The reorg of GM by the Obama administration does not tick all the boxes [1], but is the most recent example that would come to mind of government support via BK management and recapitalization. The administration did this to save jobs and the manufacturing supply chain [2].
Capital is made up, management is fungible, manufacturing supply chains and systems are the hard part (which is why, after incredibly aggressive financialization, Boeing is having to acquire Spirit AeroSystems, which had previously been spun out for cost savings...which went to management comp and shareholders). If you are optimizing for a specific outcome, it is important to understand the malleability and limits of the components that make the whole.
Even Elon recognized this during Model 3 production hell [3]. I suppose we must always learn the hard way for the lesson to be of value. If management is the problem (and it is very clear Boeing management is the problem), it must be replaced so that the people who do the actual building can build. This is no different than the tech culture of "employ great people and get out of their way."
If interested, Charlie Munger had a special take on the failure of old GM and several other things, including what was said about unions:
"General Motors, out of the profits of their good years, they could have bought, every year, for many years, a big company. They could have bought Eli Lilly one year and Merck the next, and United Technologies. General Motors could own the world. Instead, what they declared to their shareholders was a goose egg. They took the common equity to zero. And they would say it was all somebody else’s fault. The climate was bad, the unions got powerful. Those damn Asians and Europeans were too competitive.
The truth of the matter is, their very prosperity made them weak. The dealerships got in the hands of inheritors, and the executives on the sales field go around and drink martinis with inheritors, and didn’t pay enough attention to defects in their vehicles. And one thing led to another, and when they were all done the shareholders’ equity went to zero.
And that was in a company that at its peak was one of the most admirable companies in the world. Take the stuff that Boss Kettering (Charles Kettering – head of research at General Motors from 1920 to 1947) had invented in the early days. Kettering was one of the most useful citizens that ever lived in America.
A self starter on a car is a wonderful thing. Under the old system, you frequently broke your arm. You would give it a crank and it would answer back by spinning backwards and breaking your arm. I would much rather push a button than have my arm broken. Nor do I have the opportunity to go and crank in the sleet and snow." [0]
Capital is made up, management is fungible, manufacturing supply chains and systems are the hard part (which is why, after incredibly aggressive financialization, Boeing is having to acquire Spirit AeroSystems, which had previously been spun out for cost savings...which went to management comp and shareholders). If you are optimizing for a specific outcome, it is important to understand the malleability and limits of the components that make the whole.
Even Elon recognized this during Model 3 production hell [3]. I suppose we must always learn the hard way for the lesson to be of value. If management is the problem (and it is very clear Boeing management is the problem), it must be replaced so that the people who do the actual building can build. This is no different than the tech culture of "employ great people and get out of their way."
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Motors_Chapter_11_reor...
[2] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/jobs/rescuing-t...
[3] https://x.com/elonmusk/status/984882630947753984 ("Yes, excessive automation at Tesla was a mistake. To be precise, my mistake. Humans are underrated.")