The official argument is that fining public institutions is a game of taking from the right pocket to put in the left pocket. It's the state fining itself. Also, officially, public servants are thought to obey the law as a matter of cause. A certain interpretation of the law can just be made an official order to all subordinate government agencies, and any civil servant disobeying that interpretation is at fault for not performing their duties and treated accordingly.
However, that all leads to the obvious workarounds: the official interpretation is usually the most lenient possible, compliance is put off to some time next century due to lack of personell/budget/willpower. And if something is found to be amiss, the data protection officer may order a government agency to fix whatever is wrong, but can neither fine nor discipline a civil servant. Because disciplining is up to the direct disciplinary superior, which cannot be (due to them being independent) the data protection officer.
However, that all leads to the obvious workarounds: the official interpretation is usually the most lenient possible, compliance is put off to some time next century due to lack of personell/budget/willpower. And if something is found to be amiss, the data protection officer may order a government agency to fix whatever is wrong, but can neither fine nor discipline a civil servant. Because disciplining is up to the direct disciplinary superior, which cannot be (due to them being independent) the data protection officer.