>The #1 most authoritarian governments access chats is by forcing people to unlock their phone
How would you know this? If they access the data from the platforms server you would never know unlike with obvious forceful physical seazure. The point of E2EE is that the weakest link, the server, is removed. It increases the required threat model from simple dragnet surveillance to high effort targeted attacks. If the client is insecure nothing can protect your data and signal has said that many times.
I don't see how the debate about requiring a phone number is relevant to this discussion since telegram does too.
That makes no sense. If you don't trust your government anything but E2EE is compromised from the get go. "But they could seize your device" is not an argument against but for mandatory E2EE because it moves the responsibility from the server you have no control over to your device that you do.
>There is no security without anonymity.
You don't understand what these words mean. You can be surveilled 100% by bodyguards and cameras to be secure but have 0% anonymity (or privacy).
How would you know this? If they access the data from the platforms server you would never know unlike with obvious forceful physical seazure. The point of E2EE is that the weakest link, the server, is removed. It increases the required threat model from simple dragnet surveillance to high effort targeted attacks. If the client is insecure nothing can protect your data and signal has said that many times.
I don't see how the debate about requiring a phone number is relevant to this discussion since telegram does too.