
It's mostly a certification issue. There are some hardware changes and integration work that has to be done, but the biggest obstacle is that the certification work is done in and by the US. So there's a diplomatic element.
But it did the most extensive flight test program for anything in history [0]. I worked on this program for years. I do not think a lack of flight testing is the problem. The problems are many, but in short:
1) Lack of competent, forceful oversight from the program office. DOT&E reports about the F-35 program have, for years, given the program office recommendations that it has failed to follow.
2) A prime contractor (Lockheed-Martin) that restricts access to its data. The F-35 program had to sue LM in federal court to get access to the necessary data to make the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE) fully functional. In the end, the case was settled, but only after six years of battle. The report linked in the parent article describes how maintainers are not allowed access to servicing procedures that they have on other aircraft. I have seen this personally in flight test. Even something like a gear swing requires an LM certified Field Services Engineer to conduct.
3) A completely broken software release process. For many years in developmental flight test, we received software builds that were just entirely broken, as in, the jet would not start with that software loaded. The C2D2 process was advertised as fixing this, but really it was just a new name for the same old fly-fix-fly process. The parent report details entire versions that were skipped in the IOT&E process because they were so buggy. The program could have turned JSE into the final stop for new software builds before hitting the fleet, but it chose to pivot entirely into training instead.
I could keep going. A decade working in a program like this gives you a long list of things to talk about. But I'll stop here for now.
DARPA's Air Combat Evolution program (ACE) began with AIs fighting each other in a simulated environment in a tournament. Then the winning AI fought against a human (USAF Fighter Weapons School graduate) in that simulated environment, and won. The company that developed the winning AI, Shield AI, has gone on to deploy an AI in an actual F-16 that has flown against a human in trials.
Many people underestimate the challenges of working in this environment. The DARPA challenge is like saying that boxing is the same as hand to hand combat. There are many similarities but the first has rules and parameters and the second has none. I find that people in IT tend to arrogantly proclaim things along the lines of, "I've set up a Kubernetes cluster. This can't be any more difficult." but it's more like setting up a Kubernetes cluster where you're paying someone else just like you to do everything they can to destroy it including giving them a knife and stabbing you. Then letting them loose in the datacenter.
I've worked with quite a few people who were part of the AI effort, and my current boss was the architect for ACE a few years ago. All of those people were painfully aware of the gap you describe here and were actively working to bridge it.
I'm sure you and your team were very aware. That was a very cool project and I'd be interested in hearing about your experience. My comment was more directed towards the armchair tech generals out there.
By the time the signal reaches your GPS receiver, it is below the thermal noise floor of even amazing receivers. But each GPS satellite has a unique pseudo-random code (called a PRN) that is within the signal. Receivers that listen long enough can pick out the PRN and thus the GPS signal.
I'm no GPS expert, I've read some of the theory had enough of a working understanding to deal with tactical navigation systems, but that was in my past. I remember using El-Rabbany's "Introduction to GPS" text.
The regime of steadily decreasing F-35 prices as new lots are contracted is at an end [0]. With inflation and the cost-overruns on the Tech Refresh 3 upgrade package, we are in a regime where prices will slowly increase.
My own engineering war stories are just that, stories. Any technical information I gave was taken from released sources only. I am extremely conscious of this
I went from doing things like I describe in the blog post, to verifying and validating the most complex electronic warfare simulation the DOD has ever done, to being a developer of one of the enabling technologies of that simulation.
I believe what I do now is important, but getting an issue past test and into the release that's sent to customers isn't nearly as satisfying as "I fixed the tailhook last night, which let today's flight test happen". I miss having an aircraft that I can touch.
