In practice, the real number is probably closer to 36% than to 65% (and likely even lower).
Here's the problem: the article doesn't account for the capacity factors of the various new installed sources they mention [1]. A capacity factor is the actual electrical energy produced by a generating unit, divided by the maximum possible electrical energy that generating unit could have produced if it were operating continuously at full power. And under real-world conditions, most renewable energy sources produce at far below their theoretical capacity maximum.
For example: wind turbines have a capacity factor around 36%, and solar installations are under 25% [2]. If we apply these factors to correct the numbers in the article, the picture becomes much bleaker: the headline 1475 MW of new wind capacity drops to just 531 MW, while the headline 2530 MW of installed solar drops to 632 MW. Now let's generously assume that the 100 MW of hydro and 29 MW of biomass from the article both operate at a 100% capacity factor. Under those assumptions, total new installed renewable capacity drops from 4134 MW to 1292 MW — more than threefold. [3]
And of course, the real-world shortfall is even worse than this. Electricity markets need to clear continuously, and the capacity factor for solar when the sun isn't shining is not 25%, but 0%. That means if the hours of peak demand coincide with hours during which solar is offline (which they do during much of the year) there is no amount of solar you can install that will keep the grid online. To sum up: there is no way to escape the need for reliable baseload power. [4]
[1] At least, the article doesn't mention correcting for capacity factors. And the FERC source document it cites gives me a blank page when I click on it in Firefox, meaning there is no way to be sure whether anyone applied this correction. I'm assuming they didn't, because citing high "headline" capacity numbers like this is unfortunately very common in discussions about renewable energy sources.
The author is too optimistic. There are going to be continuous waves of mass firings of tenured faculty in the 2030s and 2040s.
The overwork and stress culture are going to get much worse over the next quarter century. The problem is structural, not cultural, and there isn't much that academics are going to be able to do in order to combat the problem.
Specific to the USA, but also true in much of the west:
1. Revenue is a huge problem, which means academia will become a zero-sum game even (especially!) for higher-compensated labor. Academia's revenue streams come from three sources that are decreasing in real terms. Those revenue streams will likely begin decreasing even in nominal terms even as inflation reaches a higher steady-state! Government budgets for higher education and academic R&D are more likely to decrease than to increase, and even if they increase almost certainly won't keep up with inflation. Meanwhile, due to demographics, the USA in particular is about to enter a period of decreasing college enrollments (unless the percent of the college-going population can increase substantially, which is unlikely).
2. There is an oversupply of academic labor and labor is the primary controllable expense.
3. Some of these problems used to be manageable because academics controlled the institutions that employed them. But the management culture of universities is becoming professionalized. This means that academics are losing institutional influence that would allow them to maintain good working conditions even in the face of unfavorable market conditions.
I don't think we should give young academics feel good advice like "don't work too hard". What we should be telling them is that even if they bust their ass and get tenure, it's very likely that their pay will languish and they will live in fear of layoffs despite being tenured and working at a steep discount to pay in other industries.
Academia is just another industry, and it's entering a period of secular decline. That situation is never fun for the foot soldiers.
