> Which is why most distributions and other projects has moved to WKDs for key discovery.
Yeah, WKD is a first-class citizen in GnuPG. Creating signatures with "--sender $EMAIL" embeds e-mail in the signature and then gpg --auto-key-retrieve --verify will fetch the key via WKD without the need to touch keyservers.
On first sight this looks interesting but Keybase is years ahead in the UX polish. E.g. on Keybase it's easy to see and add new proofs without a CS degree.
Allow self-signed certs and build reputation as usual. This would still require effort from indie devs to build reputation but as soon as more people start using your app the dialogs disappear. You don't need domain name, anyone can generate self-signed certs.
One variation of this scheme is making Microsoft the CA that issues certs for free with some issuance limits.
For the record Google uses self-signed certs for Android apps.
Physical safes don't lock things the way cryptography does. You can always get in, especially if you're the legitimate owner because that way you don't need to worry about doing it in secret and not making a lot of noise.
> Without compromising your security - I'd love to know how others approach their personal IT security challenges?
Most of my security is based on OpenPGP keys stored on a Yubikey. In case the first one is broken/lost I've got another one. If both are lost there is a master copy on an offline computer that can be used to provision more Yubikeys.
The key unlocks access to passwords stored in pass. Because pass is based on git and gpg can be used to access SSH then the same yubikey is used to pull/push changes to pass and read encrypted passwords. On both the laptop and the phone (Password Store).
Data on the computer is LUKS-encrypted, unlocked by the Yubikey. Full backup of my laptop's SSD is done via btrfs send/receive to a raid1 array of 3 disks (raid1c3) on a regular intervals. A small subset if very important data (documents) is also backed up via restic to S3 and Backblaze.
I try to "backup" as much of my work as possible by releasing it as open-source (where it's preserved by the Github etc.) or publishing it on a web-site (where it's preserved by archive.org).
> In a similar vein: what happens to my data after I die? How would my (non-technical) family be able to access my pictures and writings? A digital inheritance would be prevented in my security set if I don't prepare.
I've been thinking about this lately and maybe it's not a popular opinion but... would people really need your data when you die? I get access to photos (my SO has the PIN code) but everything else? Maybe this is just digital junk? Who would enjoy browsing terabytes of my data looking for... what exactly?
This sounds like my dream setup. Have you written about it somewhere in more detail or could you recommend some resources that you've used for implementing the solution?
> Most of my security is based on OpenPGP keys stored on a Yubikey. In case the first one is broken/lost I've got another one. If both are lost there is a master copy on an offline computer that can be used to provision more Yubikeys.
Sounds like a good start, I'm going to have to do much more reading on this, I use my YubiKey just as a browser 2nd factor for a few 2FA apps.
In general I'm not sure how the YubiKey stores keys and till now I had no idea you can backup YubiKey
> The key unlocks access to passwords stored in pass. Because pass is based on git and gpg can be used to access SSH then the same yubikey is used to pull/push changes to pass and read encrypted passwords. On both the laptop and the phone (Password Store).
I'm not sure about storing the master keychein file in Git, but the workflow sounds interesting (I didn't fully understand the paragraph though).
> Data on the computer is LUKS-encrypted, unlocked by the Yubikey. Full backup of my laptop's SSD is done via btrfs send/receive to a raid1 array of 3 disks (raid1c3) on a regular intervals. A small subset if very important data (documents) is also backed up via restic to S3 and Backblaze.
This is next level and not of immediate interest to me. I was looking at something simpler like: https://cryptomator.org/
> In general I'm not sure how the YubiKey stores keys and till now I had no idea you can backup YubiKey
Well, actually you can't. You can backup keys if you create them in software and then just copy then to YubiKeys instead of moving them there. If you do that in an offline computer there is no risk of any malware stealing your keys in mid-process: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21701488
Setting up Yubikey and OpenPGP took me some time reading all resources on the net but once done this is just working without any hiccups.
> I'm not sure about storing the master keychein file in Git, but the workflow sounds interesting (I didn't fully understand the paragraph though).
If it's encrypted there is no much harm to be done here. The only leaking info is that by default pass uses filenames based on domain names so if you have credentials for news.ycombinator.com they'd be in "news.ycombinator.com.gpg" file. For me a private repo for this use case is OK.
> This is next level and not of immediate interest to me. I was looking at something simpler like: https://cryptomator.org/
Yep, I do store external disk passwords in pass too. Udiskie can use a decryption command so when I put something like this in the config: `password_prompt: ["pass", "devices/{id_uuid}"]` it will grab the password from password store. This has an added benefit that I won't forget the password (it's stored alongside all others) and it's always valid (it's checked on each boot by udiskie).
I wonder if you push your Password Store to GitHub? Its encryption is based on RSA with around 128 bits of security with current keys. It's unclear if it's going to stand beyond 2 decades.
I might be paranoid but with clouds I would be more comfortable with AES-256. If RSA is a must, maybe RSA 7680.
For the record there are quite a few new algos in GPG, most notably ed25519. While RSA 7680 offers 192 bits of security [0] ed25519 on the other hand is offering 128 bits of security. GnuPG 2.3 will have ed448/goldilocks available [2] and that should offer 224 bits of security [3] so in theory it should be better than RSA 7680.
I don't mind putting my encrypted passwords in a private GitHub repo but I understand the concern.
It's still a thing for people that started using it when it was the latest Google chat product. It may be surprising but people just want stable chat experience not chasing whatever next product Google releases or kills next year.
(I did migrate my family and friends to self hosted XMPP server as Hangouts doesn't have E2EE)
I think what that means is, if you have a GSuite account, you can let anonymous users join your Meet. But if you just have an individual, personal account, you cannot.
So, if you are a G shop already, then it shouldn't prevent your customers from joining your meeting without having a Google account. But if you're trying to host that meeting via a personal Gmail account, you will run into a problem if a non-Google account tries to join.
Yeah, WKD is a first-class citizen in GnuPG. Creating signatures with "--sender $EMAIL" embeds e-mail in the signature and then gpg --auto-key-retrieve --verify will fetch the key via WKD without the need to touch keyservers.