So people say. I suspect that as they are made in the same buildings over the decades or even centuries that the yeasts eventually become part of the local ecology and are thus quite stable.
> And if he isn't "annoying Steve" now he will be known as that soon enough :)
I once heard a guy — named Ed — who responded to a query about something with, "Well, I'm special." You can guess how he was referred to from then on ....
> It's not copy protection. It may change the structure and content of the page that is sent but that is not copy protection.
It is though!
Often news websites use the user agent to detect e.g. the google crawler, and allow google to index the contents of news articles; but then throw up a paywall when anyone with a normal browser shows up.
I recall some news websites tried to threaten people making browser extensions with the DMCA/CFAA as they considered it working around their copy protection to illegally gain access to their content.
>recall some news websites tried to threaten people making browser extensions with the DMCA/CFAA as they considered it working around their copy protection to illegally gain access to their content.
Source? I spent two minutes looking and failed to find anything like that, hardly an exhaustive search though.
Hard to argue a user agent could be DRM though, considering it's a string I the user send to the website.
You know you're in trouble when people start talking about forward secrecy being problematic. What you're saying about the "email-like use case" for cryptography is that it's unserious protection, because a lack of forward secrecy practically guarantees full decryption of the entire history of messages, for any ordinary participant in the system.
Sure. Because people overwhelmingly aren't relying on the security of their email; it's overwhelmingly stuff no adversary would care to read. Then they retrofit the UX requirements they have for those boring mails onto all emails, and suggest that encrypted email should just accept those as constraints, and then we'll declare victory.
Eventually a private key will leak, and without forward secrecy, that private key will probably decrypt all past messages to that person, and all future messages to that person, until they give all their correspondents a new key.
With email, because people quote when replying, you'll get the other side's messages too.
Like, the simple PGP-like system where sender encrypts message using recipient's public RSA key.
And of course it's not improved by switching from RSA to ECIES.
You need to ratchet the key, or double ratchet like Signal protocol.
I expect it would be far cheaper to scale up tempo/loki than it would be to even run an idle kafka cluster. This feels like spending thousands of dollars to save tens of dollars.
When handling surges of the order of 10x, it's much more difficult to scale the different components of loki than to write them to Kafka/Redpanda first and consume at a consistent rate.
I personally find the yq tool from https://github.com/kislyuk/yq much more useful: it has all the same options and formats as `jq` (as it's really a wrapper around jq). Rather than the `yq` in the OP here where only partial functionality exists.
e.g. some anti-virus software requires a kernel module; this adds additional attack surface
e.g. historically anti-virus engines have had bugs where e.g. when they search inside of a .zip file; their .zip parser was susceptible to a buffer overflow that would have allowed a malicious file when scanned to run arbitrary code.
e.g. some anti-virus software has a daemon that runs on localhost with an exposed port. This port receives RPCs. websites in your browser have been able to make requests to the anti-virus daemon.
